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At the heart of this thesis is the following question: why do we categorise two
objects (e.g., an apple and a banana) as instances of the same concept (e.g., the
concept fruit) despite their perceptual differences? This is the problem of per-
ceptual categorisation. One way of dealing with this problem is to appeal to the
notion of psychological similarity: the apple and the banana belong to the same
concept because they look similar. However, there is no scientific agreement on
what entity or mechanism the notion of psychological similarity refers to and how
this notion explains our ability to categorise both objects as fruit. A promising
alternative approach to the problem is Bayesian modelling, whereby perceptual
categorisation is analysed as a generalisation and concept-learning task: when
categorising the apple and the banana as fruit, we compute the conditional
probability that the banana is an instance of the concept fruit, given the back-
ground knowledge that the apple is an instance of this concept.
This thesis argues for a combination of a Bayesian and a similarity-based ap-
proach to perceptual categorisation. I argue that a Bayesian model of concept
learning by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) can help us to comprehend a va-
riety of behaviours associated with perceptual categorisation. These were diffi-
cult to understand in light of two previous competing theories of psychological
similarity—Shepard’s (1987) geometric and Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching
theories. One of the behaviours that the Bayesian model can help us comprehend
is the tendency to, for example, seek out mushrooms that look similar to edible
ones and avoid those that look different from edible ones. The Bayesian model
can help us understand why this tendency becomes stronger or weaker depending
on how similar or different the mushrooms are. Another of these behaviours is a
‘directionality effect’: we are sometimes more likely to judge Tel Aviv to be sim-
ilar to New York than vice versa. I argue that the Bayesian approach predicts,
systematises and summarises the data on both types of behaviours, whereby it
becomes a useful tool to understand perceptual categorisation as a unified phe-
nomenon.
The second argument is that the advocated Bayesian approach implicitly relies
on a theory of psychological similarity when characterising the hypotheses in
the Bayesian inference of perceptual categories. The role of such a similarity-
based theory is to explain how a concept such as fruit should be represented
in a Bayesian model and how this concept’s representational content is active in





My thesis is a philosophical analysis of categorisation. For example, when we see
an apple and a banana, we categorise them both as fruit. Why? I look at two
types of answers to this question. One answer is similarity-based: we categorise
the apple and the banana both as fruit because they taste similar (e.g., both are
sweet). The other answer refers to probabilities: we categorise the apple and
the banana as fruit because when we find apples, it is probable that we will find
bananas as well (e.g., when we are in the supermarket).
It is not clear how these two kinds of answers can be combined. In my thesis,
I propose one way in which we can combine a similarity-based answer with a
probabilistic answer to the question of why we tend to categorise our perceptual
experiences in this way. In Part I, I contrast and compare two fundamental models
of similarity in computational-cognitive psychology—Shepard’s (1987) geometric
model of similarity and Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching model of similarity.
I make explicit that there is a conflict between the theoretical assumptions of
these models, which leads them to apparently incompatible empirical predictions
about similarity and categorisation. For example, one of these predictions is that
our tendency to categorise two objects as the same decreases exponentially with
a decrease in their similarity, a finding which is commonly referred to as the
‘Universal Law of Generalisation’. The other prediction is that similarity and
categorisation depend on the context, and in particular, on the direction of a
comparison. For example, people typically judge Tel Aviv to be more similar to
New York than vice versa. Neither of the theories of similarity can explain both
of these findings at the same time.
In Part II, I evaluate a Bayesian model of concept learning by Tenenbaum and
Griffiths (2001). I defend three philosophical criteria of unification and argue
that this model meets these criteria. Thereby, it unifies these predictions and
resolves the apparent incompatibility between them. On this basis, I propose
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T&G: Tenenbaum & Griffiths
C&H: Colombo & Hartmann
G&K: Guttman & Kalish
ULG: Universal Law of Generalisation
MDS: Multi-Dimensional Scaling
Notational conventions
Throughout the monograph, and if not otherwise specified, I use small capitals to
refer to concepts. I use single quotation marks to indicate oral, written or gestured
expressions. I use italics to express emphasis. For instance, if I want to stress
the difference between concepts and categorisation I write ‘concepts are mental
representations whereas categorisation is the performance of grouping perceptual
experiences into kinds that can form such mental representations.’ Except for
block quotes, I use double quotation marks to quote.
Preliminary remarks and terminological clarifications
Perceptual categorisation versus perception
The difference between perceptual categorisation (PC) and perception can be
analysed as a distinction between two problems. PC is the problem of learning
a cognitive category, where this representation also contains information about
possible future members of the category. To approach the problem of PC, an agent
must compare perceptual experiences associated with at least two perceptual
stimuli. For example, categorising an apple as edible involves deciding that one
can possibly eat it or that it will be edible, based on previous experiences with
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apples that were edible as well. Thus, PC requires the imagination of possible
states of objects that belong to a category (what edible objects are like) on the
basis of comparisons across the perception of individual instances of a category
(edible apples). This description of a perceptual category comes close to Carnap’s
(1988) notion of the intension of a concept.
This ‘imagistic’ aspect of PC can be detached from the immediate perceptual
experience that comes with object perception, which is the problem of finding a
stable representation from a mess of varying sensory inputs to the perceiving sys-
tem (e.g., the visual system). For example, perceiving an apple requires, among
other things, representing the constancy of its colour and distinguishing its figure
from its surrounding background (Wertheimer, 1923/2013). In this sense, the
ability to perceive is bound to the immediate perceptual experience of a percep-
tual stimulus (e.g., the apple) but PC is not.
There are two sorts of relations between PC and perception. On the one hand,
PC directly and necessarily relies on perceptual abilities but perception does not
directly rely on the ability to perceptually categorise. For example, it is impossible
to categorise a mushroom as edible without ever having tasted a mushroom in the
past whose edibility can be taken as a standard of comparison for future instances
of edible mushrooms. On the other hand, it is possible to perceive a mushroom
without categorising it as edible.
On the other hand, PC can facilitate perception in the sense that it makes per-
ception more discriminative. A pattern of air pressure might be sensed with
receptors in the cochlea (and hence processed in the nervous system), while not
being (consciously or unconsciously) identified as a sound. The phenomenon of
perceiving the pattern of air pressure as a sound such as a voice or a tone has also
been described as categorical perception (cf. Harnard, 1987). Categorical percep-
tion increases the discriminability of different stimuli. Practice in categorising
musical pieces and tones increases the ability to perceive a tone as a ‘C’ as op-
posed to an ‘E’. Such classifications commonly require the stimuli to achieve a
certain threshold (e.g., in loudness or pitch) to be categorically perceived.
Like perception, PC is not limited to human cognition. An example for this
comes from a famous study by Guttman and Kalish (1956a) (G&K), who have
shown that pigeons can be trained to generalise a pecking response from a key
lit by some wavelength x to a key lit by a similar wavelength y. A door would
subsequently open, presenting a container of seeds to the pigeons. This finding
has typically been interpreted to mean that these pigeons categorise x and y as
the same perceptual inputs (see also chapter 3.2).
One way in which the achievement of PC is typically explained is on the basis of
mental representations. For example, G&K’s explanation of pigeon’s behaviour
is that the pigeons compare the two differently lit keys mentally with each other
and build a stable representation that extracts the information associated with
each of the keys for reaching the food before the door opens. This style of
explaining behaviour based on representations follows the sandwich model (see
perception entry in glossary). When generalising, the pigeons in G&K’s study
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(a) perceive the new wavelength, (b) compare it with the old wavelength (e.g.,
based on an internal representation of their similarities) and (c) output a pecking
response. PC involves all stages, (a), (b) and (c) but perception is the process
limited to stage (a). Although this picture is very simplified (as it is clear that
the particular processes underlying PC must be more complex), it has led to
remarkable computational models today, which have helped to systematically
investigate PC. Some of these models will be discussed in this thesis and it will
be argued that these models help us to better understand PC.
Staying neutral about perceptual categories
This thesis is not about the question whether perceptual categories are meta-
physically real (i.e., beyond the senses). There might not be a real kind in the
world that corresponds to the things that we call ‘apple’ or ‘mushroom’. This
thesis takes also no position towards whether perceptual categories are real (i.e.,
in the world).
I view perceptual categories as cognitive representations. What a perceptual cat-
egory represents depends at least in part on its purpose for adaptive behaviour.
For example, an organism’s representation of the category of red things is what
it is because of the significance of this category for the organism’s survival (e.g.,
it typically correlates with dangerous events). Behaviour can be adaptive even if
it happens on the basis of a hallucinated representation that does not correspond
to anything real in the world. For example, an agent might be very success-
ful at avoiding poisonous mushrooms and seeking edible mushrooms despite her
hallucinatory representation of the mushrooms as apples. A cognitive agent’s rep-
resentation of the class of all edible mushrooms in the world need not correspond
to properties of the set of all edible mushrooms in the world. It just needs to rep-
resent for the agent relevant relations between things in the world that cognitive
agents would treat as mushrooms under a given set of environmental conditions.
Perceptual miscategorisation
Representations of perceptual categories must allow for misrepresentation, and
whether or not they do depends on whether they lead to successful or unsuccessful
behaviour. PC fulfils the function of guiding action qua representing relevant
information in the world. For example, categorising two lit keys as food-relevant
evokes a pecking response to both of them qua representing their similarities in
their light intensities. If the pigeon categorises the second key as too different
from the first key and avoids a pecking response, no door will open and no food
will be served. This is a case of miscategorisation as it prevents the pigeon to
obtain food.
Here I assume that the conditions for miscategorisation are observer-relative.
Why some pieces of information about the world are relevant for comparison is
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decided in retrospect by an observer’s (e.g., a scientists) evaluation of whether an
action was adaptive to a given environment or not. To identify miscategorisation,
an agent’s behaviour has to be evaluated in retrospect with respect to its adaptive
value.
Perceptual categorisation and adaptive value
In this thesis, I assume that all cases of perceptual categorisation potentially in-
volve adaptive value. That is, I assume that the ability to categorise groups of
objects according to internal representations or concepts potentially has conse-
quences (even if only over the long run) for the thriving and survival of a per-
ceptual categoriser in its environment. For example, there is a great advantage
in being able to infer which mushroom exemplars are edible and which ones are
poisonous. Inferring the correct one of these categories is crucial for the agent to
decide what behavioural response (e.g., eating or avoiding to eat) should be given
to the objects. The behavioural response, in turn, will (at least partly) deter-
mine how likely the agent will be to thrive and survive—eating edible mushrooms
feeds the agent with important nutrients, while eating poisonous mushrooms may
disturb or even kill the agent. Thus, the adaptive value associated with the abil-
ity to perceptually categorise objects (e.g., edible mushrooms) as belonging to
a category or concept (e.g., edible) is that it increases one’s chances of having
a longer or better live. Some possible perceptual categorisations may be of dis-
value, for instance, when they decrease one’s chances to survive or thrive (e.g.,
the identification of poisonous mushrooms as edible).
Why should we consider a criterion of adaptive value for the norms of PC be-
haviour? The role of adaptive value in this thesis is particularly to help explain
why PC is sensitive with respect to different contexts and environmental niches.
For example, developing a category system that involves the concepts edible
mushroom and poisonous mushroom is context sensitive in the sense that
it facilitates behaviour adapted to ‘natural’ environments in which the sole goal
of behaviour is survival. Learning to eat edible and avoid poisonous mushrooms
serves this goal as it will increase an agent’s chances to thrive and survive. In con-
trast, a more complex category system that also includes subordinate concepts
such as fly agraric mushroom, portobello mushroom, chanterelle
mushroom etc. seems to facilitate behaviour that is adaptive to a different en-
vironment (e.g., a cooking competition or a biology classroom). In this case, the
goal seems to be different (e.g., to select the most suitable mushroom for a de-
licious meal or to learn about biological distinctions among mushrooms). In the
latter case, behaviour that is only selective between edible and poisonous mush-
rooms would carry less adaptive value with regards to the latter environments—it
simply is not conducive for the relevant goal. Thus, the role of adaptive value
for PC is to determine the goal or context with regards to which PC behaviour
is successful (or not).
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A reason to question the criterion of adaptive value is that some cases of cat-
egorisation seem to be, at least intuitively, unrelated to adaptive value (e.g., a
classification of Whales as mammals). However, it is, in the first place, unclear
whether the classification of Whales as a mammals is a genuine case of perceptual
categorisation. For centuries, Whales and Dolphins had actually been classified
as fish. The newer insight that they should be classified as mammals is based
on a closer examination of their essential features (e.g., their hot-bloodedness,
their ability to communicate) as revealed by the natural sciences. In contrast,
the earlier categorisation of Whales as fish seems to be closely related to their
appearance (e.g., their fish-like shape and the observation that they live in water).
It is unclear that the novel categorisation is a case of perceptual categorisation,
whereby it is not ruled out that the earlier classification may have had some
adaptive value. There seems to be a difference between perceptual (e.g., ‘Whale’,
based on its perceptual properties) and non-perceptual (e.g., ‘Whale’, based on a
scientific taxonomy) cases of categorisation. While category systems in scientific
taxonomies seem to follow scientific norms (e.g., norms that concern how well
instances of these categories can be identified on the basis of their scientifically
observable features), I assume that perceptual categorisation follows the norms of
adaptive behaviour; Perceptual categorisation is of potential adaptive value in all
cases. Whether the more general cases of categorisation, such as in scientific tax-
onomies, have the potential to be of adaptive value as well cannot be concluded
by the work in this thesis.
Psychological similarity versus similarity of natural kinds
Psychological similarity contrasts with the similarity of natural kinds. At least
two differences between the two stand out. Firstly, the similarity associated with
natural kinds concerns groupings of objects in nature. For example, members
of the kind electron can be grouped into those that are positively charged and
those that are negatively charged. In contrast, psychological similarity concerns
groupings of objects and their associated properties that are accessible to the
perceptual organs of organisms. Electrons are not perceivable, neither are kinds
of colours, such as ultraviolet. Secondly, the two domains differ with respect to
how they ground similarity. One approach to grounding natural-kind similarity
is to derive it from essences: members of a kind are similar because they have
the same essence (e.g., being of the substance H2O). In contrast, psychological
similarity is grounded in perception, cognitive function and survival. For example,
stones with different minerals such as jadeite and nephrite are psychologically
similar because they are perceived as the same kind of stone—Jade. Thirdly,
the similarity of natural kinds is objective. In contrast, psychological similarity
depends on the subjective aspects of how a person sees the world. This last
point locates questions about natural-kind similarity in the area of fundamental
questions about science: the similarity of natural kinds is a basis for scientists
to draw distinctions and classify their scientific discoveries in a way that reflects
information about nature or reality. Natural-kind similarity is a basis for scientific
5
Contents
inductions based on scientifically objective observations, whereas psychological
similarity is in the area of questions of psychology; in particular, questions about
the functioning of psychological processes. Psychological similarity is a basis of
induction by humans and other animals based on subjective experiences.
Similarity versus probability
Similarity in the content of this thesis is psychological similarity. Two objects are
similar if they are perceived to be similar and two political regimes are similar
if they are conceived of as similar. Thus, psychological similarity is a property
bound to perceiving/conceiving subjects (or groups thereof). Two people might
perceive two objects to be differently similar, and this will depend on their dif-
ferent conceptual or perceptual representations of the object. Thus, similarity is
a mind-dependent property.
Despite their differences in detail both Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories explain
PC as a result of cognitive processes that calculate similarities. For instance,
apple and a banana are both in the category fruit because they are similar enough,
as compared to other things that fall into different categories.
T&G’s theory, on the other hand, explains PC as a cognitive process that calcu-
lates probabilities instead of similarities. For instance, apple and a banana belong
to the same category, fruit, because it is more likely to observe them together given
that they are members of that category. The psychological similarity- and the
probability-based explanations use different explanans. Either the probability to
which two or more items are placed into the same category depends on their psy-
chological similarity or it depends on some probabilistic process itself. According
to the latter explanation, PC involves probabilistic inference. According to the
former, similarity explains PC. The debate is about which of these explanations
of PC is better, and according to which criteria this can be evaluated.
Motivated by the Shepard & Tversky debate about a coherent account of psycho-
logical similarity, T&G have argued that a probabilistic explanation is superior
to a similarity-based explanation because (a) it is simpler and does not need an
additional concept of psychological similarity, (b) it is more general because it
can unify both Shepard’s and Tversky’s accounts, and (c) it can predict empirical
effects that could previously only be explained by either Shepard’s or Tversky’s
theories but not by both. In effect, T&G have suggested that psychological sim-
ilarity is an unnecessary concept in the explanation of PC and should hence be
abandoned.
In my PhD thesis, I refute T&G’s case against psychological similarity and argue
that there is yet no reason to replace an explanation via psychological similar-
ity by an explanation via probabilistic inference. This argument is supported
by my illustration that the probabilistic explanation itself relies on a theory of
similarity. My alternative proposal is that a Bayesian (i.e., probabilistic) ap-
proach to PC can offer ‘what-if’ explanations (van Rooij, Wright, Kwisthout,
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& Wareham, 2018) that can describe aspects of possible psychological processes
(e.g., similarity-based processes) in particular individuals that seem to generate
behaviour associated with PC. I argue that such an approach can interact with





1.1. The problem and the claim
Perceptual categorisation (PC) is the ability to generalise behaviour from old
perceptual experiences to new perceptual experiences. For example, upon having
eaten an umami portobello mushroom, and in light of the new experience of a
bitter fly agraric mushroom, an agent will be likely to seek further instances of
portobello mushrooms and avoid instances of fly agraric mushrooms. The problem
is how to explain this ability to generalise.
In this thesis, I approach this problem from a computational-modelling perspec-
tive. This perspective contrasts with a neuroscientific approach to explaining PC.
The goal of my thesis is to present a unified approach to PC. The key claim of my
thesis is that a Bayesian explanation of generalisation, inspired by Tenenbaum &
Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian model of concept learning, can deliver such a unified
approach. I contrast my contribution against two previous attempts to explain-
ing behaviour associated with PC in terms of a psychological model of similarity.
These attempts are Shepard’s (1987) model of geometric distance and Tversky’s
(1977) model of feature-matching.
These previous attempts had treated the behaviour that we commonly associate
with PC as an effect of two separate kinds of cognitive processes—one process
calculates geometric distances while the other matches features. The models as-
sociated with each of these assumed processes are experimentally well confirmed.
Problematically, Shepard’s and Tversky’s theoretical assumptions about how psy-
chological similarity explains the observed behaviour are inconsistent with each
other, so that it is difficult to combine their explanations of how a unique psycho-
logical process (e.g., one of similarity) could generate the observed PC behaviour.
At the same time, because of the solid empirical evidence for Shepard’s and Tver-
sky’s models, it is difficult to decide which of their theories comes closest to a
correct explanation of PC. Does the behaviour associated with PC at all express
a unique internal psychological mechanism? In this thesis, I approach the con-
flict between these competing theories of psychological-similarity processes from
a novel, Bayesian, perspective. The principal virtue of my approach is that it
offers a computational explanation of PC as a unified phenomenon.
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1.2. Positioning the approach
On some accounts in the psychological literature, it is common to view PC as
an explanans when answering questions about related cognitive phenomena. An
example is Bundesen’s (1990) study of subjects’ behavioural performance in visual
identification tasks. The task is to identify digits on a display where the digits
have different colours. When interpreting the data, Bundesen refers to subjects’
cognitive ability to discriminate the digits based on the colour-category that the
digits are assigned to. Correspondingly, it is this ability that influences the speed
and accuracy of subjects’ performances (Bundesen, 1990, pp. 523–524). The
observation that red digits are commonly identified more quickly than digits of
other colours is explained by the assumption that red digits are more relevant to
the subject for solving the task than digits with other colours (e.g., because red is
often associated with concepts such as danger). Thus, assuming that the subject
engages in a PC task explains the subject’s performance when identifying digits.
There are other approaches that consider PC as an explanans when studying
concept- and word-learning (e.g., Sloutsky, 2010; Smith & Samuelson, 2006).
In contrast to this literature, this thesis takes PC to be the explanandum. From
this perspective, there are three relevant questions about PC:
1. Why should we do PC in the first place?
2. Why do we make the specific perceptual categorisations that we do?
3. What is the relationship between PC and similarity?
My motivation to consider PC as the explanandum is that there seem to be no
clear answers to these questions in the psychological literature, revealing that PC
is itself not well understood. In this thesis, I propose that a Bayesian approach
offers partial answers to these three questions. In answering the first question,
this thesis focuses on a computational approach to PC. This approach is inspired
by Marr’s (1982) computational level analysis of information-processing systems
and Anderson’s (1991; 1991a) rational analysis of adaptive organisms, which will
be reviewed in chapter 2. My approach to PC can be positioned alongside these
approaches as it also investigates the psychological process concerning possible
algorithms and representations used to successfully perform PC. In answering the
second question, I focus on the assumption in the literature that PC is guided by
certain principles of rationality, based on which some perceptual categorisations
appear to be better than others. My answer to the third question is that the
Bayesian approach to PC that I advocate here implicitly relies on a theory of
similarity, when this approach is used to explain the psychological processes and
concepts that drive aspects of behaviour associated with PC.
Previous answers to the three questions have often built on two fundamental
studies about categorisation and similarity. These are Shepard’s (1987) Universal
Law of Generalisation (henceforth ‘ULG’) and Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching
model of similarity. In these studies, categorisation is explained by similarity. For
example, the explanation of why we categorise apples and bananas as instances
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of the fruit category is that they are similar to each other. The problem with this
sort of explanation is that the notion of similarity is itself poorly understood;
it is not clear what ‘similar’ in such explanations means (Decock & Douven,
2011; Goodman, 1955). A popular alternative to similarity-based explanations
of categorisation are probabilistic explanations. An early example are models of
cue validity, which represent aspects of categorisation in terms of the conditional
probability of a category given a cue (Reed, 1972; E. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, John-
son, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). The corresponding explanation of why we categorise
apples and bananas as instances of the fruit category is that it is more probable
that apples and bananas belong to the same category given that they often occur
together with the same cues. Recently, probability-based explanations of cate-
gorisation have been taken up again, e.g., in a Bayesian model of concept learning
by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001). It is still unclear how these two types of ex-
planations of candidate psychological processes underlying PC behaviour can be
related.
What sets my project apart from these previous approaches to similarity and cat-
egorisation is that it explicitly connects a Bayesian (i.e., one kind of probabilistic)
and a similarity-based explanation of PC. Instead of choosing between the two
conflicting approaches to psychological similarity, I suggest to take on a novel,
unifying, perspective on PC. This third approach to PC unifies two different
empirical phenomena associated with similarity and categorisation according to
three philosophical criteria of unification. One phenomenon consists in Shepard’s
(1987) observation that the behaviour associated with PC shows an exponential
gradient: the probability to generalise from one experience to another decreases
exponentially with the perceived similarity between these experiences. The other
phenomenon consists in Tversky’s (1977) observation that judgements of simi-
larity often show an effect of directionality. For example, Tel Aviv is typically
judged to be more similar to New York than vice versa. Earlier, no philosophical
argument for unification of these phenomena had been provided and it was not
clear how these phenomena could be unified.
In this regard, this thesis does not refute either of the similarity-based explana-
tions. With regards to questions about the psychological processes and repre-
sentations, the competition between the two theories of psychological similarity
remains. Which of these theories of psychological similarity is ultimately correct
cannot be decided on the basis of my approach alone, which only grounds a third
possible theory of these phenomena.
My proposed unified approach is useful beyond the current state of the art
on the problem of modelling PC in two respects. Firstly, in clarifying the ex-
plicit connection between a Bayesian and a similarity-based explanation, the uni-
fied approach helps us to better understand the relationship between questions
about psychological-similarity processes and the apparent guiding principles of
behaviour associated with PC. Secondly, the unified approach clarifies Tenen-
baum and Griffiths’ (2001) earlier Bayesian approach as a computational theory,
its possible limitations and its possibility to contribute to the Shepard-Tversky
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debate about psychological-similarity processes. This helps us to comprehend the
diversity of behavioural patterns associated with PC.
1.3. The overall argument
The general structure of my argument that a Bayesian approach unifies be-
haviours associated with PC (and that this is worth considering) is as follows.
1. There are two candidate approaches to explaining patterns of behaviour
associated with perceptual categorisation. On the one hand, there is Shep-
ard’s (1987) geometric approach to similarity and his Universal Law of
Generalisation (ULG). On the other hand, there is Tversky’s (1977) feature-
matching model of similarity.
2. These approaches can accommodate different patterns of behaviours. Shep-
ard’s approach can accommodate the exponential gradient, while Tversky’s
can accommodate the effect of directionality. However, they cannot agree
on a unique psychological process that generates these types of behaviours.
They conflict with regards to their theoretical assumptions about what sim-
ilarity is.
3. An alternative approach to explaining these different patterns of behaviours
is offered by Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian model of concept
learning. Principally, the Bayesian model proposed by Tenenbaum and
Griffiths is neutral about the conflict between Shepard’s and Tversky’s as-
sumptions about psychological similarity processes.
4. The Bayesian approach satisfies three criteria of unification: (i) it is simple
because it uses only a few formalisms to analyse PC, (ii) it has a broad
scope because it predicts both, the exponential gradient and the effect of
directionality, and (iii) it reveals that these different patterns of behaviours
appear to be dependent on each other, while they had appeared to be inde-
pendent before. In this sense, the Bayesian approach unifies the diversity
of behaviours associated with PC.
This argument is embedded within the following structure of this thesis. Chapter
2 provides a working definition of PC and characterises the framework of reverse-
engineering, which I assume as a background for the advocated Bayesian approach
to explaining PC. In Chapters 3 and 4, I discuss Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories
of psychological-similarity processes as candidate answers to questions 1-3 above.
Chapter 5 states the conflicting assumptions of these theories and motivates my
project of unifying their distinct empirical predictions.
Chapter 6 explains the Bayesian approach to PC that I advocate in this thesis
on the basis of Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ Bayesian model of concept learning.
The chapter clarifies the implicit connection between T&G’s model and Shep-
ard’s (1987) geometric theory of psychological similarity. Chapter 7 reflects on
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the possible limitations of the Bayesian approach at the computational level of
explanation. This explicates my claim that a Bayesian explanation of how the
cognitive mechanism of PC could work implicitly relies on a similarity-based ap-
proach.
Chapter 8 argues for three criteria of unification that can be used to evaluate
the Bayesian approach to PC: elegance, unbounded scope and informational rel-
evance/probabilistic dependence. Chapter 9 shows that the advocated Bayesian
approach to PC satisfies these criteria, and argues that PC is a unified phe-




This chapter presents the theoretical background of my approach. In section 2.1, I
provide a working definition of the explanatory target—perceptual categorisation
(PC). In section 2.2, I motivate the Bayesian approach to PC in the context of
the reverse-engineering strategy in cognitive science.
2.1. The explanatory target
PC is the ability to recognise and distinguish objects on the basis of their per-
ceptual attributes. Following Palmeri,
[p]erceptual categorization is a fundamental aspect of human cogni-
tion. Any time we decide that some visually presented object is a
dog rather than a cat, a bottle rather than a jar, or a tree rather
than a shrub, we are making a categorization decision based on the
perceptual attributes of that object. (Palmeri, 2001, p. 193)
Accordingly, PC is the cognitive ability to decide for any perceptual experience
what category the experience belongs to. PC serves a variety of other cognitive
processes, such as decision-making for the control of behaviour, recognition and
learning. PC allows organisms to use stored information about past perceptual
experiences in an appropriate way. For example, recognising a red traffic light
as dangerous makes us more likely to avoid car crashes. Likewise, being able to
distinguish a portobello mushroom from a fly agraric mushroom can help us to
learn that one is edible but the other is not.
Five aspects stick out that together provide a working definition of PC: it is cog-
nitive, possibly unconscious, hierarchical, normative and wide-scoped. I discuss
each of these aspects in turn.
Cognitive
PC is a cognitive process and PC behaviour may be interpreted in terms of
stimulus-response behaviour. Such behaviour may, for example, express aspects of
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associative learning (e.g., classical conditioning1). Although some PC behaviour
may express cognitive processes that build upon a background of coordinated
automatic (unconditioned) response behaviour, PC behaviour is not limited to
giving an unconditioned automatic response. Correspondingly, PC behaviour
does not consist of inflexible action patterns (e.g., reflexes). PC behaviour is
flexible and can be modified to suit the cognitive agent’s needs.
An example illustrates this basic point. Mushrooms are known for being often
confused as edible when they are in fact poisonous. When a dog eats one mush-
room and avoids another, this is an instance of PC. The dog decides on the basis
of the smell of one mushroom whether to sniff around it further and eat it or
whether to avoid it. If the mushroom carries a very sweet smell, the dog will
not eat it. If it smells fresh, the dog may eat it. This process is not a mere
reflex-like response to the perceived smell because there are many different ways
in which the perception of the mushroom could have been interpreted by the dog.
More generally, the choice of eating or avoiding the mushroom is a choice among
multiple alternative interpretations of a given situation.
To abstract from the example, PC involves thinking about relations between
perceptual experiences and deciding whether they should be treated as belonging
to the same or different perceptual categories. Intuitively, similarity plays a role to
make this decision. In the mushroom case, the dog must decide whether the smell
of the mushroom is like the smell of a previously experienced mushroom that was
edible. To make a choice, some criterion of sameness between these experiences
is necessary. If the mushrooms smell similar enough, they should be treated as
the same—eat one and feel good, eat the other and you will feel good. If the
mushrooms’ smells are too dissimilar to each other, then the mushrooms should
be treated differently—eat one and feel good, be cautious about the other because
you might not feel good after eating it. Thus, the decision as to how perceptual
inputs (e.g., two mushrooms) shall be treated (e.g., eaten) is not arbitrary, it
is made on the basis of a criterion of similarity or difference (e.g., similarity in
smell).
As we will see, a big question in research on PC is: what does ‘similar enough’
or ‘too dissimilar’ mean? Chapters 3 and 4 take this question to a slightly more
general form: ‘what is psychological similarity?’
1In classical conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus is repeatedly paired with a conditioned
stimulus. For example, in Pavlov’s original experiments on dog salivation, the unconditioned
stimulus is a piece of meat, the conditioned stimulus is the sound of a bell and the salivation
response is a conditioned response. The goal of classical conditioning is to make the subject
(e.g., a dog) build an association between the unconditioned stimulus and the conditioned
stimulus so that, whenever only the unconditioned stimulus is presented, the subject elicits
the conditioned response. For example, the dog has learned an association between the bell
ring and the meat when, upon hearing only the ring of the bell (i.e., without the actual
presence of the meat), the dog salivates, while, prior to the conditioning, salivation was
naturally elicited only upon the presence of the meat (as cited by LeDoux (1998, 142)).
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Possibly unconscious
Perceptual categorisation is not confined to conscious processes, it can also hap-
pen unconsciously. For example, PC can be conscious, such as when subjects
verbally report on the categorisation, or unconscious, where, despite behavioural
measures indicating PC has taken place, subjects are neither consciously aware
this is the case nor able to report on it. This claim is motivated by the idea that
the ability to categorise objects, events or situations that are associated with our
perceptual experiences is vital for decisions that we make on a daily basis. These
decisions are often quick and need not involve conscious reflections or deliberate
reasoning.
It is possible for a subject, S, to process information cognitively but unconsciously.
A non-trivial view of consciousness assumes that to perceptually categorise a set
of stimuli, S need neither be consciously aware of the presence of the stimuli nor
be consciously aware of the possibilities for acting upon them/the fact that S is
categorising them. S can be said to perceptually categorise objects into classes
if S behaves distinctively in behavioural patterns towards the objects, without
being able to verbally report that S is doing so (cf. Kouider & Faivre, 2017).
This notion of unconscious PC does not preclude the possibility that subjects
perceptually categorise also when they are able to consciously report on their
discriminatory behaviour.
When investigating PC in terms of reliable behaviour patterns towards certain
objects, we commonly assume that animals that are not able to report on the con-
tents of their experience and lack linguistic competence are also able to perform
PC. Thus, although research in categorisation has largely focused on the ques-
tion of what aspects of our perception of the world determine the use of linguistic
categories, questions about PC apply to non-linguistic animals as well. For ex-
ample, one can ask: why does a mouse eat all the raisins but not the poisonous
berries? In this sense, the ability to make differences in categorisations seems
to be species-independent. This awareness has been raised by the psychologists
Rosch and Mervis (1975) on empirical grounds and by Wittgenstein (2006, sec.
65-78), on empirical and theoretical grounds.
Hierarchical
Explaining PC typically requires reference to perceptual categories. PC is a
cognitive process by which a set of distinct observations is grouped into one
single abstract representation—what I call a cognitive category, in the style of
E. H. Rosch (1973), or a concept, in the style of Fodor (1987). (Both terms have
an entry in the Glossary.) Perceptual categories are hierarchically nested. For
example, the observations of a terrier, a shepherd and a pug can be grouped into
the category dog. At the same time, these observations are all instances of the
categories pet and mammal. This illustrates that the perceptual experiences of
these instances can be categorised at various levels of a taxonomic hierarchy (cf.
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Gelman & Markman, 1987). The hierarchical structure of perceptual categories
presents a problem of underdetermination. Given a set of instances of a category,
there is no unique solution to the categorisation task.
One approach to solve this problem is to explain PC in light of a notion of PS.
For instance, Rosch and Mervis have famously argued on an empirical basis that
cognitive categories are structured in terms of the relative degree of PS among
their members. The resulting representation in a categoriser’s mind takes the
form of a prototype.2 According to Rosch and Mervis’ prototype theory, an S
should categorise an object as a bird if S’s mental representation of the object is
similar to its representation of other possible members of the bird-category. One
way to interpret this constraint is to say that x is similar to the other members
only if x shares enough properties with them (Margolis & Laurence, 1999, p. 29).
Taken together, the examples from this literature illustrate that the structure of
cognitive categories or concepts is inherently nested and no clear boundaries may
be defined between them. A penguin may be categorised as a penguin, as a bird,
or as an animal. This is a problem for similarity-based accounts of PC. Although
PS may be a guide to the structure of these categories, it does not explain why
subjects sometimes categorise penguins as penguins and sometimes as birds or
animals. An additional approach to finding out why subjects sometimes prefer
some of these categories over others is needed. Resolving this indeterminacy is a
motivation for placing a normative constraint, that is, a specification of why one
or other category should be preferred given certain conditions. These conditions
are best understood in light of the fact that PC is a solution to a functional
problem that is performed relative to the subject’s goal.
Normative
This problem can be characterised as the problem of treating stimuli appropri-
ately. Take x to be a known perceptual stimulus and y to be a novel perceptual
stimulus. For example, x is a portobello mushroom and y is a fly agraric mush-
room. S knows that x is edible. The problem is: given our treatment of x, should
S treat y in the same way and expect it to be edible? The task is to build a cog-
nitive category that says whether, and if so then to which extent, a behavioural
response that was given to an old perceptual input should be generalised to a
new perceptual input. Upon eating x, should S eat y as well?
A generic solution to the task includes roughly two steps. (1) Take a candidate
perceptual category, for instance edible. (2) Have a criterion to compare x and
y. (3) Use the criterion to decide how to treat y. Together, (1), (2) and (3)
2A prototype is an item that is maximally similar to any random member of the category. For
example, a robin is a prototype for a bird because robins are maximally similar to all other
sorts of birds. They typically have many features in common with other birds (e.g., they
fly, they have two legs, they are of a small size, etc.). On the contrary, a penguin is not a
prototypical bird because, although it has two legs, it is neither of a decent size nor can it
fly. Hence, the penguin does not share many attributes with the average of all other birds.
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are abstract components of a function that transforms a number of perceptual
inputs (mushrooms) into a category representation (e.g., edible) and attaches a
behavioural disposition or response to it (e.g., eating).
Who determines what the problem is? One way in which the problem of PC
can be identified is from a teleofunctional perspective, which can be observer-
independent (cf. Millikan, 1989) or observer-relative (cf. Dretske, 1988). The
observer-independent perspective assumes that the problem is set by the etiolog-
ical history of the system that consumes the behaviour. In the case of PC, the
consumer of S’s categorisation behaviour, e.g., the eating, is S’s body. From this
perspective, the purpose of a PC mechanism is to cover the adaptation or survival
of S as a whole organism. On this view, PC is relative to organismic needs and
what these needs are is independent of an external observer (e.g., a scientist).
Likewise, the normative constraint on PC is its adaptive value, which is not up
to us but to processes in evolutionary history. From this perspective, when a dog
decides whether to eat or avoid a mushroom, it should act upon only those per-
ceptual categories (e.g., those containing only edible mushrooms) that increase
the adaptivity of the dog’s behaviour. In contrast, the observer-relative perspec-
tive assumes that the problem is set by an external observer, for instance, an
experimenter. From this perspective, the function of PC is to display behaviour
that is appropriate with respect to an observer’s assumptions about S’s environ-
ment (e.g., a set of experimental conditions) and about the cognitive resources
that are available to S. On this view, PC is deemed successful or unsuccessful
relative to the criteria imposed by an external observer, such as an experimenter.
Wide-scoped
As a psychological explanandum, PC is subject to a range of different theories
and models. Abstract descriptions of many other cognitive phenomena exhibit
similar features to PC. For instance, concept learning is typically described as a
computational process of inference, in which from a few experiences, a learner
has to infer the concept that the experiences belong to.
Likewise, perception is sometimes understood as involving categorical decisions.
An example is Harnard’s (1987) explanation of people’s perceptions of the sim-
ilarities between two green colour shades and a yellow colour shade. Harnard
finds that even if one of the green shades is closer to the yellow shade than to
the other green shade on the physical wavelength spectrum, people perceive the
two green shades as being more similar to each other. This task can equally be
interpreted as a problem of categorising the shades on the basis of the visual
input and in light of background knowledge about existing concepts or cognitive
categories (e.g., green and yellow).
The overlap of the abstract descriptions of perceptual and concept learning as well
as categorisation tasks suggests that attributes associated with instances of PC
overlap with attributes associated with instances of other cognitive phenomena.
In this respect, the cognitive process of PC is likely to interact with other cognitive
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processes (e.g., perception and concept learning). Correspondingly, a theory of
PC will possibly encompass theories of other cognitive processes. It will be a
wide-scoped theory.
2.2. The approach
Inspired by the observation that PC overlaps with other phenomena (e.g., per-
ception and concept learning), the guiding research question of this thesis is:
How can we study the cognitive mechanisms underlying the diversity of phe-
nomena associated with PC? In approaching a possible answer to this question,
this thesis focuses on a computational approach to PC. This approach can be
positioned alongside Marr’s (1982) computational level analysis of vision as an
information-processing system and Anderson’s (1990, 1991a) rational analysis of
adaptive organisms. Both approaches have inspired the development of a reverse-
engineering strategy in cognitive science. The following paragraphs provide an
overview of these approaches and draw a connection to my approach.
Marr’s analysis starts with identifying the problem that the system is faced with,
why this problem is appropriate and what the logic of the strategy is with which
this problem can be solved, instead of starting at neurophysiological details in the
brain. For example, the problem of vision is to generate a 3-dimensional image
from 2-dimensional input patterns on the retina. The problem is appropriate
because mapping the 2-dimensional patterns onto a 3-dimensional image serves
the organism to track features in its environment that are of value to its thriving
and increase its chances to survive. The logic of the strategy to solve this problem
is to identify properties of the visible surfaces (Marr, 1982, 36), which give rise
to the structure of the world underlying the image. After having identified the
problem, the analysis continues with an identification of the representations and
algorithms that are appropriate to solve the problem. For example, in the case
of vision, the representations are features like bars, oriented edges or blobs and
properties like orientation, depth or discontinuities of visible surfaces as well as
shapes and how these are organised into hierarchies that build on volumetric and
surface primitives (Marr, 1982, pp. 72-73).
An example of an information-processing task is object recognition. In Marr’s
analysis of vision, object recognition proceeds by pairing a 3-dimensional repre-
sentation from a stored collection with a symbolic index according to a set of rules.
Following these rules, an object-recognition algorithm pairs novel object repre-
sentations with old indices on the basis of a comparison between the novel object
representation and object representations in the existing collection (Marr, 1982,
ch. 5). Marr’s analysis of vision ends with an investigation of the implementa-
tion of these computational processes in the neuro-visual system. This procedure
presents a top-down approach to vision and contrasts with a bottom-up approach




From Marr’s perspective, all three levels are needed to explain vision but he
highlights the role of the analysis at the computational level. He writes:
The central tenet of the approach is that to understand what vision is
and how it works, an understanding at only one level is insufficient. It
is not enough to be able to describe the responses of single cells, nor
is it enough to be able to predict locally the results of psychophysical
experiments. Nor it is enough even to be able to write computer pro-
grams that perform approximately in the desired way. One has to do
all these things at once and also be very aware of the additional level
of explanation that I have called the level of computational theory.
The recognition of the existence and importance of this level is one of
the most important aspects of this approach. (Marr, 1982, p. 329)
Here, Marr expresses his belief that neither the implementational nor the algo-
rithmic levels of analysis alone can specify the essential aspects of the task of
vision, that vision is an information-processing problem. This specification hap-
pens at the computational level. The problem with the other levels is that they
describe the visual processes and states as well as the activities of cells that im-
plement these processes but they fail to explain the behaviour of the agent that
sees. Explaining this is part of Marr’s approach to vision, and the analysis of
what vision is and why it is what it is contributes to this explanation. This is
why the computational level is so important.
Anderson’s (1988/2014; 1991; 1991a; 1990) rational analysis of a cognitive agent
serves as a methodology to restrict the logical space of possible theories at the
computational level.3 Rational analysis is similar in spirit to the use of optimal
models in evolutionary biology; both involve a rationality principle, which reflects
the assumption that cognitive capacities are characterised by functions that are
optimised relative to agents’ needs and their environments (Anderson, 1988/2014,
p. 16).
In chapter 6 of this thesis, I will argue that two assumptions that can be added to
the Bayesian model can each play the role of such a principle. On the one hand,
this is the weak sampling assumption in Shepard’s (1987) model of generalisation
and on the other hand, this is the strong sampling assumption in Tenenbaum and
Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian model of concept learning. Weak sampling assumes
that observed instances of a perceptual category are random samples, which just
happen to fall under a concept by coincidence. Shepard suggests on this basis
that the corresponding measure of whether the instances fall under a candidate
concept or not is a simple measure of consistency. In contrast, strong sampling
3Anderson and Matessa (1990, p. 29) summarise this methodology in six steps: (1) Precisely
specify the goals of the cognitive system. (2) Develop a formal model of the environment
to which the system is adapted. (3) Make the minimal assumptions about computational
limitations. (4) Derive the optimal behavioural function given items 1 through 3. (5)
Examine the empirical literature to see if the predictions are confirmed. (6) If the predictions
are off, iterate. They subsequently demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology in four case
studies on memory, categorisation, causal inference and problem solving.
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assumes that instances are systematic random samples and causal effects of a
concept. T&G propose the size principle (the principle that concepts with a
smaller size should be preferred), which I discuss in detail in chapter 6, as a
measure of how well a candidate concept is justified by the given observations. I
will argue in chapters 6 and 7 that the simple measure of consistency is optimised
relative to inferences of perceptual categories in ‘natural’ environments, while
the size principle is optimised relative to inferences of perceptual categories in
word-learning environments. This means that in natural environments, choosing
any concept that is consistent with the observations will lead to optimal (i.e.,
adaptive) behaviour. In word-learning environments, there are only a few optimal
choices and these correspond to concepts that have a small size, which, as I
will argue in chapter 6, is a function of the concept’s intension. At the same
time, the simple measure of consistency would be suboptimal in word-learning
environments and, likewise, the size principle would be too exclusive to guarantee
inferences that are adaptive in natural environments.
The point of my argument and illustrations is that both of these assumptions place
different optimality constraints on the Bayesian-inference task of PC; of inferring
the ‘correct’ concept of perceptual category given a set of observations, from these
observations, how they justify the concept and some background knowledge about
the concept (for details, see chapter 6). Thus, the rationality of the Bayesian
approach to PC does not purely depend on the Bayesian nature of the model that
I propose here, but on the additional assumptions of weak and strong sampling,
which determine which choices of perceptual categories that determine behaviour
are optimal, and which ones are not.
The normativity of my approach to PC is grounded in the fact that the agent’s
task is framed under the additional consideration of what would be the optimal
behaviour of a rational agent in a given environment, where ‘optimal behaviour’
is behaviour that is most adaptive to a given environmental niche (cf. Anderson,
1991a), and the assumption here is that choosing the ‘correct’ concept produces
behaviour that is adaptive. On this basis, when analysing PC behaviour from
a computational-level perspective, we should look at the function that would
produce behaviour that is optimal for surviving and thriving, i.e., a function
that makes behaviour adaptive with respect to the environment in which the
perceptual categoriser aims to thrive and survive.
Rational analyses are useful because they offer a way of analysing behaviour as
rational from a ‘what-if’ perspective by asking how the behaviour would change
under hypothetical changes in the given environment (van Rooij et al. 2018).
Thus, the assumption of a rationality principle, that the cognitive function (e.g.,
of PC) is optimised with regards to the environment or the agent’s needs, acts
as a constraint on the computational level of analysis. Making this assumption
allows cognitive scientists to narrow down the space of possible cognitive problems
or functions that could be investigated—only those problems or functions that
are optimal or adaptive should be investigated. Thus, what kind of function
counts as a description of a ‘rational’ behaviour (i.e., rational in the sense of
adaptively successful within a given environment) is important for the selection
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of the descriptive framework that shall be used to investigate the behaviour. In
chapter 4, I conclude that this is one potential reason for disfavouring Tversky’s
description of PC as a function of feature-matching—there are no obvious reasons
to assume that this function is optimised with regards to the adaptive success of
PC behaviour.
In recent decades, Marr’s top-down approach and Anderson’s rational analysis
have been combined towards a broader strategy of reverse-engineering the mind.
The strategy is to move through a “triumphant cascade” (Dennett, 1987, p. 227)
from the computational via the algorithmic to the implementational level of anal-
ysis. Proponents of the strategy (e.g., Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Zednik &
Jäkel, 2014; Zednik & Jäkel, 2016) argue that this strategy presents an opti-
mal procedure to use behavioural data in a relevant domain of investigation and
reversely inferring from that data the underlying cognitive processes that have
generated the data. For example, when the cognitive process to be inferred is
vision, the behavioural data from which the process is reverse inferred may be
a set of recordings from a study on saccadic eye movements. What makes the
procedure optimal is that it is likely to adequately describe aspects of the target
phenomenon (e.g., vision) and to predict a wide variety of data associated with it
(Zednik & Jäkel, 2016, p. 666). The practical implication of a reverse-engineering
strategy is that cognition can be studied efficiently with a variety of tools other
than neurophysiological methodology, for example, cognitive computational mod-
els (see Glossary). In following this strategy, researchers can study cognition from
a reversed angle: they can infer from the observed behaviour and some rationality
assumption what the most plausible candidate cognitive mechanism is that has
generated this behaviour.
The strategy is often associated with Bayesian models of cognition (e.g., Chater &
Oaksford, 1999, 2008; Chater & Vitányi, 2003; Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors,
& Tenenbaum, 2010; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008; Tenenbaum, Kemp,
Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). These models typically analyse cognitive phenom-
ena at the computational level. For example, a Bayesian model of vision analyses
vision as a perceiver’s problem to infer from an image on the retina what physical
stimulus/object has caused the retinal image. The perceiver’s strategy to solve
the problem is Bayesian inference. The logic of this strategy is that the perceiver
infers backwards, from features of the perceived image, what the features of the
environment are. The strategy is rational in light of the perceiver’s circumstances,
under which the hidden state that has caused the input to its visual image is not
directly accessible.
A possible limitation of Bayesian models of cognition is that they are idealised;
they explain how an ‘ideal observer’ would solve a Bayesian inference task (e.g.,
vision), but not how she actually does this. At the computational level, the model
is limited to offering a generic solution to a cognitive function or problem—the
model uses a generic function to map inputs onto outputs but does not specify
a set of rules for computing the function (Colombo & Seriès, 2012, p. 698). The
reason for this is that many different algorithms will be able to compute the same
function, which thereby underdetermines the algorithmic process. Nevertheless,
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in the context of reverse-engineering, where the goal is to move through the
cascade, Bayesian models of cognition have been proposed as offering constraints
on possible algorithms (Zednik & Jäkel, 2014, p. 669). Likewise, Colombo and
Hartmann (2017) have argued that Bayesian models in cognitive science have
unifying powers, whereby they can offer fruitful constraints on the discovery,
identification and confirmation of possible cognitive mechanisms in the brain
(Colombo & Hartmann, 2017, pp. 466–479). In this regard, Bayesian models in
cognitive science can serve as a heuristic tool to traverse from (e.g., Bayesian)
investigations at the computational level to (e.g., mechanistic) investigations at
lower levels in the cascade.
A detailed explanation of how Bayesian inference works with respect to PC is
given in chapter 6, where I discuss Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian
model of concept learning. Importantly, this model is positioned at the compu-
tational level in the cascade, where the task is specified but not how this task
is actually carried out by representations and algorithms or implemented in the
brain. The Bayesian unification proposed in this thesis builds on Tenenbaum and
Griffiths’ model at the computational level, yet, my approach is compatible with
the motivation to constrain investigations at other levels in the cascade. How-
ever, the details of how exactly my proposed unification could constrain Shepard’s
(1987) and Tversky’s (1977) competing theories at the level of representation and
algorithm lie outside the scope of this thesis and form part of future research.
What is within the scope of this thesis is a discussion of Shepard’s (1962, 1987)
and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001) models in the context of reverse-engineering.
I will argue that both models exemplify this strategy—they are used as tools to
reverse infer the candidate cognitive mechanisms that underlie behaviours asso-
ciated with categorisation. I will borrow Machery’s (2013) analysis of typical
reverse inferences in cognitive neuroscience to describe the structure of these re-
verse inferences. Machery’s original analysis is as follows.
Machery’s argument structure of typical reverse inferences:
A. “When psychological process, p, is recruited by a task, pattern of brain
activation, E, is likely to be found.
B. In task T, pattern of brain activation, E, was found.
C. Hence, psychological process p was recruited by task T.” (Machery, 2013,
p. 252)
I will use this structure to compare Shepard’s and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’
approaches, where this structure is instantiated with regards to observations of
statistical patterns associated with behaviour, instead of patterns of neural activ-
ity. The corresponding task, T , is a Bayesian task of generalisation, the relevant
patterns of behaviour are the exponential gradient of generalisation, E, and the





In summary, the first section of this chapter has provided a working definition
of PC, which is the ability to decide whether a perceived object belongs to a
cognitive category or concept on the basis of the perceptual attributes of that
object and of other objects. I have associated PC with five aspects: (1) it involves
a choice among various alternative concepts and (2) the process corresponding to
this choice is possibly unconscious. (3) Perceptual categories are hierarchically
organised and learning them involves a problem of avoiding indeterminacy. (4)
In the face of this problem, PC behaviour should be understood as adaptive. (5)
A theory of PC is likely to be wide-scoped because attributes of PC behaviour
overlap with attributes of other cognitive behaviours (e.g., perception and concept
learning).
In the second section, I have explained the background of my approach to mod-
elling PC. I have situated my approach in the context of the reverse-engineering
strategy in cognitive science, which builds on Marr’s (1982) top-down approach
to information-processing systems and Anderson’s (1991a) rational analysis of
cognitive agents. What has been learned is that Bayesian models, such as the
one that I advocate in this thesis, are positioned at Marr’s computational level.
At this level, we identify (a) what the problem of PC is, (b) why this problem is
appropriate for the system or agent exhibiting the behaviour that we associate
with PC and (c) the logic of the agent’s strategy to solving the agent’s problem of
PC. The function of Anderson’s rationality principle is to add further constraints
to the analysis at this level—only problems that are adaptive or optimal should
be studied. The principles of strong and weak sampling that I discuss in chapters
6 and 7 can be identified as such constraints. I have explained that the value of
the reverse-engineering strategy is that it allows us to study PC with toy models
of cognitive mechanisms from a reversed angle. This is useful when our access to
studying PC is limited to observations of behavioural patterns whose neurophys-
iological underpinnings are still obscure. I have used Machery’s (2013) argument
scheme to describe the general structure of reverse inferences that are facilitated
by this strategy. I refer to this scheme continually throughout the thesis.
In the next chapter, I begin my discussion of the two competing approaches to
similarity and categorisation. I will start with Shepard’s (1975; 1980; 1981/2017;




“There is nothing more basic to thought and language than
our sense of similarity; our sorting of things into kinds.”





3. Shepard’s geometric approach
3.1. Introduction
My motivation to use Shepard’s (1975; 1980; 1981/2017; 1987; 1970) approach
to a theory of psychological similarity (PS) and generalisation as an explanans
with regards to perceptual categorisation (PC) builds on an intuitive connection
between Shepard’s approach to generalisation and PS and the reverse-engineering
approach to PC that I have explained in chapter 2. From the reverse-engineering
perspective, a computational level approach to PC is helpful for explaining PC
but one must also move beyond this level once the task of PC has been identified
with enough precision.
Shepard’s model suits this ideal; when building it, Shepard was primarily inter-
ested in unrevealing the cognitive mechanism underlying generalisation behaviour
for perceptual stimuli such as colours, geometric symbols, vowel phonemes etc.
His approach is a mathematical model of the ‘Universal Law of Generalisation’
(henceforth ‘ULG’). Roughly, the ULG is an exponential function that relates
a measure of generalisation to a measure of the perceived PS associated with a
pair of objects. PS is a psychological measure of stimulus dissimilarity and gen-
eralisation is the objective likelihood of an agent to generalise a behaviour from
one object, a, to another object, b. In Shepard’s model, the function indicates
an internal representation of the objects’ similarity and can be studied by inves-
tigating patterns in subjects’ generalisation behaviour. Because of its precision
and intuitive relationship with the working definition of PC in chapter 2, Shep-
ard’s ULG is a good starting point for specifying what the function and possible
mechanism of PC could look like.
The goal of this chapter is to reconstruct Shepard’s proposal that generalisation is
a function of geometric distance so that it can be contrasted against Tenenbaum
and Griffiths’ (T&G’s, 2001) Bayesian theory of generalisation, which will be
presented in chapter 6. The key argument in the current chapter is that PC relies
on the metric axioms. Roughly, the argument is that the negative-exponential
function in Shepard’s model of ULG shows that geometric distance is a variable
that can be experimentally investigated, and that it varies in a lawful manner.
This is a case in point against popular objections against the explanatory power
of PS with respect to categorisation (e.g., Goodman, 1972). Goodman had argued
that PS would be too variable with respect to the context and frame of reference
of a similarity-judgement task. He thought that therefore, the notion of PS would
not be objective enough to satisfy scientific standards of explanation. The ULG
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illustrates that a geometric conception of PS is invariant when seen in relation to
a task of generalisation. One purpose of this chapter is to explain this invariance
and to argue that a geometric conception of PS is a possible explanans with
regards to the possible mechanisms underlying PC.
Section 3.2 outlines Shepard’s approach to generalisation as a universal law, which
he models as a monotonic function1 that determines the relationship between PS
and generalisation behaviour. Section 3.3 clarifies the relevance of the ULG for the
problem of modelling PC and the method of multi-dimensional scaling. Section
3.4 outlines the theoretical assumptions of the geometric conception. Section 3.5
considers four reasons for why PS should be constrained by the metric axioms.
Section 3.6 concludes with a connection between Shepard’s model of the ULG
and the problem of modelling PC.
3.2. Shepard’s Universal Law of Generalisation
The ULG is a psychological law that governs generalisation behaviour. The law
models generalisation as a psychological phenomenon that describes a pattern of
behaviour that is invariant under changing conditions (Shepard, 1987, p. 1318)2.
In light of the ULG, generalisation behaves in the same way when considering
varying species, stimuli and modalities (cf. figure 3.1). For instance, according to
the model, the shape of generalisation is the same when comparing how humans
treat different geometric shapes and how pigeons treat different colour shades (cf.
subfigures A and E).
Mathematically, the ULG is a negative exponential curve that maps the per-
ceptual similarity of two objects onto subjects’ likelihoods to generalise their
behaviour from one to the other object. Thus, when knowing how perceptually
similar two objects are, one can use the function to predict how likely subjects
1A monotonic function is a mapping between ordered sets that maintains the order of the sets.
For example, if a function between two ordered sets of points is monotonically decreasing,
then the order between the sets never increases in the mapping. The ULG is an example of
a monotonic function because it maintains the decreasing order of two sets of stimuli. This
order is typically represented in the row and column of a similarity matrix. An example for
such a matrix is presented on the left of figure 3.2.
2On Hempel’s 1942 classical account, laws are regularities that meet certain further conditions.
These conditions help to make sure that the regularities are non-accidental. Hempel illus-
trates the distinction between accidental and non-accidental conditions with the example of
the Greensbury School Board for 1964, in which all members happen to be bald. Hempel’s
intuition is that there is not a law of baldness that governs the fact that all members of
the Greensbury School Board for 1964 are bald. In contrast, the fact that all gases expand
when heated under constant pressure is a regularity that is non-accidental, and is therefore,
following Hempel, a law. One example for a relevant condition is that laws must be general:
laws are regularities associated with phenomena that are invariant when repeated under
a range of different circumstances in nature. Thus, if there was a psychological law that
adequately described generalisation behaviour, then it could be expected that generalisation
behaviour expresses patterns that stay invariant across a range of different circumstances in
nature.
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will be to generalise behaviour from one object to another. This is exactly what
Shepard did; he used a geometric model of PS and predicted on this basis the
pattern of generalisation that is described by the negative exponential curve in
figure 3.1. To predict patterns of generalisation on the basis of PS, Shepard used
a measure of geometric distance. To obtain the ULG, Shepard determines the
particular distances in PS space such that how likely it is that the model gener-
alises from one object to another is a monotonic function of the corresponding
points’ geometric distance in the PS space. Shepard’s model predicts generalisa-
tion likelihoods best when this function has a negative exponential shape. What
the ULG says can be summarised by the following proposition.
Definition 3.2.1 (The universal law of generalisation). For any pair of stimuli, i
and j, the empirical probability, gij, of an organism to generalise a response from
i to j is a monotonic function of the psychological distance between i and j, dij,
with a negative exponential shape.
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the law models a variety of case studies of generali-
sation. Subfigures E and H depict the relation between pigeons’ generalisation
behaviour and a physical measure of stimulus distance. For example, the physical
difference between colours is measured by their differences in physical wavelengths
of light. Subfigures B and K depict the relation between humans’ generalisation
behaviour and a psychological measure of stimulus distance. A measure of psy-
chological difference in colour is how similar or different colours are perceived
to be. This measure relies on psychophysical scaling tools, such as tests of how
well (e.g., quickly or accurately) people detect or discriminate between different
colours. Subfigure L depicts data on humans’ categorisations of Morse Code sig-
nals. In this data set and according to Shepard’s geometric-distance model, the
psychological difference between Morse Code signals is a function of how much
these signals overlap in their length (number of components) and style (dots ver-
sus dashes). In all cases, the function that maps stimulus distance in PS space
onto probability of generalisation has a negative exponential shape, no matter
what species the agent belongs to nor what stimuli it generalises. This is the
sense in which the function describes a universal gradient of generalisation.
The following paragraphs provide two examples of what type of entities the ULG
relates to each other. These examples connect what has been said about the ULG
to the phenomenon of PC. Example A illustrates that behaviour associated with
PC is often studied in the form of a generalisation task (e.g., ‘if a is a ‘fep’ is b
a ‘fep’ as well?’). One explanation, which is illustrated in the examples, is that
the agent’s decision as to whether or not the agent should generalise depends on
the underlying perceptual categories. Typically, a representation of a perceptual
category (cf. Glossary) is more abstract or comprehensive, than a representation
of the PS between two individual objects in a similarity-judgement task. However,
if understood as a psychological representation, a perceptual category or concept
is also defined in terms of the PS amongst its possible members. It is generally
unclear what the exact relation between the PS between two objects and their
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Figure 3.1.: A graphical illustration of several instantiations of the universal law of gen-
eralisation. Each subfigure, A-L, represents a negative exponential func-
tion that maps stimulus distance or dissimilarity (on the x-axis) monotoni-
cally onto generalisation probability or confusion likelihood (on the y-axis).
From “Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science,”
by Shepard, Science, 237(4820), p. 1318. Copyright 1987 by The American
Association for the Advancement of Science. Reprinted with permission.
belongingness to a concept is. Thus, I take it that, practically, the data sets in
figure 3.1 could be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that a process of
PC is happening. The following two examples illustrate this point.
(A) People’s categorisation of circles
One example of the ULG is McGuire’s (1961) study of how people categorise
circles according to their relative sizes. Subjects were trained with sets of black
circles that varied in their diameter sizes. In the first condition, sizes varied in big
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steps of .14cm. In the second condition, sizes varied in small steps of .07cm. Each
circle was assigned a numerical label. The smallest circle was labelled with a ‘1’
and the largest circle was labelled with a ‘9’.3 In the test phase, subjects were
asked to assign one of the learned labels to a novel circle. McGuire’s hypothesis
was that it is easier to assign the correct label to circles in the first condition than
in the second condition. A label was correct if the experimenter had assigned it
to a circle of the same size in the test phase.4 His reasoning was that circles in
the first (big) condition are less similar to each other than circles in the second
(small) condition. Hence, it should be easier to discriminate between them.
McGuire’s (1961) results (see graph A in figure 3.1) illustrate that the ULG is a
good description of how people categorise circles according to their relative sizes.
With an increase in the relative similarity between two circles (with respect to
their diameter sizes), there is an exponential increase in people’s likeness to treat
(i.e. label) them as the same. In other words, people were more likely to give
two circles of a similar diameter size a similar label, and they were less likely
to give circles with different diameter sizes the same label. Thus, knowing the
similarities between conditioned pairs of circles, McGuire was able to predict how
people will categorise circles they had not yet seen.
(B) Pigeons’ categorisation of colours
Another example is Guttman and Kalish’s (1956b, henceforth ‘G&K’) study of
pigeons’ pecking responses to a key that was illuminated in different colours. In
the training phase, G&K conditioned pigeons with keys of colours within some
range on the physical wavelength spectrum (e.g., green colours). In particular,
the conditioned stimuli were wavelengths of 530, 550, 580 and 600 Mµ. Upon
pressing the key, a door would open the way to a food magazine. When pigeons
pecked at the key when it was lit with wavelengths that were outside that range
(e.g., red colours), no food would be offered. In the test phase, a wavelength
of light (e.g., 530Mµ, corresponding to green light) was projected onto the key.
The overall range of wavelengths of the test stimuli was from 460Mµ to 660Mµ
in 10Mµ intervals for each of the conditioned stimuli types, and pigeons had to
respond with several pecks to open the magazine when the door was lit with the
right colour (i.e., within the range 530− 600Mµ).
G&K measured the degree of a pigeon’s generalisation as the number of pecks
that that pigeon would give a key relative to all pecks from that pigeon across
3 For instance, in the first condition, a circle with a radius of .7 cm would be labelled with a
‘1’, a circle with a radius of .21 cm would be labelled with a ‘2’, a circle with a radius of
.35 cm would be labelled with a ‘3’ and so on. Likewise, in the second condition, a circle of
size .37 cm would receive a ‘1’, a circle with size .44 cm would be labelled ‘2’ and so on.
4For instance, if in the training phase of condition I a circle of size .21 cm was paired with
a ‘2’, and a circle of size .35 cm was presented in the test phase, then the correct response
would be a ‘3’. Likewise, if in the training phase of condition II a circle of size .44 cm was
paired with a ‘2’, and a circle of size 51 cm was presented in the test phase, then the correct
response would be a ‘3’.
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trials. Generalisation was considered to be more likely if pigeons pecked on av-
erage relatively more often. For instance, pigeons in the 530Mµ group should be
more likely to peck in the test phase if the key was projected with 540Mµ than
if it was projected with 550Mµ or 600Mµ. G&K’s hypothesis was that pigeons
will be more likely to peck if they expect food in the magazine and whether they
expected food depends on the similarity between the conditioned colours and the
unconditioned/test colours. G&K’s results confirm these predictions. Graph E
in figure 3.1 shows that the correlation between the recorded wavelengths and
response likelihoods takes the shape of a negative exponential curve. Together,
examples A and B illustrate that there is a correlation between similarity and
generalisation.
On reflection, there are two issues with McGuire’s and G&K’s models. Firstly,
the models do not seem to predict aspects of the cognitive mechanisms involved
in PC. This is because they use physically objective measures of behaviour and
stimulus properties. In McGuire’s study, the objective measure of stimulus dis-
similarity is their difference in physical diameter size and the measure of gen-
eralisation is people’s objective likelihood to correctly label a circle. In G&K’s
study, the objective measure of stimulus dissimilarity is the difference in physical
wavelength of illumination and pigeon’s tendency to generalise is measured by
the objective number of pecks that they give the key. None of these measures is
a psychological measure. In contrast, Shepard’s geometric-distance measure (on
the x-axis in figure 3.1) is supposed to be a measure of the unconscious perceptual
experience associated with subjects’ generalisation behaviour. Thus, from these
studies alone, there is no reason to believe that subjects in examples A and B
in fact generalise because of how similar or different the stimuli look to them.
Secondly, without regards to the negative exponential curve in figure 3.1, there
is no link between the results of these two studies on PC. This is problematic
because it makes it difficult to integrate the results of these studies into a theory
of generalisation or PC.
In contrast, the ULG relates these models elegantly by predicting the results of
examples A and B simultaneously. It also adds information to the interpretation
of McGuire’s and G&K’s findings. The additional information is that the data is
not only a mere correlation of objectively observable events but is caused by men-
tal states of the agent. In particular, on Shepard’s approach to generalisation and
PS, the ULG (exponential function in figure 3.1) describes a correlation between
the physical similarity of the stimuli and generalisation behaviour. But it also de-
scribes how generalisation should change with a change in the PS associated with
the stimuli (a representation in the agent’s mind). The prediction that generali-
sation should be relatively improbable under relatively dissimilar pairs of stimuli
is justified by the additional assumption that agents represent the psychological
properties (e.g., the similarity) of objects in their mind and that the accuracy of
this representation, and the generalisation response plays a role for the agent’s
success (e.g., their adaptive success). Thus, the ULG contributes with a method
of predicting McGuire’s and G&G’s data from a psychological perspective.
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Taken together, this section has explained that the ULG presents a rationale for
why the exponential gradient represents a cognitive phenomenon and not a mere
stimulus-response behaviour. With regards to PC, what allows the ULG to claim
the status of a psychological law is the assumption that a subject’s tendency
to categorise two stimuli as the same (or different) depends on the degree of
PS between the stimuli (i.e., on an internal representation thereof), instead of
physical stimulus difference. The next section explains why the ULG matters
for an explanation of PC. It presents two ingredients that motivate ULG for
this purpose: (1) A theoretical strategy of reverse-inference and (2) an empirical
method of predicting generalisation behaviour with a psychological measure of
stimulus difference.
3.3. The universal law and perceptual
categorisation
3.3.1. Reverse inference
The following paragraphs explain how Shepard’s (1987) model of the ULG re-
sembles a reverse-engineering approach to PS and generalisation. The target of
Shepard’s model of generalisation was to find the psychological function that re-
lates a pair of stimuli and the agent’s response in a generalisation task. The
available evidence for inferring this function was limited; it consists in the avail-
able recordings of subjects’ explicit judgements about how similar the stimuli
are or the average probability of subjects to confuse these objects. To carry out
this inference, Shepard relies on various additional assumptions that are more
explicitly reflected in his earlier work (especially in Shepard (1962, 1981/2017)).
In this work, Shepard claims that there exists some structural correspondence
between subjects’ behaviour and their internal mental representations of cat-
egories5. Shepard’s motivation for this claim was that subjects’ behaviour is
implicitly governed by evolutionary norms; Shepard had though that the most
adaptively successful behaviour is such that it indirectly reflects aspects of natu-
ral kinds (e.g., whoever avoids mushrooms of the poisonous kind and eats those
of the edible kind gets the representations right). In light of the structural-
correspondence claim, Shepard inferred that the observed exponential gradient
of generalisation behaviour reflects subjects’ ‘internal’ preferences to generalise
the same behavioural consequence towards objects that are more similar to each
other (i.e., in the model, points that are closer in PS space) than to objects that
are dissimilar (i.e., far apart in the model). Intuitively, this is the behaviour that
is most probable to ensure the subject to be adaptively successful (e.g., it would
be a ‘miracle’ that an agent could survive if there was no such mapping between
the internal structure and the behaviour, such as eating or avoiding).
5In his 1981/2017, he calls this correspondence a ‘second-order isomorphism’.
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On the basis of these considerations about structural correspondence and adap-
tive success, Shepard inferred that the observed statistical structure of subjects’
behaviour (e.g., the observed confusion probabilities) reflects something about
what the structure of subjects’ internal spaces of concepts look like. Therefore,
he believed that the study of the objective generalisation probabilities associ-
ated with subjects’ behaviour would help him to reverse-infer from the subjects’
behaviour what the structure of subjects’ internal representations of categories
looks like.
The structure of Shepard’s (1987) scientific inference can be simplified with Mach-
ery’s (2013) reverse-inference scheme that I have discussed in chapter 1.
Argument structure of Shepard’s approach:
A. When psychological process, PS, is recruited by a generalisation task, an
exponential gradient of generalisation, E, is likely to be found.
B. In generalisation task T, E, was found.
C. Hence, PS was recruited by T.
In Shepard’s model, PS refers to a cognitive process that uses a representation of
PS to generate an appropriate response to a stimulus on the basis of aspects of
another stimulus.
The assumption that PS drives generalisation and, as I claim here, the mechanism
of PC, connects Shepard’s theory of generalisation to the problem of modelling
PC. In Shepard’s theory, generalisation is the cognitive act of deciding whether
i and j, despite the fact that they are distinct perceptual objects, belong to the
same natural kind or concept (Shepard, 1987, p. 1319). Assuming that a concept
in Shepard’s theory is equivalent to a cognitive category, the cognitive process that
underlies generalisation in Shepard’s model is an instance of PC. In support of this
point, S. A. Frank (2018, p. 9803) argues that “‘[g]eneralization’ arises because
perceived similarity may describe recognition of a general category. For example,
two circles may have different sizes, colors, and shadings. Perceived similarity
arises from the generalized perception of ‘circle’ as a category.” Generalisation
from i to j on the basis of their perceived similarity should be interpreted as
the decision that i and j belong to the same category. Thus, given the model’s
assumption that PS drives generalisation, deciding whether i and j belong to the
same perceptual category is driven by PS as well.
This makes the connection between Shepard’s model of ULG and a reverse-
engineering approach to PC more explicit. The ULG figures into the scheme
of reverse-engineering because the geometric-distance model is only a means to
finding out what the assumed perceptual categories or concepts proposed in the
model look like, and how they can be eventually understood as efficating gener-
alisation behaviour. Let us take a closer look at how ULG can be understood to
reverse-infer PS.
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3.3.2. Multi-dimensional scaling
As argued in section 3.2, to predict patterns of generalisation on the basis of
PS, it is necessary to have a measure of the PS between the objects. Roughly,
Shepard’s solution to this problem is to measure PS as geometric distance. He
assumes that there exists a PS space with multiple dimensions in which points
represent perceptual objects (e.g., Munsell colour chips or Morse Code signals)
and the distances between these points represent the relative dissimilarity be-
tween the objects. The model of geometric PS space represents aspects of the
agent’s mental states. For example, the mental image of a red colour shade is
a point in a space in which the dimensions are hue, saturation and brightness.
Shepard defines PS as the psychophysical function that maps between properties
of the physical stimuli and an appropriate behavioural generalisation response (cf.
Shepard, 1981/2017). This introduces the particular method that Shepard uses
to reverse-infer PS from patterns of generalisation data—the method of multi-
dimensional scaling (henceforth ‘MDS’).
An MDS algorithm transforms empirical recordings of generalisation data such as
similarity judgements and confusion probabilities into a distribution of points in a
multi-dimensional, geometric, space. The goal of MDS is to find the cognitive pro-
cess and representation of the objects that accurately generates the generalisation
data. In other words, this is a form of reverse-engineering the cognitive process
that has generated the data. The MDS algorithm uses information about met-
ric distances between points to generate a function that accurately predicts this
generalisation data.6 In calculating distances, MDS ‘scales’ the data and thereby
offers a psychological interpretation of stimulus difference. This transformation of
a similarity judgement or confusion probability to a point in geometric space can
be interpreted as a perceptual representation of how similar two stimuli are. In
the model, this representation corresponds to a “mental arithmetic that mimics
the distance formula” (Borg & Groenen, 2005, p. 3). In other words, geometric
distances in the model represent subjects’ perceptions of similarities between ob-
jects and the multi-dimensional space models a PS space. Recently, this model
has been taken a step further towards the explicit claim that the dimensions of
geometric space represent qualities associated with subjects’ perceptual experi-
ences, for instance, the perceptual experience of colour (cf. Gärdenfors, 2000, pp.
6-15). This characterisation of MDS can be summarised in the following propo-
sition.
Lemma 1 (Geometric Similarity). If two perceptual objects, i and j, can be rep-
resented as vectors in a psychological similarity space that is structured by geo-
metric quality dimensions, then how perceptually similar i and j are is expressed
6Computationally, the most important aspect of the method is that the distribution of points
in multi-dimensional space is modelled along as few dimensions as possible, until there is
no better fit with the linear differences in the ordinal data with n dimensions than there
would be with n+1 dimensions. The ergodicity of the distribution ensures that the resulting
configuration is objective, in the sense that any starting point of modelling the data will
result in the same spatial configuration of points.
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in the geometric distance between their corresponding vectors in psychological
similarity space.
Figure 3.2.: On the left: Similarity matrix indicating judgements of similarities of Morse
Code Signals. From “A measure of stimulus similarity and errors in some
paired-associate learning tasks,” by Rothkopf, 1957, Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 53(2), p. 97. Copyright permission is in the public
domain. Indexes indicate averages of subjects’ confusion probabilities as-
sociated with a pair of signals. On the right: a 2-dimensional configuration
of Rothkopf’s data. Morse code signals are classified according to the num-
ber of components on the y-axis and the relative proportion of dots versus
dashes on the x-axis. For example, the signal for letter ‘V’ has 4 absolute
components, and a relative proportion of 3 dots to 1 dash. From “Multidi-
mensional scaling, tree-fitting, and clustering,” by Shepard, 1980, Science,
210(4468), p. 391. Copyright 1980 by The American Association for the
Advancement of Science. Reprinted with permission.
An example of MDS is Shepard’s (originally 1963, as cited in Shepard 1980,
p. 391) analysis of Rothkopf’s (1957) Morse Code data. The left of figure 3.2
presents Rothkopf’s original 36 × 36 similarity matrix, which indexes the ordinal
differences between subjects’ average confusion probabilities associated with each
pair of Morse code signals in the stimulus set of Rothkopf’s study.7 The right
7Rothkopf computed these indexes by taking the confusion probability associated with any
judgement for each pair, e.g. for {A,B}, and its respective counterpart, e.g. {B,A}, adding
the results and dividing by two. Thus, where originally there was a ‘09’ at position [∅,A]
and a ‘03’ at position [A, ∅], the new matrix indicates a ‘06’ at position [∅, A] because
09 + 03 = 12, 12/2 = 06. Thus, the matrix only shows the values for an idealised pair of
signals.
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of figure 3.2 illustrates the results of Shepard’s transformation of Rothkopf’s
data into a 2-D configuration of points in multi-dimensional space (as cited in
Shepard 1980, p. 391). Shepard models the signals along two dimensions. The
y-axis indicates the absolute number of components that each signal has, where
this value ranges from 1 to 5 components. For example, the signal ‘... ’, which
stands for the letter ‘V’ in the International Morse Code alphabet, has 4 absolute
components. The x-axis indicates the relative number of dots and dashes that is
associated with each signal. For instance, the signal ‘... ’ (‘V’) has a proportion
of 3 dots against one dash.
Taken together, this section has connected Shepard’s method of MDS to the
reverse-inference scheme suggested in chapter 1. This method operates under the
assumption that the cognitive mechanism that generates patterns of generalisa-
tion behaviour operates on representations of perceived similarities between the
relevant stimuli. The next section explains more precisely the proposal that PS
can be measured as a geometric distance function.
3.4. Assumptions of the geometric approach
The assumption that the structure of perceptual categories or concepts is a func-
tion of geometric distance deserves special attention because in Shepard’s model,
the ULG is derived from this assumption. (In chapter 6, it will be shown that
some aspects of the ULG can also be preserved without the geometric-distance
assumption.) This assumption guides the scientific inference that the observed
patterns of generalisation are based on a process inside the agent’s mind that
involves mental representations of relations between the relevant objects. This
is why the ULG is a law about psychological mechanisms, as contrasted earlier
with correlations of physical events (e.g., objective probability of generalisation
and wavelength of light). Two aspects of this assumption should be highlighted.
The first aspect is that there are multiple ways to measure geometric distance,
suggesting that there might not only be one unique function that could accurately
model PS. The second aspect is the reliance of the geometric distance model on
the metric axioms. To start with the first aspect, the following paragraphs explain
two prominent distance functions.
The first function is the city-block distance, which measures the distance between
a pair of points by taking the sum of their distances along each axis in a geometric




|xi − xj|, (3.1)
where dij stands for the psychological dissimilarity (i.e., the geometric distance)
between a stimulus i and a stimulus j. The formula says that for a pair of
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points, the dissimilarity between their associated objects is the sum of the points’
distances along each axis in geometric space.
The second function is the Euclidean distance, which measures distance along
a direct path by taking the diagonal between any pair of points or vectors in







In equation 3.2, the dissimilarity between two points is their squared distance,
raised to the power of 1/2.
Note that in Shepard’s (1987) model, dissimilarity is interpreted to mean the
opposite of PS. Correspondingly, PS is the inverse of geometric distance so that
distance corresponds to dissimilarity, d(·, ·). Hence, according to the model, the
closer two objects are in PS space, the more similar they are. Conversely, the
greater the distance associated with two objects is, the less similar they are. More
formally, let a and b each represent a vector in multidimensional space, and their
geometric distance be represented as the function d(a, b) = 1/s(a, b). Figure 3.1
suggests that the distance function has a negative exponential form with respect
to generalisation tasks.
The method of MDS uses either of these distance measures to derive the ULG.
It has been suggested that which distance measure is more appropriate for mod-
elling PS depends on the context, which can be specified as differences in the
structure and relations between the dimensions. However, there is no consensus
about which measure is better in which context. Shepard (1980, p. 394) argues
that the measures obtain different accuracies depending on whether the stim-
uli are “perceptually unitary” or whether they are “analyzable”. Homogeneous
colours are an example for perceptually unitary stimuli and differences between
them should be measured with the city-block distance. Geometric shapes are ex-
amples for analysable stimuli and should be measured with the Euclidean metric.
Gärdenfors (2000, p. 24) argues for a similar difference between “integral” and
“separable” dimensions. Gärdenfors’ example for integral dimensions are the di-
mensions of hue, saturation and brightness. He argues that differences in colours
should be measured with the Euclidean distance instead. Separable dimensions,
such as size versus shape, should be measured with the city-block distance. Thus,
both distance measures of PS may be more or less appropriate, depending on the
given context.
3.4.1. The metric axioms
Both measures satisfy the most important theoretical assumption in the geomet-
ric model; that PS is governed by the geometric axioms—a geometric distance
function, δ, is a mapping from a pair of points in a geometric space to a non-
negative number, under the condition that δ maps numbers onto pairs of points
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in a way that satisfies the metric axioms. Geometric distance is constrained by
the metric axioms: symmetry, minimality and triangle inequality.
1. Minimality: δ(a, b) ≥ δ(a, a) = 0.
In words: The distance between an object and itself is equal for all objects,
and must be smaller or equal to the distance between two objects. It is only
equal to the distance between two objects if and only if these are identical,
that is, if and only if a = b.
2. Symmetry: δ(a, b) = δ(b, a).
In words: The distance between two objects must be the same, regardless of
the direction from which their distance is measured. The distance from a to
b must be the same as the distance from b to a.
3. Triangle inequality: δ(a, b) + δ(b, c) ≥ δ(a, c).
In words: In a triadic comparison, one distance must always be shorter or
equal to the sum of the other two distances.
The axioms lead to the following constraints on possible PS processes.
1. The PS between an object and itself is constant, and must be greater or
equal to the PS between two distinct objects.
2. The PS between a and b must be the same as the PS between b and a.
3. Given three objects, a, b, c, the PS of any pair, (a, c) must be shorter than
the PS of any two pairs, (a, b) and (b, c), together.
In summary, this section has presented the geometric conception of PS. The next
section presents three arguments in favour of this conception.
3.5. In favour of the geometric conception
Empirical support
A first argument in favour of the geometric conception focuses on the success-
ful application of the method of MDS. At Shepard’s time, this method achieved
more empirical support than earlier attempts to interpret similarity-judgement
data. One of such attempts was a linear model that only relied on the ordinal
data from subjects’ similarity judgements or their confusion probabilities. On an
ordinal scale, the numerical distances have a linear relationship to each other.
This method is less predictively powerful; it cannot derive the ULG as it pre-
dicts a linear instead of an exponential relationship between the probability of a
generalisation responses and stimulus similarity.
Another problem of ordinal analyses is that they complicate the empirical support
for the hypothesis that there is a unique cognitive mechanism that corresponds
41
3. Shepard’s geometric approach
to behaviour that is associated with these similarity judgements. Linear distri-
butions associated with categorisation data vary depending on whether the data
is from studies with one or another species and one or another type of stimulus.
McGuire’s and G&K’s results illustrate this: In both cases, probability of gener-
alisation decreases with physical stimulus dissimilarity but the way it decreases
varies from A to B. Therefore, the data from these studies cannot be regarded
as instances of support for a common theory of PC. In contrast, the ULG ac-
cumulates empirical support across different species and stimuli and is a better
candidate for such a theory. Given that the ULG is derived with MDS, MDS
receives indirectly more empirical support than the ordinal model.
The assumption that generalisation depends on geometric distance has also mo-
tivated further empirical research that lends indirect support for the ULG from
the empirical sciences over recent decades. From their comprehensive survey and
analysis of more recent ethological generalisation data, Ghirlanda and Enquist
(2003, p. 15) conclude that there are aspects of generalisation that are uni-
versal: “patterns of generalization are largely independent of systematic group
(evidence is available for insects, fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals,
including humans), behavioural context (feeding, drinking, courting, etc.), sen-
sory modality (light, sound, etc.) and of whether reaction to stimuli is learned or
genetically inherited”. They note that “[...] such gradients are better described
by Gaussian curves than by exponentials” (ibid.). However, mathematically, the
Gaussian form is a special case of the exponential form of the gradient when a
multi-dimensional psychological space is assumed (S. A. Frank, 2018). Overall,
this research shows that the geometric conception has suggested further questions
about the shape of the generalisation function and that these questions have af-
forded more recent practical applications and additional empirical support for the
ULG.
Visual transparency
A second argument in favour of the geometric conception is that it allows for
more simplicity in the interpretation of the behavioural data. One way in which
this can be seen is by looking at the MDS method. Figure 3.2 illustrates this.
The MDS solution makes the overall relationship between the averaged PS data
explicit and visually accessible. The resulting configuration on the right simplifies
the matrix on the left in this sense by rearranging the data points from the left
into a 2-dimensional configuration on the right. The simplification makes the data
also more explicit. For example, the information revealed by indices on the left
is restricted to the pair-wise comparisons of data but the spatial configuration on
the right visualises the implicit psychological structure across these comparisons.
What is more, the spatial configuration allows us to classify the Morse Code
signals into five categories, as illustrated by the band that is cut across the 2D
space. This illustrates that the visualisation of similarity-judgement or confusion




A third argument for the spatial solution is that it makes the data more com-
prehensive. In the Morse Code example from figure 3.2, the spatial configuration
reveals how the original pair-wise PS judgements relate to each other across the
whole signal system. For example, the band-classification explains why subjects
are more likely to wrongly judge Morse Code signals of the form ‘ .. ’ (represent-
ing the letter ‘X’) and ‘. .’ (representing the letter ‘P’) to be the same; these
signals lie in the same band in proximity space, while other signals lie in different
bands. In other words, the band pattern allows one to infer where in the distri-
bution subjects may place category boundaries. Thus, the spatial configuration
is useful to interpret the original data in novel ways.
When considered in the context of a reverse-engineering approach to PC, the
geometric approach is useful in serving an ‘as-if’ explanation of how PC could
work.8 The idea is that the MDS algorithm simulates the mental process that is
responsible for computing similarities in the subject’s mind. Roughly, the process
takes a measure of PS between two objects, a and b, and generates a probability of
generalising from a to b, given this similarity measure. Changes in generalisation
behaviour can then be explained by reference to a psychological mechanism that
works ‘as if’ subjects compute geometric distances between perceptual object
representations in their internal psychological spaces.
3.6. Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has reconstructed Shepard’s (1987) proposal that PS is
a geometric-distance function (section 3.3.2). Roughly, two objects are relatively
similar if the distance of their corresponding points in psychological similarity
space is relatively small. In Shepard’s geometric model, the objects are perceptual
kinds and the dimensions represent perceptual attributes (e.g., for colour, these
are the hue, saturation or brightness dimensions). The use of Shepard’s geometric
model of PS is to derive the ULG, which is Shepard’s cognitive approach to
generalisation. I have explained what the ULG is (section 3.2): a psychological
law that states that the probability to generalise from one object to another is a
negative exponential function of the psychological distance or dissimilarity of the
objects. Objects that are closer in this space obtain a higher probability of being
confused or judged to belong to the same category. I have discussed the ULG in
the context of two case studies: peoples’ categorisations of circles and pigeons’
categorisation of colour.
I have argued that Shepard’s ULG can be understood as a psychological law
of PC behaviour and positioned this view on ULG in the context of a reverse-
engineering approach to PC (section 3.3). The method of MDS is a key step in
8For an excellent explanation of how ‘as-if’ explanations are used in models that analyse
cognitive behaviour as rational, see van Rooij et al. (2018).
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this relation. This method offers an approach to modelling PS representations and
algorithms, thereby moving beyond a computational level approach to PC. I have
subsequently favoured the geometric conception of PS based on three arguments
(section 3.5). Firstly, the method of MDS obtains more empirical support than
ordinal methods. Secondly, the method makes the generalisation data visually
accessible. Thirdly, the geometric conception allows for novel interpretations of
the data. Lastly, I have explained the model’s key assumption that PS relies on a
geometric-distance function and on the metric axioms (i.e., minimality, symmetry
and triangle inequality, section 3.4.1).
Overall, the key argument put forward was that PC is a function of geometric
distance and relies on the geometric axioms. The key support for this argument
was the intimate connection between Shepard’s ULG, which he had derived from
a metric PS spaces model, and the phenomenon of PC. Both phenomena reflect
a cognitive function of categorising perceptual objects. Shepard’s ULG is math-
ematically elegant and has a broad scope; it predicts generalisation behaviour
across species, stimulus domains and modalities (figure 3.1).
I close this chapter with a critical reflection on two problems with Shepard’s
ULG that are worth mentioning about his approach. The first problem is that
in Shepard’s (Shepard, 1987) examples, ULG is typically derived from data that
is aggregated across subjects. For example, in the ordinal matrix in Rothkopf’s
(1957), each index reflects the average of a group of subjects’ judgements of the
similarity associated with a stimulus pair and does not directly reflect subjects’
individual judgements. The worry is that ULG may not reflect information about
a possible mechanism that may have generated the data patterns in any single
subject. In other words, Shepard’s ULG may not be a description of the func-
tion that explains generalisation behaviour in an individual subject. However, it
should be noted that this criticism possibly concerns only the result of ULG and
not the practical viability of the MDS method. In principle, MDS can be used to
construct configurations of individual data (Borg & Groenen, 2005, ch. 21).
The second problem concerns the assumption that PS relies on the metric axioms,
and in particular, on the axiom of symmetry (section 3.4.1). The assumption is
problematic in two respects. In one respect, the assumption limits the power of
the geometric model to account for some effects in the generalisation data. For
example, in figure 3.2, the spatial solution on the right lacks information about
ordering effects that were initially present in the original data matrix on the left.
For example, the original matrix in figure 3.2 indexes different values for the two
distinct pairs (A,B) and (B,A) but the transformed matrix is more restricted;
it indexes an average value to represent these two pairs indistinctly (i.e., A is
as similar to B as B is to A). Thus, with respect to ordering effects, the spatial
configuration is useful to reveal some aspects of the generalisation data (e.g.,
classification patterns) but it is not a perfect solution for revealing all aspects of
it.
The second respect is philosophical and concerns a problem of directionality.
Shepard (1981/2017) sees PS as a mapping from processes in the world (e.g.,
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physical relations between two stimuli) to mental states (e.g., mental represen-
tations of their similarities). Given that he defines PS as a geometric-distance
function, this implies that the world-mind relation must be symmetric. However,
there are strong reasons to doubt that this relationship is symmetric. From a
philosophical perspective, the relation between processes in the world and men-
tal processes is inherently directional because PS states are about states in the
world (see A. M. Isaac, 2013, for discussion). A possible argument against the
geometric model is then that it lacks an account of aboutness because the model
assumes that PS is symmetric. To account for the aboutness of mental states
(e.g., representations of similarity), one needs to account for the directionality in
the function that relates PS states to states of objects and the relations between
them.
These respects are distinct: the first sense of directionality is present in the empir-
ical data on similarity judgements but the second sense of directionality concerns
the aboutness of mental states. The first sense is an objectively measurable fact
while the second sense is an assumption of a theory of the mind. The next chapter
focuses on the empirical problems of directionality and discusses a possible alter-







This chapter discusses Tversky’s (1977) theory of PS as a set-theoretic function
of matching features. The chapter contrasts Tversky’s feature-matching model of
PS with Shepard’s (1987) geometric model of PS. I focus on Tversky’s explana-
tion of the directionality associated with empirical ordering effects in similarity
judgements. An example for this directionality is the finding that people typically
judge Tel Aviv to be more similar to New York than New York to Tel Aviv. I
argue that Tversky’s account of why directionality occurs contributes to an un-
derstanding of why patterns of PC sometimes change depending on the context.
An example of this context-sensitivity is that sometimes, it is more natural to
group the first pair in figure 4.1 with the second pair, while other times, it is
more natural to keep these sets of pairs separate. This is interesting because
explaining effects of directionality and context-sensitivity is difficult to do with
the ULG and the geometric conception of PS. The ULG describes a regularity
(i.e., it is context-insensitive) and the geometric conception relies on the axiom
of symmetry.
Section 4.2 clarifies the key assumptions of the feature-matching model. Section
4.3 motivates Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching theory of PS as an alternative to
Shepard’s (1987) geometric theory of PS on the basis of the finding of direction-
ality. Section 4.4 illustrates how Tversky’s model accommodates asymmetries
with a case study of Rothkopf’s Morse Code data. Section 4.5 explains how
the feature-matching model, in conjunction with Tversky’s diagnosticity princi-
ple, can account for effects of context-sensitivity in PC. Section 4.6 evaluates
the feature-matching model. I argue that ability to accommodate context effects
speaks in favour of the feature-matching model but Tversky’s theory of PS is
possibly too far-fetched or idealised.
4.2. Feature-matching
In Tversky’s (1977) theory, feature-matching is a process of PS. The process is
described by a function that takes sets of features as inputs and outputs a linear
measure of their overlap. Figure 4.1 illustrates this with schematic faces. a and b
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Figure 4.1.: 4 pairs of schematic faces. From “Features of similarity,” by Tversky, 1977,
Psychological review 84(4), p. 331. Copyright 1977 by the American Psy-
chological Association. Adapted with permission.
overlap with respect to one feature—the round profile. They divide with respect
one feature that is distinct to a—the smile—and one feature that is distinct
to b—the straight eyebrow. According to Tversky’s theory of PS as feature-
matching, the PS of two objects is the extent to which they ‘match’ each other
on a linear scale of discrete features. It is apparent that Tversky’s theory of PS is
mathematically different from Shepard’s (1987) theory because the former relies
on a set-theoretic description of the data, not on geometric quality dimensions
(section 3.3.2).
More formally, the feature-matching function is defined as follows. Let ∆ =
{a, b, c, ...} be the domain of objects. A,B,C, ... is the set of sets of features,
where each feature set is associated with an object from ∆. (For example, A is the
set of the features that are associated with the object a.) The feature-matching
function characterises PS as a set-theoretic difference between two objects and
takes the following general form.
s(a, b) = F (A ∩B,A−B,B − A). (4.1)
Equation 4.1 says that for a pair of objects, a and b, the PS between these objects
is a function, F , of
the intersection of their features, A ∩B,
the disunion, A−B, of the features that are distinct to a without b, and
the disunion, B − A, of the features that are distinct to b without a.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relations between these sets in the faces example.
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Figure 4.2.: Sets of common and distinct features for each pair of faces from figure 4.1.
4.2.1. Key assumptions
The first assumption of Tversky’s model is that sets of common and distinct
features are discrete elements. This implies that features must be expressed
by integers (i.e., countable whole numbers). For example, the set of possible
eyebrows that a face has is countable and this set can be isolated from other sets
of facial features1 A face cannot have 2.5 features.
The second assumption is that the origin of the feature space is a data base of
objects, ∆ = {a, b, c, ...}, where ∆ represents the stimuli given in a similarity-
judgement experiment. This assumption implies that there exists a process prior
to feature-matching, which extracts a set of features associated with each object
in the data base. For example, if the data base is ∆ = {a, b}, where a and b
represent the faces in figure 4.1, the process might extract the features 〈R, SE, S〉,
where R represents the feature round profile, SE represents the feature straight
eyebrow and S represents the feature smiling. The extraction process somehow
links 〈R, SE, S〉 to a and b.
On Tversky’s approach, when these assumptions are met, the feature-matching
algorithm can proceed by counting the number of links that the objects do or
do not already share. This illustrates that in contrast to Shepard, Tversky is
not concerned with the problem of perception (i.e., how the agent arrives at a
stable representation of an object). The goal is to explain how PS judgements are
computed once stable object representations (as stored in the data base) are in
place, and once the relevant sets of features have been extracted from the objects.
In the next section, I motivate this approach and explain how Tversky’s model
accommodates the directionality associated with judgements of similarity.
1A contrasting example is the set of possible colours of a face, which is uncountable because
it cannot be isolated: a face has varying shades of colour, which transition gradually into
each other. However, this understanding of sets of features leaves open the possibility that
a set of features is countable yet cannot be isolated.
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4.3. Why feature-matching?
The feature-matching model is motivated by the aim to avoid three shortcomings
of the geometric model. Firstly, the geometric model relies on the metric axioms
but these, particularly the symmetry axiom, are sometimes violated. Secondly,
the geometric model does not explain the directionality associated with judge-
ments of similarity. Thirdly, the geometric model does not capture the full range
of possible PS functions. I walk through each shortcoming in turn.
4.3.1. Violations of the metric axioms
The geometric model is ignorant to directionality in the following sense. By
definition, the metric distance between two points, a and b, is always the same
as the metric distance between b and a. On the basis of the symmetry axiom,
the geometric conception lets us expect that subjects’ judgements of similarity
should be non-directional. That is, we would expect that subjects judge that a is
as similar to b as vice versa. Implicit in this expectation is the assumption that
directionality is the opposite of symmetry. We can then say that a PS judgement
of two objects is symmetric (i.e., non-directional) if and only if it is independent
of the order in which the two objects are compared. For instance, a geometric
function of the distances between cities on the world map is symmetric (non-
directional) because it is ignorant of whether distance is measured from the point
representing Tel Aviv to the point representing New York or whether distance is
measured from New York to Tel Aviv instead. The function that computes the
distance should give the same results in either direction; it should be symmetric.
The geometric model illustrates the same ignorance.
Tversky refutes the geometric model on the basis of empirical evidence that seems
to show that subjects’ judgements of similarity are sometimes directional in this
sense. His case in point are observations such as the following. He reports that
phenomenon that people are more likely to judge (S1) Tel Aviv to be similar to
New York and they are less likely to judge (S2) New York to be similar to Tel
Aviv. He also reports that people commonly prefer to say that (S3) ‘North Korea
is like Red China’ instead of saying that (S4) ‘Red China is like North Korea.’
(Tversky, 2004, p. 8) He extends this analysis to further domains of evidence,
showing that similarity statements comparing geometric figures or Morse Code
signals are directional as well (Tversky, 1977, pp. 333-334).
Before looking at the details of his explanation of these cases, it should be noted
that Tversky uses the term ‘directional’ in two ways. On the one hand, he uses
this term to refer to empirical similarity-judgement data (e.g., the observation
that people commonly say that Tel Aviv is more similar to New York than the
other way around). In this way, directionality describes the objective behaviour
associated with similarity statements (e.g., statements about how similar New
York is to Tel Aviv and vice versa). On the other hand, it is implicit in Tver-
sky’s explanation of these effects that directionality is also a property of subjects’
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mental states about the objects (e.g., how subjects represent the relation between
Tel Aviv and New York in their minds). In Tversky’s theory, the directionality
in the observable similarity statements is structurally the same as the direction-
ality in the internal PS judgements. He seems to think that the latter are verbal
expressions of the former. My interpretation is that Tversky understands di-
rectionality so that the internal judgements of PS take the form of beliefs that
can be understood as propositions in a language of thought (Fodor, 1975, 2008).
Nevertheless, conceptually, the two notions should be distinguished. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, I explicate a possible distinction between them. I start with
PS judgements.
Definition 4.3.1 (Directionality, PS judgements). A pair of PS judgements,
S(a, b) and S(b, a), is directional whenever S(a, b) 6= S(b, a), where S describes a
belief about the relation between a and b.
According to this definition, an example for a PS judgement is the case in which a
subject judges the similarity between Tel Aviv and New York to be different from
the similarity between New York and Tel Aviv. This judgement is directional; the
subject’s belief about the relation between Tel Aviv and New York is not equal
to the subject’s belief about the relation between New York and Tel Aviv.
I contrast this with Tversky’s description of directionality in similarity statements.
On Tversky’s (1977, p. 328) account, a directional similarity statement typically
has the (grammatical) form ‘a is like b’ (1) or ‘b is like a’ (2). Correspondingly, a
non-directional similarity statement should have the form (3) ‘a and b are alike.’
Recapitulate that it is assumed that there is a structural correspondence between
similarity judgements and similarity statements. On this basis, Tversky’s illus-
trations implicitly suggest that the corresponding similarity judgements take the
form S(a, b) in (1) and S(b, a) in (2) when S(a, b) 6= S(b, a). The form of (3)
implies that S(a, b) = S(b, a), so that the corresponding similarity judgement is
symmetric. I define the directionality in similarity statements as follows.
Definition 4.3.2 (Directionality, similarity statements). A similarity statement,
‘a is like b’, is directional if, when asserted, its counterpart, ‘b is like a’, is
simultaneously denied. Formally: s(a, b) 6= s(b, a).
In light of definition 4.3.2, the explanation of directionality builds on changes
in the meaning of similarity statements. For example, people judge the similar-
ity between Tel Aviv and New York to be different from the similarity between
New York and Tel Aviv because the terms referring to these objects in peo-
ple’s expressions of similarity statements take on different semantic roles and
this creates a difference in the meanings of the statements “Tel Aviv is like
New York” (S1) and “New York is like Tel Aviv” (S2). In S1, Tel Aviv has
the role of the subject and in S2, Tel Aviv plays the object, while New York
takes on the role of the object in S1 and the role of the subject in S2. Tversky
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seems to understand the change in the meaning from S1 to S2 to be somehow
caused by a difference in the content associated with people’s internal similar-
ity judgements. This seems somewhat plausible under the implicit assumption
that similarity statements are verbal expressions of similarity judgements (e.g.,
beliefs with the same structural form). Thus, in the actual example, the expla-
nation of the current example is that the similarity statement about Tel Aviv is
directional (i.e., s(Tel Aviv, New York) 6= s(New York, Tel Aviv)) because sub-
jects’ inner similarity judgement is directional (i.e., S(Tel Aviv, New York) 6=
S(New York, Tel Aviv)). More generally, when a pair of similarity statements
is directional, this observation is the expression of the directionality between a
pair of similarity judgements. Correspondingly, effects showing that pairs of sim-
ilarity statements are sometimes directional indicate that pairs of judgements of
similarity are sometimes directional.
This outline of Tversky’s understanding of directionality makes his claim that di-
rectionality violates the assumption that PS relies on the symmetry axiom more
transparent. Provided that directionality is the opposite of symmetry and that
there is a structural correspondence between similarity statements and similar-
ity judgements, the hypothesis that pairs of statements of similarity are some-
times directional implies that judgements of similarity are sometimes asymmetric.
Therefore, Tversky’s finding of evidence for this hypothesis is evidence against
the universal truth of the assumption that PS is a function of geometric distance.
Note that Tversky attempts to refute minimality and triangle inequality as well.
He attempts to refute minimality based on two claims. (1) Self-similarity is not
always the same. (2) Self-similarity is typically less than 1. Both claims are
confirmed by the averaged data in the diagonal entries in Rothkopf’s similarity
matrix (section 3.4, figure 3.2, left).2 However, these results do not violate what is
implied by the minimality axiom. Firstly, it does not follow from minimality that
self-similarity must be the same across subjects and stimulus pairs. Secondly, the
most obvious prediction of the minimality axiom can be confirmed; the diagonal
entries in Rothkopf’s similarity matrix (figure 3.2, left) exceed the off-diagonal
entries.
Tversky endeavours to refute triangle inequality on the basis of a simple coun-
terexample, which centers on the similarities among Cuba, Russia and Jamaica.
Recapitulate that triangle inequality says that for any triadic relationship, the
individual distances between any pair of points must be smaller than or equal
to the sum of the other two alternative distances. Correspondingly, the judged
dissimilarity between Jamaica and Russia must be smaller than the joint dissim-
ilarities between Cuba and Jamaica and Cuba and Russia. Formally, if trian-
gle inequality holds: δ(Jamaica, Russia) ≤ δ(Jamaica, Cuba) + δ(Cuba, Russia).
2The diagonal of this matrix indicates similarity judgements associated with objectively iden-
tical stimuli, (a, a), (b, b), (c, c), etc. For example, if b is the signal ‘-...’, then the index
(b, b) represents the typical similarity judgement for the identical signal pair ‘-...’ and ‘-...’
. In figure 3.2 (left), these indexes vary from 83 to 96 percent. Therefore, the averaged
identification probability is not constant across identical pairs.
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Tversky’s argument against triangle inequality rests on the premise that trian-
gle inequality implies transitivity3 and the hypothesis that PS cannot be ex-
pected to be always transitive. In the example, Jamaica is geographically sim-
ilar to Cuba and Cuba is politically similar to Russia but Jamaica and Rus-
sia are not similar at all (or, to put it differently, Jamaica and Russia are
extremely dissimilar). If PS was transitive, Russia should be in some respect
similar to Jamaica. Tversky drives this example a bit further, suggesting that
δ(Jamaica, Russia) > δ(Jamaica, Cuba) + δ(Cuba, Russia), which is roughly the
opposite of what triangle inequality predicts. However, the caveat of Tversky’s
example is that it is a thought experiment and still needs empirical validation.4
Considering these arguments, I think that Tversky’s case against the geometric
model is strongest with respect to the directionality associated with pairs of sim-
ilarity statements and the hypothesis that directionality is a property associated
with the internal structure of pairs of PS judgements.
Taken together, this section has explained Tversky’s (1977) claim that the ob-
servation of directionality in similarity statements is evidence against the axiom
of symmetry. I have explicated Tversky’s implicit assumptions about the rela-
tionship between directionality and symmetry and the systematic correspondence
between similarity judgements and their expression in similarity statements. On
this basis, I have outlined how Tversky’s theory of PS as feature-matching pos-
sibly explains the apparent violations of the symmetry axiom. In conclusion,
if Tversky’s assumptions are correct, then Shepard’s (1987) geometric model of
PS cannot represent all aspects of PS. The next section outlines Tversky’s more
precise explanation of directionality effects.
4.3.2. Origins of directionality
Tversky’s theory of PS explains directionality under the assumption that three
conditions are simultaneously met.
1. The similarity-judgement task is formulated in a directional way. The task,
‘how similar are a and b to each other?’ is non-directional but ‘how similar
is a to b?’ is directional.
2. One of the distinct sets of features associated with the objects is more salient
than the other. In the model, this requires that f(A−B) 6= f(B − A).
3If a is quite similar to b and b is quite similar to c, then a cannot be very dissimilar from c
either. All other things being equal, the further c departs from a, the more likely it becomes
that the triangle axiom will be violated.
4Similarly, Müller-Trede, Sher, and McKenzie (2015, p. 280) argue that “no clear triangle
inequality violations have been empirically demonstrated to date” Yearsley, Barque-Duran,
Scerrati, Hampton, and Pothos (2017, p. 27). add to this observation in pointing out the
difficulty that “there is currently no precise notion of how the triangle inequality translates
into a constraint for similarities, as opposed to dissimilarities.”
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3. The focusing hypothesis: if conditions 1 & 2 hold, then the sets of distinct
features should be weighted unequally in the feature-matching process, so
that α 6= β.
Following Tversky (Tversky, 1977, pp. 331-332), the feature-matching model can
explain directionality whenever these three conditions are met. I outline the intu-
itive explanation of this here and illustrate the details of how this works in section
4.3.3. Roughly, the intuitive explanation is that the effect of directionality occurs
because subjects change their focus of attention to the objects’ distinct features
when the experimental task changes in design. In particular, when conditions
1-3 are met, the objects become relatively more or less distinct with a change
in their relative order in the comparison. One interpretation of this dynamic is
offered in Tversky and Gati (1978, pp. 81, 85), who argue that the objects under
comparison become relatively more or less distinct because their semantic roles
in the similarity statements change. On this understanding, subjects’ shift of
attention is elicited by their interpretation of the semantic roles of the referring
terms in similarity questions. The assumption is that people pay generally more
attention to whatever stimulus in the pair takes the place of the object (e.g., New
York in S1), and less attention to the stimulus that plays the role of the subject
(e.g., New York in S2). When the more salient stimulus (e.g., New York) takes
the role of the object, the distinctiveness (dissimilarity) between the objects is
strengthened (e.g., in S1). When the more salient stimulus takes the role of the
subject, the objects are relatively less distinct (e.g., in S2). More generally, a
change in the relative position of two objects of different salience (as indicated by
differences in the cardinalities of their distinct sets of features) in the comparison
produces the directionality effect.
To illustrate Tversky’s explanation of directionality, I forestall aspects of the con-
trast model (section 4.3.3). In the model, S(a, b) is the linear difference between
the common and distinct sets of features associated with a and b. When α > β,
then in S1, the set of features distinct to Tel Aviv obtain more weight than the set
of features distinct to New York. In S2, the set of features distinct to New York
obtain more weight than the set of features distinct to Tel Aviv. Since Tel Aviv
is, intuitively, associated with fewer distinct features (it is relatively less salient),
its position in second place in the contrast model (corresponding to S2) subtracts
a smaller amount of dissimilarity from the set of common features. Table 4.1
summarises these results.
Taking stock, this section has explained directionality with the feature-matching
function, F (equation 4.1) and with Tversky’s focusing hypothesis (α 6= β). Re-
capitulate that in equation 4.1, F takes sets of features to a similarity measure
but it does not specify the mathematical operation that combines these sets (e.g.,
addition, subtraction, multiplication or division). The next section explains two
variants of the feature-matching model—the contrast model and the ratio model.
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New York (salient) Tel Aviv (not salient) PS
object subject high
subject object low
Table 4.1.: Illustration of the influence of relative position between objects of different
salience in feature-matching. Relative position is indicated as semantic role
(subject or object) in a similarity statement. The prediction of amount of
PS (high vs low) is based on the additional assumptions that the task is
directional and the focusing hypothesis.
4.3.3. Diversity of directionality
Tversky (1977, p. 322) describes the contrast model with the following mathe-
matical function.
S(a, b) = θf(A ∩B)− αf(A−B)− βf(B − A), for some θ, α, β ≥ 0. (4.2)
The model represents S(a, b) as a linear combination of the shared and distinct
features associated with the object pair a and b. The parameter f is a non-
negative scale over a given set-theoretic space, which relates the function S to
the features of the objects. f takes the set of common or distinct features as an
input and outputs a value for the cardinality of that set. The weights, θ, α and
β are positive constants between 0 and 1. They determine how much each set
of features contributes to the overall measure of PS associated with a and b. If
θ = 1, α = β = 0 then similarity depends only on the set of common features.
Conversely, if θ = 0, α = β = 1 then similarity depends only on the sets of distinct
features.
In the contrast model, a change in the PS associated with a and b is a result of
changes in the absolute cardinality of sets of features. When keeping the cardi-
nality of common features constant, directionality effects can be accommodated
by either swapping the order of the objects and their associated distinct features
or by changing the weights associated with the corresponding sets of distinct fea-
tures. In other words, under the focusing hypothesis (i.e., α 6= β), an effect of
directionality is either produced by a change in the relative difference between
the weights (e.g., by changing α > β to α < β), or by a change in the relative
position of the sets of distinct features (i.e., by swapping the positions of the
terms f(A−B) and f(B − A)). Table 4.2 illustrates these effects.
Table 4.2 shows that, under the focusing hypothesis (α 6= β), a change in the
relative weight between a pair of two sets of distinct features is enough to produce
directionality. This can be seen when comparing row 1, where α < β, and row
5, where α > β, while keeping all other parameters fixed. A comparison between
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f(A ∩B) f(A−B) f(B − A) α β S(·, ·)
1. 100 60 10 2 5 -30
2. 100 10 60 5 2 -70
3. 100 60 10 2 2 -40
4. 100 10 60 2 2 -40
5. 100 60 10 5 2 -180
6. 100 10 60 2 5 -220
Table 4.2.: Illustration of the accommodation of directionality (S(a, b) 6= S(b, a)) with
different parameter settings in the contrast model.
rows 1 and 6 illustrates that, under the focusing hypothesis, only a change in
the relative position of the distinct sets of features suffices likewise to evoke an
effect of directionality. However, changing the relative order of the objects in
the comparison (corresponding to a change in the relative position of the sets of
distinct features in the model) will not suffice to evoke directionality if the focusing
hypothesis is denied (i.e., when α = β). This is illustrated in the comparison
between rows 3 and 4. Thus, the focusing hypothesis needs to be accepted to
produce effects of directionality with the contrast model.
The second variant of the feature-matching model is the ratio model. This model
represents S(a, b) as a ratio of the number of the common features to the total
number of the common and the distinct features associated with an object pair.
Tversky describes this model with the following mathematical function.
S(a, b) = f(A ∩B)
f(A ∩B) + αf(A−B) + βf(B − A) , for some α, β ≥ 0. (4.3)
In equation 4.3, PS is normalised and S takes on values between 0 and 1. This
implies that the sum of the values in the denominator is fixed relative to the
measure of similarity between a and b.
The ratio model can accommodate directionality effects as well. For comparisons
with the same pair of objects, PS increases when there are more common than
distinct features and when one set of distinct features is more important than
the other (i.e., α 6= β). PS decreases when the opposite is the case. Table 4.3
illustrates this with numbers. Under the focusing hypothesis (i.e., α 6= β), only
changing the relative weights, while all other parameters are fixed, will evoke
directionality in the ratio model. This is illustrated in the comparison between
rows 1 and 3. A comparison between rows 1 and 6 illustrates that a change in
the relative position of the objects and their associated distinct sets of features is,
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ceteris paribus, sufficient to generate an effect of directionality. This result holds
only when the focusing hypothesis (α 6= β) can be accepted. This is illustrated
in the comparison between rows 3 and 4 (table 4.3).
f(A ∩B) f(A−B) f(B − A) α β S(·, ·)
1. 100 60 10 2 5 .37
2. 100 10 60 5 2 .37
3. 100 60 10 2 2 .42
4. 100 10 60 2 2 .42
5. 100 60 10 5 2 .24
6. 100 10 60 2 5 .24
Table 4.3.: Illustration of how directionality (S(a, b) 6= S(b, a)) can be accommodated
by setting parameters differently in the ratio model.
Taken together, equations 4.2 and 4.3 look quite different. How can they be
understood as instances of a common feature-matching process? In some sense,
both models belong to an overarching description of what it means for two objects
to be similar. Firstly, in both models, S (‘similarity’) is an interval scale over
a pair of objects, a and b, and preserves the similarity order between a and b.
Whenever it is true that s(a, b) ≥ s(c, d), then it will be true that S(a, b) ≥ S(c, d).
For example, when the observed similarity between an apple and a pear is greater
than the similarity between a banana and a peach, the scale S maintains this
information, regardless of the particular numbers that it assigns to the similarities
of these objects. Secondly, in both models, this relationship is linear. S increases
linearly with a linear increase of the number of common features of a and b and
S decreases linearly with an increase in the number of distinct features. Finally,
both models can explain directionality only under the additional assumption that
conditions 1-3 in section 4.3.2 are met. Most importantly, both models rely on
the truth of the focusing hypothesis (α 6= β), as is illustrated in tables 4.2 and
4.3.
In another sense, the contrast and ratio models are differently informative about
what it means for a and b to be relatively (dis-)similar. In equation 4.3, a change
in the relative position of the objects (e.g., row 1 vs row 6, table 4.3) has the
same effect as a change in relative weight (e.g., row 1 vs row 5, table 4.3). In
contrast, in equation 4.2, a change in relative position (row 1 vs row 6 in table
4.2) has a different effect as a change in relative weight (row 1 vs row 5 in table
4.2). The reason for this is that in the ratio model (equation 4.3), a change in S
is relative to the number of all features considered, while in the contrast model
(equation 4.2), the change is a function of the absolute differences between the
numbers attached to common and distinct features. In other words, according
to the contrast model, PS is an absolute relationship between a and b, while
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according to the ratio model, PS indicates how much more or less similar a and
b are in relation to the associated overall cardinality of features.
Taken together, I have explained that Tversky’s accommodation of directionality
with either the contrast or the ratio models relies on the three conditions that
the task is directional, that the objects are differently salient and that the subject
pays more attention to one object than to the other (i.e., α 6= β). I have illus-
trated this with the cities and countries examples. In these examples, Tversky’s
explanation of directionality relies on an interpretation of the semantic roles that
are played by the objects. However, it is possible that shifts in attention may
be elicited in a more general way. From the perspective of the feature-matching
model, the focusing hypothesis should be true when conditions 1 & 2 are met,
and these conditions are independent of an interpretation of the objects’ seman-
tic roles. In the next section, I discuss one of Tversky’s tests of the generality of
the focusing hypothesis under conditions 1 and 2. This is Tversky’s analysis of
Rothkopf’s (1957) Morse code data (section 4.4). Following this analysis, direc-
tionality is relatively independent of the type of stimuli. I illustrate that under
the assumption that shorter signals are less salient than longer signals, and when
α > β is fixed, PS in the model will be higher when the longer signal takes the
second position while the shorter signal takes the first position in the comparison
(and PS will be lower when this order is reversed, under the assumption that
α > β).
4.4. A case study: directionality in similarity
judgements of Morse Code signals
Tversky’s analysis of the Morse Code data (Tversky, 1977, p. 336) serves to test
the focusing hypothesis. To recapitulate, the hypothesis says that the distinct
sets of features of a pair of objects in a similarity-judgement task are differently
important to a subject, depending on the relative position of the objects in the
comparison. In the feature-matching model, this translates to the assumption
that α 6= β. To test the focusing hypothesis with an analysis of Rothkopf’s (1957)
data, Tversky concentrates on only those pairs of Morse Code signals, i and j,
that are judged to be differently similar. When analysing these pairs, Tversky
considers at two factors. The first factor is the order of a signal within a pair
(i.e., the relative positions of i and j). The second factor is the temporal length
of the signals (i.e., how many components each signal has). He then addresses
two questions:
1. Is a subject more (or less) likely to confuse i and j if i is presented first and
j is presented second (respectively, vice versa)?
2. Is a subject more (or less) likely to confuse i and j if i is temporally longer
than j (or vice versa)?
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The first question serves to tests the hypothesis that similarity judgements are
directional. The second question serves to test the hypothesis that the direction-
ality of a subject’s similarity judgement is guided by different attentional weights
on sets of distinct features. When accommodating directionality in the Morse
Code data, Tversky uses the contrast model. I have illustrated in section 4.3.2
that the corresponding explanation of directionality effects relies on three addi-
tional assumptions. In Tversky’s analysis of the Morse Code data, these are the
following assumptions.
(a) Temporally longer signals (denoted by ‘p’) are more salient than temporally
shorter ones (denoted by ‘q’).
(b) The focusing hypothesis (i.e., α 6= β): differences in relative salience induce
differences in subjects’ foci of attention to the distinctive aspects of each
signal.
(c) The task is directional: when q is presented prior to p, this is equivalent to
q being the subject and p being the object in the comparison.
Tversky’s analysis shows that, when (a)-(c) are met, the contrast model can be
used to accommodate effects of directionality in the Morse Code data. In partic-
ular, the model can be used to accommodate the observation that the probability
to confuse the signals ‘..’ (q) and ‘.–.’ (p) is sometimes greater than the probability
to confuse the signals ‘.–.’ and ‘..’. From the perspective of the theory of PS as
feature matching, a possible explanation of this effect would be that if conditions
(a)-(c) are met, then the distinct features associated with p decrease the PS of
the pair relatively more than the distinct features associated with q in the first
case than in the second case. Two aspects of Rothkopf’s (1957) data seem to
support Tversky’s assumption that conditions (a)-(c) are met and that the con-
trast model can be used to accommodate these effects. Firstly, the probability to
confuse a signal pair was usually higher when the shorter signal appeared prior
to the longer signal. This seems to be relevant to the first and second conditions:
depending on the relative length of the signals, the objects become differently
salient. Secondly, the order in which the signals were presented made a difference
to how likely is was to confuse them. This seems to relate to the third condition,
that the order of the signals is important to the difference in their salience.
Kind of relationships Number of cases Percentage of total no. of cases
s(q, p) > s(p, q) 336 0.61
s(p, q) > s(q, p) 181 0.33
s(q, p) = s(p, q) 38 0.07
Table 4.4.: Overview of the effects of directionality in Rothkopf’s Morse code data,
based on Tversky’s (1977, p. 336) analysis.
A summary of these findings is presented in table 4.4. Row 1 indicates that
relative to all 555 analysed cases, it was more likely to confuse q and p if q is
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presented prior to p. Row 2 indicates the opposite, that it was more probable to
confuse q and p if p is presented prior to q. s(q, p) exceeds s(p, q) in 61 percent
of all trials5.
These results support Tversky’s assumptions. Firstly, the relative differences
between the results in the third columns associated with rows 1 and 2 confirms
the assumption that the signals’ relative temporal length affects their relative
salience. Secondly, the results in row 1 confirm the assumption that the signals’
relative position affects the directionality in their comparison. Overall, table 4.4
illustrates that the effect of directionality is a pattern in the data. There are
517 out of 555 pairs of similarity judgements that are directional and only 38 out
of 555 cases in which confusion probability is symmetric despite a change in the
relative order of p and q. Intuitively, this pattern needs explanation.
In the following paragraphs, I use Tversky’s contrast model to elucidate why the
directionality effect might occur. For any pair of signals, (p, q), let P and Q stand
for their associated features, respectively. (P ∩Q) is the set of features common
to both p and q, (P − Q) is the set of features distinct to p and (Q − P ) is the
set of features distinct to q. Following the contrast model (equation 4.2), the
similarity between p and q can be computed as follows.
A. S(p, q) = θf(P ∩Q)− αf(P −Q)− βf(Q− P ).
And the similarity between q and p can be computed as follows.
B. S(q, p) = θf(Q ∩ P )− αf(Q− P )− βf(P −Q).
For example, let p stand for the signal ‘..–’ and let q stand for the signal ‘..’.
Assuming that there is no focusing, so that α = β, the contrast model can be
used to predict that S(p, q) = S(q, p).
C. S(p, q) = θf(P ∩Q)− αf × (1)− βf × (0) = θf(P ∩Q)− 1.
D. S(p, q) = θf(Q ∩ P )− αf × (0)− βf × (1) = θf(P ∩Q)− 1.
In both C and D, PS is a function of the set of shared features minus one set of
distinct features. Thus, without any additional assumptions, the PS between p
and q is symmetric in C and D. This changes upon introducing the focusing hy-
pothesis (i.e., α 6= β), under which the contrast model accommodates differences
in the ordering effects. Assuming that α = 3 and β = 1, the contrast model can
be used to predict that S(q, p) > S(p, q), such as in the following case.
5These numbers add up to more than 100 because they are rounded. When using the exact
numbers from Rothkopf’s data, the percentages in the third column add up to 100.
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E. S(p, q) = θf(P ∩Q)− 3× f × (1)− 1× f × (0) = θf(P ∩Q)− 3.
F. S(p, q) = θf(Q ∩ P )− 3× f × (0)− 1× f × (1) = θf(P ∩Q)− 1.
In E and F, PS between p and q is directional: in E, 3 sets of features are
subtracted from the overall set of common features, while in F, only 1 set of
features is subtracted. The features distinct to p (i.e., temporal length) contribute
more to the dissimilarity because the features distinct to p weigh heavier in the
PS they subtract from the set of common features.
Interim conclusion
The discussion so far has established the claim that the feature-matching model
accommodates directionality effects. These effects are at odds with the symmetry
assumption of Shepard’s (1987) geometric model of PS (section 3.3.1). A similar-
ity judgement associated with two objects, a and b will sometimes be directional
so that the PS between a and b is different from the PS between b and a.
Following Tversky’s model, I have given two possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon (section 3.3.2). The first explanation is that directionality is determined
by the relative salience of the objects and effects of directionality can be expected
if a is more salient than b or vice versa. This explanation alludes to subjects’ back-
ground knowledge about the objects’ relative salience and their semantic roles in
similarity statements. If a plays the role of the object and b plays the role of
the subject but b is more salient than a, it can be expected that a and b will be
less psychologically similar than if a was the object and b the subject in the com-
parison. On Tversky’s account, these semantic roles are determined by factors
implicit in how the experimental task is formulated. The second explanation is
that directionality depends on the relative number of distinct features associated
with each object so that the PS between a and b will be smaller than the PS
between b and a if a has more distinct features than b. This explanation alludes
to the attentional mechanisms involved when comparing a pair of objects. In
other words, an object with a larger number of independent features will con-
tribute more to making the pair dissimilar. How much an object contributes
to the dissimilarity depends on the subjects’ sensitivity to the object’s distinct
features.
In section 3.3.3, I have shown in detail how the feature-matching theory of PS
accommodates directionality effects with the contrast and ratio models. Section
3.4, has illustrated Tversky’s explanation of directionality effects in Rothkopf’s
(1957) Morse Code data. The next section connects Tversky’s theory of PS to the
phenomenon of PC. I focus on an explanation of how the feature-matching model
in conjunction with Tversky’s diagnosticity principle (s.b.) can accommodate
effects of context on PC behaviour.
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4.5. Feature-matching and categorisation
Tversky’s diagnosticity principle asserts that for a given set of objects that
can be grouped into different categories, a replacement (addition or deletion)
of category members can alter how the remaining objects in the array will be
categorised. The basic assumption of the principle is that objects are grouped
with respect to the diagnostic value of their associated features. A feature has
diagnostic value for a grouping if and only if it is significant for the group. For
example, the diagnostic value of being real is low for the category animal in a
context in which there are only real animals because being real is insignificant for
any grouping amongst the real animals; all available animals in that context are
real. In contrast, in an expanded context that includes also legendary animals
like centaurs, mermaids or a phoenixes, the diagnostic value of the feature being
real increases. In this expanded context, being real becomes diagnostic of the
category animal (cf. Tversky, 1977, p. 342). I illustrate Tversky’s diagnosticity
principle with two examples (figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Figure 4.3.: Illustration of the diagnosticity principle with two sets of four countries.
The percentage of subjects who grouped any test country together with
Austria (the target) is indicated below that country. The average group-
ings were: [a,b] & [p,c] in set 1 and [a,c] & [b,q] in set 2. From “Features
of similarity,” by Tversky, 1977, Psychological review, 84 (4), p.343. Copy-
right 1977 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with
permission.
The first example is an experiment from Tversky & Gati (1978, pp. 92-95) on
the comparison between sets of countries. In one condition (1), Austria (a) was
compared to Sweden (b), Poland (p) and Hungary (c). In another condition
(1), Austria (a) was compared to Sweden (b), Norway (q) and Hungary (c).
Both conditions offer different contexts: (1) offers a political interpretation of
the similarities between these 4 countries and (2) offers a classification based
on their geographic similarity. This difference is induced by the replacement of
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Poland (p) in (1) with Norway (q) in (2). Subjects had to group the set of 4
countries into pairs. The results of Tversky & Gati’s experiment are indicated in
the percentages in figure 4.3, which is taken from Tversky’s (1977, pp. 342-343)
report of this experiment. These results support the diagnosticity principle. In
condition (1), subjects were most likely to categorise Sweden and Austria into one
category and Poland and Hungary into another. In condition (2), subjects were
most likely to classify Austria and Hungary into one category and Sweden and
Norway into another. Tversky & Gati (1978, pp. 92-94) interpret these results
to indicate that the categorisation of the countries into clusters changes with the
context because the context changes the diagnostic values associated with features
of these countries6. In (1), political features are diagnostic of the categorisation
of Austria with Sweden and Poland with Hungary. In (2), geographic features
are diagnostic of the categorisation of Austria with Hungary and Sweden with
Norway.
Note that the stimuli in Tversky & Gati’s experiment are not purely perceptual;
they are names of countries and they clearly require the subject to know the geo-
graphic and political situation of the countries to categorise them. This knowledge
is not purely perceptual—subjects do not perceive the geographic and political
situation of the countries in the experiment. Thus, one may wonder whether
this example clearly illustrates the connection between Tversky’s diagnosticity
principle and the phenomenon of perceptual categorisation.
The second example is an experiment reported in Tversky (1977, p. 342) on the
comparison between sets of schematic faces (figure 4.4). This example is supposed
to illustrate more clearly that Tversky’s diagnosticity principle is relevant to PC.
In one condition (1), the objectively neutral target face (a) is compared with faces
b, p and c. In another condition (2), a is compared with b, q and c. Intuitively,
(1) is a ‘smiling’ context while (2) is a ‘frowning’ context. As in the previous
example, a change in the context is induced by the replacement of the stimuli p
and q and a subjects’ task was to group the 4 objects into pairs. The results,
indicated in the percentages in figure 4.4, support the diagnosticity principle.
In (1), subjects were most likely to categorise a and b versus p and c. In (2),
subjects were most likely to categorise a and c versus b and q. Tversky’s (ibid.)
interpretation of these results is that the context as induced by replacement of
p and q determines the grouping of non-smiling versus smiling faces in (1) and
frowning versus nonfrowning faces in (2). Smiling has a greater diagnostic value
than frowning in (1) than in (2) and the diagnosticity of frowning versus smiling
is greater in (2) than in (1).
The examples illustrate that Tversky’s diagnosticity principle is about the context-
sensitivity of categorisation. Tversky’s (1977, p. 342) rationale for the principle
is that “[c]lusters are typically selected so as to maximize the similarity of ob-
jects within a cluster and the dissimilarity of objects from different clusters.” On
this basis, Tversky generates the diagnosticity hypothesis, which is a hypothesis
6In this experiment, the context seems to be constituted by the objects themselves (e.g., which
countries are compared), it may be explicitly chosen by the experimenter (e.g., when the
experimenter asks for a judgement of political versus geographical similarity).
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Figure 4.4.: Illustration of the diagnosticity principle with two sets of four schematic
faces. The percentage of subjects who selected any face together with the
target (a) is presented below that face. From “Features of similarity,” by
Tversky, 1977, Psychological review, 84(4), p. 341. Copyright 1977 by the
American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
about the context-sensitivity of similarity judgements. The diagnosticity hypoth-
esis says that “[a] change of clusters [...] is expected to increase the diagnostic
value of features on which the new clusters are based, and therefore, the simi-
larity of objects that share these features” (Tversky, 1977, p. 342). What this
means is that features with a higher diagnostic value obtain more weight in the
feature-matching model than features with a lower diagnostic value. This can
lead to a change in the overall cardinality of the sets of common and distinct
features in the comparison. My earlier illustrations of the contrast and ratio
models have shown that a changes in the weights and cardinality of sets of fea-
tures are likely to lead to different outcomes in the feature-matching process. On
this basis, it seems plausible to think that a change in the diagnostic value of a
set of features associated with two objects in a comparison is likely to induce a
change in the similarity judgement associated with the objects. A change in the
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diagnostic value of a feature influences the way in which objects are categorised,
since diagnosticity depends on the context (e.g., what objects are available in a
similarity-judgement or categorisation task). Therefore, Tversky’s experiments
illustrate that the context indirectly influences categorisation.
If we accept that the diagnosticity hypothesis is true in the above examples, we
would predict that S(a, b) in (1) > S(a, b) in (2), and S(a, c) in (2) > S(a, c) in
(1). Intuitively, under the assumption that diagnosticity is important for cate-
gorisation, we would expect that subjects are more likely to group a with b in (1)
but not in (2) and that they are more likely to group a with c in (2) but not in (1).
Under the assumptions that subjects’ categorisations reflect their internal simi-
larity judgements and they maximise PS among objects within a category and
minimise PS among objects across categories, these predictions are confirmed by
the results in both examples. In the countries example, in (1), Sweden and Aus-
tria are similar in that they are constitutional states while Poland and Hungary
are similar in that they are both former communist states. In (2), Austria is more
similar to Hungary than to Sweden or Norway; Austria is geographically closer to
Hungary in comparison to Sweden and Norway, which are geographically close.
In the faces example, people pair a and b more often than a and c in (1) while in
(2), a and c are more often paired than a and b.
Taken together, this section has explained Tversky’s diagnosticity principle. The
basic assumption of the principle is that objects are grouped with respect to the
diagnostic value of their associated features. On the basis of the principle, Tverksy
had shown that judgements of similarity are context-sensitive. I have discussed
two empirical examples from Tversky (1977) and Tversky and Gati (1978) that
connect this result to the phenomenon of PC. From the perspective of Tversky’s
diagnosticity hypothesis, PC can be expected to change with a change in the
diagnostic value of a set of features that is associated with a set of perceptual
objects when one of the objects is replaced with another from one context to the
other. The next section evaluates Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching approach to
similarity and categorisation.
4.6. An evaluation of the feature-matching
approach
My evaluation of Tversky’s approach has a negative and a positive side. On
the negative side, I argue that Tversky’s approach is too idealised because the
assumption that features are discrete sets is too simple to accurately describe
aspects of similarity and categorisation in the domain of perception. On the
positive side, I argue that Tversky’s approach is valuable because it offers an
explanation of the plausible assumption that patterns of PS and PC often vary
with regards to the context. I start with the positive side.
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4.6.1. Context-sensitive
The examples in section 4.5 have shown that PS is context-sensitive with regards
to explanations of PC. It may be surprising that this is a positive result. In the
introduction of chapter 3, I have mentioned Goodman’s (1972) criticism that PS is
not explanatory because it would vary too much with the context. In that chapter,
I have motivated ULG as a case in point against Goodman’s criticism. ULG
shows that with respect to generalisation, PS is invariant and useful to predict
a wide variety of empirical data. But Goodman is also right in his observation
that similarity judgements are obviously context-sensitive. Goodman gives an
intuitive example:
[C]omparative judgments of similarity often require not merely selec-
tion of relevant properties but a weighting of their relative impor-
tance, and variation in both relevance and importance can be rapid
and enormous. Consider baggage at an airport checking station. The
spectator may notice shape, size, color, material, and even make of
luggage; the pilot is more concerned with weight, and the passenger
with destination and ownership. Which pieces are more alike than
others depends not only upon what properties they share, but upon
who makes the comparison, and when [...] Circumstances alter simi-
larities. (Goodman, 1972, p. 445)
The respects in which the spectator, pilot and passenger may judge pieces of
baggage to be similar may obviously vary depending on what aspects of the
baggage they pay attention to. An adequate model of PS should be able to
account for this intuition. Therefore, such a model should represent the aspect
that PS varies with the context. Recapitulate that the geometric model of PS
does not do this. The geometric representation of distances does not vary with
respect to the context because the dimensions are fixed by the modeller. On the
contrary, Tversky’s contrast model accounts for the observation that similarity
judgements change with the context (section 4.5). The following paragraphs
support the claim that this is a good outcome for Tversky’s theory of PS.
One argument in favour of Tversky’s diagnosticity principle is that it offers a
possible explanation of why patterns of PC might vary depending on the con-
text. An intuitive explanation is the following. In a political context, Cuba and
Russia are similar but in a geographical context, Cuba and Jamaica are similar.
Their membership to the same political or geographical category influences the
judgement of similarity. Likewise, in a political context, Austria and Sweden are
more similar than Austria and Hungary while in a geographic context, Austria is
more similar to Hungary than to Sweden. These are two examples for how the
feature-matching model in conjunction with the diagnosticity principle explains
context effects.
In conjunction with the diagnosticity principle, the feature-matching theory of
PS can accommodate changes in the context by adjusting the weights in the
contrast model. For example, consider figure 4.1 and assume that people like
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smiling faces more than frowning ones, and that they prefer round ones to sharp
ones but are indifferent towards the shape of eyebrows. Correspondingly, in 1)
and 2), θ, α > β and in 3) and 4), θ, α < β, so that, according to the contrast
model: S(a, b) = S(c, d) = 2 + 2 + 0 = 4 > S(a′, b′) = S(c′, d′) = 0 + 0 + 2 = 2.
This accommodates directionality effects in PC. Depending on the distribution
of preferences (i.e., the settings of the weights), two different groupings of the
faces according to their pair-wise similarities arise. For example, g1 = (a, b, c, d)
and g2 = (a′, b′, c′, d′), or a single group that subsumes all these types of faces.
If the preferences (e.g., the faces’ saliency and order) change, the similarity-
orders amongst the pairs change, and consequently, it is reasonable to change the
groupings. For example, if people like smiling faces more than frowning ones,
and they prefer round eyebrows to straight ones but they are indifferent towards
a face’s profile, then S(a′, b′) = 1 < S(a, b) = S(c′, d′) = 3 < S(c, d) = 5. Thus,
intuitively, only the two pairs in the middle shall be grouped according to these
similarity judgements.7
Nevertheless, it should be noted that only the contrast model but not the ratio
model is sensitive to changes in the context. The ratio model is not context-
sensitive because different weights do not produce differences in S. To illustrate
this, consider the case in which people have a preference for smiling and round
faces over frowning and sharp faces but are indifferent towards eyebrow shape
and assume that α = 2 & β = 0 in S(a, b) & S(c, d) and that α = 0 & β = 2
in S(a′, b′) & S(c′, d′). These differences lead to an ordering of the Ss in the
contrast model but the ratio model stays indifferent towards this order so that
S(a, b) = S(c, d) = S(a′, b′) = S(c′, d′) = 1/3.8 This order stays constant even
if various different values for α and β are considered (table 4.3). The only way
in which the ratio model could accommodate differences in S is by changing the
absolute sizes of the sets of the common and the distinct features for each object
pair. Yet, these are fixed for each pair and do not vary with the context. Thus,
contrary to the contrast model, the ratio model cannot explain why different
groupings of the faces arise in light of different preferences. Only the contrast
model seems useful for explaining the context-sensitivity associated with PC.
4.6.2. Far-fetched
The main thread of previous criticisms on the feature-matching model centres on
the fact that the sets of discrete features that describe the objects are given. De-
cock and Douven (2011) have argued that this makes Tversky’s approach circular.
On behalf of Goodman (1972), they argue that a good theory of similarity can be
used to define properties because similarity is the most fundamental relation be-
tween objects. In their (and Goodman’s) view, a feature is a property. In contrast
7Note that the contrast model can also make absolute distinctions. If people prefer smiling
faces over frowning ones, round faces over sharp faces and curved eyebrows over straight
eyebrows, then S(c′, d′) = 1 < S(a′, b′) = 2 < S(a, b) = 4 < S(c, d) = 6. Correspondingly,
no grouping is plausible since all pairs are differently similar.
8The same result obtains when the weights are ignored such that S(·, ·) = 1/1 + 1 + 1 = 1/3.
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to this view, Tversky seems to think that features come prior to similarity. He
presupposes the domain of objects, ∆, where each object is represented by a set
of features (section 4.2. This presupposition is problematic because it makes the
theory of feature-matching viciously circular. Similarity cannot be used to define
properties if similarity itself is defined in terms of a set of properties associated
with the objects under comparison.
Another previous source of criticism comes from Shanon (1988), who argues that
Tversky’s model is explanatory poor because it leaves the discrete sets of features
unspecified. Shanon calls this “the problem of feature specification” (Shanon,
1988, p. 309). He illustrates the problem with an analogy to a communication
task. He asks: which features should a person, a, choose to describe to another
person, b, what face she is talking about? There is an innumerable amount of
features with which a could describe the face to b. Which are those relevant to
both a and b? A fixed objective standard for evaluating which features should
be specified seems necessary for making the communication successful. In other
words, the problem is that Tversky’s theory offers no criteria according to which
the relevant features should be selected prior to the matching process. More
generally, the problem of feature specification seems to be important for a variety
of similarity-judgement problems. For instance, which are the features that are
relevant to identify a cup? Is it the shape? If so, is handleness more important
than roundness? What about the colour? Is it irrelevant for identifying a cup?
The roundness of a cup may be more important in a classical pottery course,
while it may become less important in a modern design outlet for cups, where
cups may have a futuristic shape.
Taken together, both Decock and Douven’s and Shanon’s criticisms centre on the
problem that Tversky assumes either similarity or features as given. My own
worries with the feature-matching model expand on these previous criticisms and
focus on the explanation of directionality. These worries concern three assump-
tions: firstly, the implicit assumptions that the process of feature-matching seems
to rely on symbolic thought (section 4.3.1), secondly, the assumption that direc-
tionality relies on an analysis of the semantic roles of the objects in a comparison
(section 4.3.2), and thirdly, the explicit assumption that objects are decomposable
into features (section 4.2.1).
With regards to the first and second assumptions, my worry is that the feature-
matching model seems to be limited to an explanation of directionality in sym-
bolic similarity judgements. Intuitively, these judgements seem to require two
ingredients: symbolic thought and a prior semantic analysis of the objects’ ref-
erents in a similarity statement. To give some background on this intuition, I
have argued that it is implicit in Tversky’s theory that subjects’ internal com-
parisons take the form of beliefs or propositions (section 4.3.1). For instance,
judgements of the similarity between a and b have the same systematic structure
as statements of the form ‘a is like b’. What is more, I have explained that a
similarity judgement becomes directional when the relative salience of the dis-
tinct sets of features associated with a and b changes. In the explanation, the
change in saliency depends on prior knowledge about the semantic roles of the
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objects’ referents in a similarity statement (section 4.3.2). For example, Tel Aviv
is more similar to New York than vice versa because the distinct features of the
more important object (i.e., New York) become more salient when New York
is the object rather than the subject in a statement like ‘Tel Aviv is similar to
New York’ (or vice versa). Following the contrast model, the increased salience
of New York’s distinct features makes the objects less similar. This explanation
accommodates a wide range of empirical data (Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati,
1978) but its underlying assumptions are problematic.
The first assumption is quite controversial. One view, defended by Barsalou
(2008), is that also amodal symbols (e.g., the signal ‘.—.’) must be grounded in
modal qualities perceived by the system (e.g., in auditory qualities). That is, the
content of these symbols must come from perception. Tversky’s assumption that
features (e.g., the signal’s temporal length) are discrete is at odds with this qual-
itative description because perception is inherently continuous (e.g., there seems
to be no clear perceptual boundary between a crimson- and a scarlet-red colour
shade). It is difficult to explain the perception of similarities with the feature-
matching theory of PS because perception is at least sometimes continuous but
in Tversky’s theory, features are always discrete.
The second assumption is problematic when it comes to explanations of direction-
ality in simple perceptual similarity-judgement tasks. In such tasks, the subject-
object relationship between the objects under comparison might not be known
to the subject. The finding of directionality in the Morse Code data seems to
allow for this possibility; in Rothkopf’s (1957) experiment, subjects were unfa-
miliar with the international Morse Code alphabet. It is unlikely that they could
have identified the subject-object relationships between the signals. This raises
further questions, such as: according to the feature-matching model, would chil-
dren and animals who cannot identify subject-object relationships be capable of
representing the similarity between pairs of objects? Tversky’s explanation of PS
as a function of feature-matching is difficult to generalise across different types
of species, stimuli and modalities. It seems to be limited to comparisons of ob-
jects that are semantically analysable. This may motivate arguments in favour of
Shepard’s (1987) competing theory of PS. The assumption that PS is a symbolic
process is generally difficult. One view, defended by Barsalou (2008), is that
also amodal symbols (e.g., the signal ‘.—.’) must be grounded in modal qualities
perceived by the system (e.g., in auditory qualities). In other words, the content
of these symbols must come from perception. Tversky’s assumption that features
(e.g., the signal’s temporal length) are discrete is at odds with this qualitative
description because perception is inherently continuous.
There are two problems with the third assumption (that objects can be decom-
posed into features). The first problem is that this assumption is difficult to
combine with psychophysical models of how the perception of features works.
The second problem is that this assumption seems to fall short on some evidence
from developmental studies. I start with the first problem. Consider an analogy
with the geometric model, in which dimensions shall play the role of features. In
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psychophysical models of perceptual-object representations, it is common to dis-
tinguish between ‘inseparable’ and ‘separable’ dimensions (cf. Cheng & Pachella,
1984; Gärdenfors, 2000; Maddox, 1992; Melara, 1992; Shepard, 1994). Accord-
ingly, a set of dimensions is inseparable if an object that is assigned a value on
one of the dimensions must also be assigned a value along all the other dimen-
sions that it is integrated with. For example, the dimensions hue, saturation and
brightness in the colour space are integral because it is impossible to represent a
colour shade along only one of them (e.g., only the hue dimension); representation
of colour requires the simultaneous assignment of values along the hue, brightness
and saturation dimensions. Conversely, a set of dimensions is separable if it is
possible to represent an object’s property by assignment of values on a single
dimension in this set without also assigning it values on the other dimensions.
For instance, the shape of a chair can be represented independently of the chair’s
colour. The analogy suggests that some psychological representations of per-
ceptual objects, particularly psychological representations of properties such as
colours, require a structure that is inseparable. If such representations of objects
are comparable to dimensions, then some psychological representations of objects
will not be decomposable. In Tversky’s model, the object-base, ∆, is decom-
posable into discrete sets of features. The assumption that features correspond
to psychological representations of properties of objects seems to be compatible
with the assumption that psychological representations are separable but seems
to clash with the assumption that some psychological representations of objects
are inseparable. As argued above, the latter assumption is basic to at least some
psychophysical studies of object perception. Because it is incompatible with this
assumption, Tversky’s model cannot take into account the results of experiments
in such studies. Thus, Tversky’s model seems to be disconnected from some of
the evidence on the perception of similarities between objects and limited to an
account of PS processes that involve only separable object representations.
I now turn to the second problem. Some findings in developmental studies suggest
that psychological representations of objects in children are not (yet) decompos-
able. It is common to find that young children below the age of five typically
confuse the height of a liquid in a container with the liquid’s volume and just with
time (typically after the age of five) do they learn to distinguish between height
and volume. However, at this stage, children are able to identify what colour the
liquid has.9 According to this view, the decomposability of objects (e.g., liquids)
into discrete features (e.g., height and volume) is not cognitively given and needs
9Initially, these studies were used to test Piaget’s (1964, p. 177) theory of conservation,
which hypothesises that young children fail to understand conservation (e.g., conservation
of volume when pouring a liquid from a wider into a narrower container). One explanation
of this learning effect has been proposed by Gärdenfors (2000, p. 28). He explains the
shift in children’s understanding how liquids should be represented by arguing that children
learn to represent the qualities along distinct dimensions. Leach (1964, p. 34) puts this
trajectory nicely, and as follows: “... the physical and social environment of a young child
is perceived as a continuum. It does not contain any intrinsically separate ‘things.’ The
child, in due course, is taught to impose upon this environment a kind of discriminating
grid which serves to distinguish the world as being composed of a large number of separate




Taken together, this section has argued that the feature-matching theory of PS
is context-sensitive (section 4.6.1). I have argued that this aspect of the the-
ory is helpful to explain why PC might vary from context to context. However,
this is only possible with the contrast model and not the ratio model. I have
subsequently supported the claim that Tversky’s feature-matching theory of PS
is too far-fetched (section 4.6.2). I have reviewed Decock and Douven’s (2011)
and Shanon’s (1988) earlier criticisms. I have then outlined four additional pos-
sible limitations of Tversky’s model. The first limitation was that under the as-
sumption that similarity judgements take the form of similarity statements, the
processes of feature-matching in Tverky’s model seem to correspond to symbolic-
thought processes, which seem difficult to account for the perception of simi-
larities. The second problem was that Tversky’s explanation of directionality
relies on the assumption that subjects can assess the subject-object relationships
between objects in a similarity statements, but subjects often cannot do this al-
though intuitively, they can perceive the similarities between the objects. The
third problem was that the assumption that features are decomposable is diffi-
cult to combine with psychophysical studies on the perception of integral object
representations and studies that suggest that the ability to decompose features is
not developmentally given. Overall, I suggest on this basis that Tversky’s theory
can accommodate much empirical data, but its assumptions are in many respects
too idealised or far-fetched.
4.7. Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has proposed Tversky’s (1977) set-theoretic theory of PS
as an alternative to Shepard’s (1987) geometric theory of PS. The key assumption
of Tversky’s feature-matching model is that PS is a linear function of the common
and distinct sets of discrete features. I have explained this assumption in detail
(section 4.2). I have explained how two versions of the feature-matching model
each accommodate the directionality in judgements of similarity (section 4.3). I
have illustrated this with Rothkopf’s (1957) Morse Code data (section 4.4), which
was already subject to my illustration of the method of MDS in chapter 3. I have
evaluated Tversky’s set-theoretic theory of PS in section 4.6. I have argued that,
on the one hand, the theory is very flexible; in conjunction with the diagnosticity
assumption, Tversky’s feature-matching model offers one possible explanation of
why PC is inherently context-sensitive. On the other hand, the assumption of
discrete features is possibly too far-fetched.
Before closing this chapter, let me add a critical remark to my evaluation of Tver-
sky’s theory of PS. My exposition has illustrated that the theory has obtained
a wide variety of empirical support and can accommodate many aspects of PS-
judgement behaviour that were previously difficult to explain with the geometric
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conception. However, Tversky’s theory does not explain why the behaviour asso-
ciated with PS takes the form that it does. For example, why is the PS between
a and b sometimes different from the PS between b and a? This lack of expla-
nation is problematic from the perspective of a reverse-engineering approach to
PC (chapter 3). Recapitulate that this approach starts with a computational
level analysis of what the problem of PC is and why the problem is appropri-
ate (Marr, 1982). The logic of the solution to the problem is then evaluated
with respect to its optimality given certain environmental conditions (Anderson
& Matessa, 1990). Models following this approach are typically appreciated for
their predictive power (Zednik & Jäkel, 2016, p. 666). Neither of these aspects
are present in Tversky’s theory of PS. The feature-matching model is different
from a computational level description. It describes what the function is that
the system has to compute but not why this function is rational or why it should
be computed (section 4.2). The theory is descriptive but not normative. From a
perspective other than data-fitting, it is still unclear why PS should be regarded
as a function of matching distinct sets of features. There is no reason to think
that feature-matching is optimal with regards to the agent’s environment. So why
think that the feature-matching function is a plausible model of a subject’s rep-
resentation of similarity? Together, these points suggest that Tversky’s model of
feature-matching hardly fits into a reverse-inference explanation of PC behaviour.
Taken together, the feature-matching model targets explanations of different cases
than the geometric model of PS. It is not immediately clear in how far these mod-
els compete with each other. The directionality associated with PS judgements
like the case in which Tel Aviv is more similar to New York than the other way
around and the context-sensitivity in categorisations of sets of countries like Ja-
maica and Cuba against Russia, on the one hand, and Cuba and Russa against
Jamaica, on the other hand, are a case in point; these cases are not in the domain
of explanatory targets of Shepard’s model of ULG. The next chapter compared
and contrasts these two theories of PS and argues that they compete with each
other.
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Both Shepard’s (1987) and Tversky’s (1977) models offer possible approaches to
the problem of modelling PC. Both propose that the ability to recognise or gen-
eralise and classify or distinguish objects depends somehow on the internal rep-
resentation of how similar the objects are. Although many of Tversky’s empirical
examples go beyond purely perceptual cases (such as in the countries example
from section 4.5), I have argued that some of these cases deserve to be interpreted
as genuine examples of PC. A case in point are the faces (section 4.5) and Morse
Code examples (section 4.4). The question that both theories seem to address is:
How is it possible for an organism to generalise its behaviour from one (previous)
experience to another (novel) experience, even if these experiences are unique?
For instance, upon having eaten a (portobello) mushroom, x, and encountering
a (fly agaric) mushroom, y, should you eat y as well?
The standard solution to this decision task is to say that the organism uses a
measure of the similarity amongst the experiences of x and y, or a measure of
their difference, to decide. Roughly, the rule is: if the two experiences are similar,
then generalise. If the two experiences are different, then don’t. The challenge for
both Shepard and Tversky is to answer the question of what ‘similar (or different)’
means. In some sense, x and y are similar: they both have a body and a head.
In some sense, they are different: x has a brown colour, y is red with white spots.
In chapters 3 and 4, I have illustrated that Shepard’s and Tversky’s models offer
different approaches to a more precise notion of PS. This chapter compares these
approaches with respect to their differences and commonalities and outlines the
theoretical debate that has emerged between them.
5.1. Conflicting assumptions about similarity spaces
The first difference concerns assumptions about the PS spaces. Shepard (1962;
1987) assumes that there is a PS space and defines PS as the inverse of geometric
distance in that space. The key points of this approach are (i) that PS must
comply with the axioms of geometric distance and (ii) that this definition of PS
accounts for the exponential gradient of generalisation, which is described by the
ULG.
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Regarding (i), particularly the symmetry axiom stands out when contrasting
Shepard’s and Tversky’s models. Recall that symmetry says that δ(x, y) =
δ(y, x), where δ stands for ‘dissimilarity’ (section 3.4.1). The underlying assump-
tion of the geometric model of PS is that dissimilarity corresponds to an internal
representation of stimulus difference and is directly proportional to a metric mea-
sure of distance. Thus, the symmetry axiom indirectly says that the PS between
x and y must be the same as the PS between y and x. Tversky’s (1977) al-
ternative definition of PS refrains from the metric axioms. The motivation for
this is the empirical observation that judgements of similarity are sometimes di-
rectional. For example, people judge Tel Aviv to be more similar to New York
than vice versa. I have explained that Tversky (1977); Tversky and Gati (1978)
interpret these effects as violations of the metric axioms because they implicitly
assume that similarity judgements take the form of similarity statements (section
4.3.1). Accordingly, while the symmetry axiom says that S(a, b) = S(b, a), this
finding illustrates that at least in some cases, S(a, b) < S(b, a) (or vice versa),
where S stands for ‘similarity’, ‘a’ stands for New York and ‘b’ stands for Tel
Aviv. Tversky’s model is not violated by observations of directionality in sim-
ilarity statements, if these are understood as effects of asymmetries in internal
similarity judgements.
(ii) is a key data point in favour of the geometric model but not the feature-
matching model. The ULG says that generalisation maps monotonically onto
PS; the higher the measured degree of PS between two objects, x and y, the
exponentially more probable it is to observe an organism to generalise behaviour
from one to the other. In contrast, the feature-matching model defines PS as a
linear combination of the sets of shared and distinct features that the organism
associates with x and y. Tversky’s key assumptions are that sets of features are
(1) discrete and (2) chosen from a database of objects that can be decomposed
into features.
Taken together, these definitions of PS seem to rely on conflicting mathematical
assumptions. The claim that PS is a function of geometric distance relies on the
metric axioms and the respective function has an exponential shape. The claim
that PS is a function of matching sets of discrete features relies on axioms of set-
theory and the respective function is linear. The axiom of symmetry cannot be
combined with the asymmetric relationship between some sets in some applica-
tions of the feature-matching model, and the exponential shape of generalisation
cannot be combined with the linearity of the feature-matching function. With
respect to these mathematical assumptions, the models seem to be in conflict.
5.2. Different explanatory targets
The second difference is that the geometric and the feature-matching model seem
to target different empirical phenomena. When contrasting their analyses of
the Morse code data, the set of directionality data that Tversky had analysed
(section 4.4) is only a subset of the data that is subject to the MDS solution
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proposed by Shepard (section 3.3.2). This may be a symptom of different goals:
while Shepard seemed to have aimed at a visualisation and explanation of how
subjects represent clusters of pairs of signals (section 3.5), Tversky seemed to
have aimed at an explanation of directionality effects and a confirmation of his
focusing hypothesis (section 4.3).
These goals seem to clash with respect to the empirical observation that similar-
ity judgements are sometimes directional (see section above). On the one hand,
the geometric model fails to explain such directionality effects because there is
no parameter in Shepard’s geometric model that could increase or decrease the
relative distance of two points when these are represented in the same geometric
space. What is more, if PS judgements have to rely on the symmetry axiom, then
these judgements cannot be asymmetric. If asymmetries correspond to direction-
ality effects, then if the symmetry axiom would accurately describe how people
judge similarities, we should not expect people to display directionality in how
they judge similarities.
On the other hand, I have illustrated that the contrast model can accommodate
the effect of directionality in the example of Tel Aviv and New York (section
4.3.3). To recapitulate, the model assigns the set of features distinct to Tel Aviv
relatively less weight than the features distinct to New York when New York is the
object and Tel Aviv is the subject. Conversely, when Tel Aviv is the object and
New York is the subject, the parameters in the model are adjusted in the opposite
way. Therefore, a relatively smaller set of distinct features is subtracted when
New York is the object than when Tel Aviv is the object in the comparison. Note
that the feature-matching model can also accommodate non-directional results.
Symmetry holds if and only if the weighted cardinalities of the sets of distinct
features are equal, and when these sets subtract equal amounts from the set of
shared features in the contrast model.
5.2.1. Existing geometric solutions to the problem of
directionality
In this section, I review two existing generalisations of Shepard’s (1962; 1987)
geometric model of PS that can possibly accommodate directionality effects. On
this basis, I suggest that directionality is less problematic for the geometric model
than Tversky had originally thought.
The first generalisation of Shepard’s geometric model is Nosofsky’s (1986; 1991)
approach to a biased-choice model. In the model, the dissimilarity between two
objects is represented as a weighted geometric distance (e.g., City-Bock or Eu-
clidean distance, chapter 3) between them1. A change in the distance between a
1A simplified version of how Nosofsky (1986) expresses this is the following function: dij =[∑
wk|xik − xjk|r
]1/r (Nosofsky, 1986, 41, eq. 6), where wk is the weight, w, attached to a
dimension, k, and 0 ≤ wk;
∑
wk = 1. This function expresses the dissimilarity between two
objects i and j as the sum of the weighted distances betwen i and j along each dimension.
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pair of objects is introduced by adjusting the weights attached to the dimensions
along which the objects are represented. In the model, a greater (or smaller)
weight represents that a subject pays more (or less) attention to the respective
dimension. This leads to a shrinking or expanding of the metric scale of distances
(which is otherwise equal along different dimensions) and can modify the metric
distance function. Increasing the weight stretches the dimension wile decreasing
the weight shrinks it. This modification of a metric distance function can express
the directionality of a task; an initial distance between two points can be length-
ened or shortened if a change in the direction of the task increases or decreases
the weights assigned to the dimensions of the relevant space.
Nosofsky’s approach originates from Shepard’s (1957) model for predicting identi-
fication/confusion probabilities in generalisation and similarity-judgement tasks.
This model is now known as the ‘similarity-choice model’ (Luce, Bush, & Galanter,
1963). In the similarity-choice model, PS is interpreted as a function of the con-
ditional probability of giving an identical response to a test stimulus j as was
previously given to a training stimulus i. The conditional probability is defined
as the ratio of the bias associated with j to the distance between i and j in a
multi-dimensional space.2
In analysing the similarity-choice model, Nosofsky (1991) has argued that the
observed effects of directionality in data-sets of confusion-probabilities (such as
in Rothkopf’s initial data matrix, figure 3.2, left) are effects of cognitive biases
that influence the perception of individual objects. On Nosofsky’s analysis, the
key to using the similarity-choice model to explain observations of directionality
effects is a separation between PS and bias in the model. Nosofsky distinguishes
the two as follows. PS is a metric relation between two objects while bias is
“a characteristic pertaining to an individual object” (ibid., 94). Building on the
similarity-choice model, Nosofsky shows how stimulus bias can be added to a
multi-dimensional scaling solution of identification/confusion-probability data to
derive cases in which the spatial relation between objects in the solution can be-
come asymmetric. On this account, it is the differences in the biases associated
with whatever object plays the role of the test stimulus, j, that account for dif-
ferences in the identification/confusion probabilities associated with two objects
a and b, while otherwise, the distance between a and b would be constant. If
the bias associated with a = j in one direction has a larger bias than b = j in
the other direction, then it is more probable to identify/confuse a with b than
to identify/confuse b with a. On this basis, a geometric model can be used to
predict asymmetries in the identification/confusion data; if two objects are asso-
ciated with different biases, then, depending on the relative order in which they
are compared to each other, their PS is likely to be different.
2Formally, the function is this: pr(Rj |Si) = bjsij/
∑
k bksik, where bj , sij ≥ 0 and sij = sji.
Rj stands for a response (e.g., a rating on a Likert-scale) attached to a test stimulus, j, and
Si stands for a training stimulus, i. bj represents the bias attached to j and sij represents
the similarity between i and j. The corresponding model says that the probability of a
response to the test stimulus given a training stimulus is a function of stimuli-similarity as
well as the bias attached to the test-stimulus.
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A special case of the similarity-choice model is Krumhansl’s (1978) distance-
density model. In Krumhansl’s model, PS is defined as the geometric distance
between a pair of points in a multi-dimensional space, while density is defined
as a function of the distance number of points surrounding a point. The model
proposes a new interpretation of similarity-judgement data, which is in terms
of a function of PS that represents also information about how well a subject
can discriminate two points in relation to their respective environments. Corre-
spondingly, the new distance-density measure of PS is a function of the geometric
distance between the points, a and b, and the sum of their weighted densities.
Formally: s(a, b) = f [d̄ = d(a, b) + αδ(x) + βδ(y)], where δ, α, β ≥ 0. δ(a) rep-
resents the density associated with the surrounding of a and δ(b) represents the
density associated with the surrounding of b, δ(b), while α, β represent weights
on these densities. On the distance-density model, the PS between two objects is
a linear function of the distance between the object representations in geometric
space and the density of the environments associated with each of the objects. In
contrast to geometric distance, density need not satisfy the metric axioms. PS
need not be symmetric because d̄(a, b) can be different from d̄(b, a). In particular,
if α 6= β, then d̄(a, b) 6= d̄(b, a) if and only if δ(a) 6= δ(b) (Krumhansl, 1978, p.
447). That is, both the densities and associated weights must be unequal to derive
directionality. However, the distance-density measure of PS becomes symmetric
when α = β while, simultaneously, δ(a) = δ(b). If either of these conditions is
not met, then d̄ will be asymmetric.
Taking stock, this section has outlined two existing generalisations of Shep-
ard’s geometric model of PS. These are Nosofsky’s (1986; 1991) approach to
the similarity-choice model and Krumhansl’s (1978) distance-density model. In
the next section, I compare and contrast these approaches to how the feature-
matching model derives directionality effects. I argue that it is possible that
the biases in Nosofsky’s and Krumhansl’s solutions are different from those in
Tversky’s solution.
5.2.2. Comparison to Tversky’s solution
According to Tversky (1977, p. 333), directionality can be expected if the task
is directional way and if the focusing hypothesis (α 6= β) holds. Under these
conditions, S(a, b) 6= S(b, a) if and only if f(B) 6= f(A) (i.e., the distinct sets of
features of the objects are unequal in their relative salience). For example, if the
task is to judge the similarity between Tel Aviv and New York, or vice versa, and
if more attention is paid to the distinct features of the subject than the referent of
the comparison (i.e., α > β), then the PS between New York and Tel Aviv should
be lower than the PS between Tel Aviv and New York (i.e., S(a, b) > S(b, a)),
since New York is (intuitively) associated with more distinct features than Tel
Aviv (i.e., f(B) > f(A)).
In comparison to Tversky’s account, Krumhansl’s (1978, p. 453) explanation of
how the distance-density model derives the desired asymmetries builds on the
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following argument. Firstly, Krumhansl takes on Tversky’s focusing hypothesis,
that when a similarity-judgement task is directional, then the subject will pay
more attention to one object than to the other (i.e., α 6= β). Secondly, Krumhansl
adds to this hypothesis the assumption that a difference in focus produces the
following effect: the density of the environment surrounding one object will affect
their judged PS more than the density of the environment surrounding the other
object (or vice versa). However, it must be well noted that this effect will only
be produced if and only if these densities are different to begin with. Krumhansl
originally applies this explanation to the case of directional comparisons between
two more or less prominent objects. Roughly, Krumhansl assumes that the promi-
nent object shares many features with other objects while the unknown object
shares only a few features with other objects. On this basis, Krumhansl argues
that the point representing the prominent object in the model falls in a dense
region in PS space, while the point associated with the unknown object falls in
an isolated region in PS space.
When applied to the above example of cities, Krumhansl’s explanation of the
observed directionality would be that the task is directional, so that α 6= β,
while, at the same time, New York and Tel Aviv share differently many features
with other countries. In particular, to produce the desired effect that Tel Aviv
is more similar to New York than vice versa, the following must hold. If α > β,
then New York has to share more features with other cities than Tel Aviv does,
so that New York is in a relatively dense region in PS in contrast to Tel Aviv. A
possible problem with Krumhansl’s explanations is that it is not clear why New
York should share more features with other cities than Tel Aviv (e.g., smaller
cities have different features, but not necessarily less features). This problem
does not apply to Tversky’s explanation, which only requires that the distinct
sets of features associated with Tel Aviv and New York are unequally salient (but
not necessarily unequal in number).
Nevertheless, whereas in Tversky’s model, it is unclear what determines the at-
tentional focus (α 6= β), Krumhansl’s model offers a bit more precise suggestion
for how the notion of cognitive bias in a geometric model could be understood.
PS is biased by density; a difference in the densities associated with the envi-
ronments of each point accounts for a difference in the PS between them, when
the order of the comparison is swapped. PS can be different between a and b
or vice versa if these objects are located in relatively more or less dense sub-
regions of the space. If a has a relatively dense environment and b has a less
dense environment then S(a, b) > S(b, a) (or vice versa). Thus, a difference in
the PS associated with two objects is a result of a difference in the spatial density
of their environments. Without regards to differences in the density, the initial
geometric distance between a and b would be exactly the same. Krumhansl’s
(1978, p. 457) motivation for incorporating a bias as density is that, intuitively,
within relatively dense subregions of PS space, finer discriminations amongst ob-
ject representations are possible than within less dense subregions. This idea adds
plausibility to the original similarity-choice model that was inspired by Shepard
(1957). It emphasises the fact that PS is a 3-place predicate; PS not only depends
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on dissimilarities associated with two objects that share properties but also dis-
similarities associated with other objects that share these properties (i.e., objects
in the environment).
Taken together, Nosofsky’s analysis and Krumhansl’s specification of the similarity-
choice model illustrate that the geometric model of PS can be extended to ac-
commodate directionality effects by adding a bias to the metric-distance func-
tion. However, this does not show that directionality in the geometric model
is the same as directionality in the feature-matching model. It is possible that
these types of models (i.e., geometric versus feature-matching) provide different
solutions to the problem of directionality. The early solution to the problem of
directionality that is offered by the similarity-choice model is compatible with a
variety of different algorithms that could be used to compute the function of the
conditional probability of giving an identical response to a test stimulus j as was
previously given to a training stimulus i. In this respect, the abstract nature of
the similarity-choice model seems to reflect a computational level approach to PS.
The function does not specify what the cognitive bias is at the level of psycho-
logical process. It is possible that the PS-judgement process in a specific case of
the similarity-choice model is different from the one in Tversky’s (1977) contrast
model (equation 4.2), even if both incorporate the abstract notion of cognitive
bias. In the next section, I support this proposal by contrasting differences in
the models’ implicit assumptions about the structure of mental representations.
Table 5.3 makes these differences explicit.
5.3. Different structures of mental representations
To interpret the differences in table 5.3 in a philosophical context, I position
the geometric and feature-matching models alongside two camps in the literature
on mental representations of objects and categories. Roughly, following the first
camp, some mental representations, particularly those used in perception, have a
continuous structure (Beck, 2019; Goodman, 1968; Haugeland, 1981). According
to this camp, such representations have contents that often cannot be clearly dif-
ferentiated from one another. For example, the perceptual experience associated
with two blue colour shades allows for more fine-grained or richer distinctions
than a distinction that is based on the colour concepts turquoise and aquama-
rine. Following the second camp, all mental representations, or at least those
that can carry semantic content, take the form of discrete symbols (Fodor, 1975;
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). For example, the mental representation of a cat takes
the form of a symbolic structure, cat that can figure in the belief ‘the cat is on
the mat.’ Correspondingly, the propositional content of the belief is a function
of the content of the individual symbols, e.g., cat and mat, and how they are
composed to form this proposition.
Shepard’s geometric model seems to follow the first camp in assuming that at
least some object representations derive from the phenomenal experiences of per-
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Geometric model Feature-matching model
Representations of objects are vec-
tors in geometric space.
Representations of sets of features
are discrete and objects are decom-
posable.
The space consists of continuous di-
mensions. Partitions can be per-
formed on them.
The basic elements are whole objects
in the data base, ∆. Objects in ∆
generate discrete sets of features.
PS is measured by geometric dis-
tance.
PS is measured by set-theoretic over-
lap.
The model partitions the continuous
dimensions into sets of regions in ge-
ometric space.
The model divides the database with
all objects into subsets with objects
that increase similarity with respect
to a diagnostic feature (cf. section
4.5).
A category’s size is the area occupied
by its region in PS space.
The size of a category is the cardinal-
ity of the set of overlapping features
of objects in this category.
PS determines categorisation; a con-
sequential region represents the av-
erage similarity of any object in the
area covered by the region in geo-
metric space.
The categorisation of objects accord-
ing to their associated sets of com-
mon and distinct features happens
prior to similarity processes.
Table 5.1.: A contrast between the implicit assumptions about the structure of men-
tal representations in Shepard’s (1987) geometric model (left column) and
Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching model (right column).
ceptual objects such as, for example, colours or tones. As can be seen in earlier
work (Shepard, 1957, 1962, 1981/2017), Shepard’s motivation for modelling PS
as geometric distance originates from the idea that relations between mental rep-
resentations must map onto relations between objects in the world. In this work,
Shepard claims that mental states represent perceptual objects because they pre-
serve structure, not because they resemble those objects like pictures. For him,
the extensions of concepts or consequential regions (which, for him, are psycho-
logical representations of the kinds that these objects belong to) are the result of
positive correlations on an evolutionary scale along the dimensions of the assumed
psychological space (Shepard, 2001, 600).
On Shepard’s account, structure-preservation is relevant for generalisation. A
structure-preserving mapping allows the subject to represent invariances in the
experimental stimuli (e.g., colour constancy in perception or the perception of
the successive presentation of an object in two positions as it moving along a
path that connects these positions), enabling the agent to treat stimuli as the
80
5.3. Different structures of mental representations
same or different. This coincides for Shepard with a treatment of the stimuli in
a survival-conducive way. For example, mental representations of poisonous and
edible mushrooms should be structured in such a way that they allow the agent
to successfully distinguish poisonous mushrooms from edible ones because only in
that way will the agent maximise her chances to eat the right kind of mushroom
(e.g., the one that is good to eat).
On this basis, Shepard justifies the definition of PS as a geometric distance by
the assumption that there exists a second-order isomorphism—a functional re-
lationship between the invariances between objects in the world and the invari-
ances between mental representations in the mind (‘second-order’, thus, because
it describes a relationship between two relationships, (Shepard, 1981/2017, pp.
290-292)).
Empirical support for the assumption that the geometric-distance definition of
PS is fruitful comes from an experimental study on mental rotation (Shepard
& Metzler, 1971) and the perception of the shapes of states (Shepard & Chip-
man, 1970). In the former, Shepard and Metzler find evidence that the time it
takes to internally rotate a representation correlates with the time it takes to
rotate its referent stimulus, confirming the hypothesis that each step in the in-
ternal transformation of the representation corresponds to a step in the external
transformation of the object. In the latter, Shepard and Chipman find that the
cartographic features that relate pairs of shapes of U.S. states to a common cat-
egory (e.g., features such as ‘smallish & wiggly’, ‘vertical & irregular’ etc.) are
mirrored in the relations between a subject’s perceptual representations of those
shapes. The results of Shepard and Chipman’s experiments show that pairs of the
states’ shapes that could be identified with properties such as ‘smallish & wiggly’
were on average judged across subjects to be more similar than, for instance, a
shape that is wiggly and a shape that is irregular (Shepard & Chipman, 1970,
p. 10). Shepard and Chipman take this to be evidence for the geometric model
because, on the assumption that distances between objects are constrained by
the metric axioms, it was possible to reconstruct patterns that had emerged from
subjects’ averaged data. In particular, it became possible to reveal that judge-
ments indicating that some pairs were consistently judged to be more similar than
other pairs corresponded to the classifications of the states’ shapes according to
the external relationships between their cartographic properties.
In contrast to Shepard’s geometric model, Tversky’s feature-matching model
seems to follow the second camp. I have argued in section 4.6.2 that Tversky
implicitly assumes that PS correspond to processes of symbolic thinking in so far
as features in the model play the roles of atomic and amodal structures. Fol-
lowing the feature-matching model, one way in which PS can be understood is
as a process of classification of objects into those that have a target feature and
those that do not have the feature. These classifications represent disjoint classes
of objects. An example is given by Sattath and Tversky (1987), who use the
feature-matching model to study the relationship between object classification
and object similarity. They write:
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the predicate ‘two legged’ can be viewed as a feature that describes
some animals; it can also be seen as a class consisting of all animals
that have two legs. The relation between a feature and the corre-
sponding cluster is essentially that between the intension (i.e., the
meaning) of a concept [e.g., two legged] and its extension (i.e., the
set of objects to which it applies [e.g., the set of animals that are two
legged]) (Sattath & Tversky, 1987, p. 16, original emphasis)
However, the feature ‘two legged’, if discrete, cannot overlap with other features
(e.g., ‘being tall’ and ‘being alive’). Thus, on this account, if a feature such as
‘two legged’ represents the meaning of a concept, then the account does have a
difficulty to specify how the contents of concepts can partly overlap. In a space of
discrete sets, it is not clear how the model represents that only a subset of the set
of objects that are two legged is simultaneously alive. On this account, features
are themselves like symbols and do not naturally overlap in a meaningful way. To
make the symbols overlap meaningfully, an additional function to interpret their
relations is required.
5.4. Different interpretations of the data
How do these assumptions fit together into an overall picture of the study of
PS? One idea, mentioned in Shepard and Arabie (1979, p. 89) and Shepard
(1981/2017, pp. 395-396) is that different sets of representational assumptions
fit better for modelling different types of psychological data. For example, when
modelling relations among stimulus data such as individual words, discrete rep-
resentations of features seem better than a low-dimensional continuous space. In
contrast, a continuous-spaces solution seems to provide the most natural repre-
sentation of perceptual stimuli such as colour shades. Shepard and Arabie (1979)
argue that in any of these cases, the different formats of representation make it
relatively easy for the modeller to interpret relations between the data. Shepard
(1980) and Shepard and Arabie (1979) make this more explicit in their compar-
isons of spatial and hierarchical methods3 of representing the same similarity-
judgement data (e.g., as collected from the same data matrices).
They focus on data representing similarity judgements of pairs of vowel phonemes.
Shepard (1980, p. 397) argues that the continuous, spatial representation pre-
serves the parallel orderings of the voiceless and the voiced fricatives [...] with
respect to place of articulation and, hence, represents such facts as that the mid-
dle fricatives are more often confused than the extreme fricatives.” He contrasts
this with a discrete-clustering representation of the same data sets. Accordingly,
only the discrete representation “reveals that [...] place of articulation [is] more
salient than presence or absence of affrication for voiced consonants, while for
the voiceless consonants absence of affrication [becomes] more salient owing to
3They particularly focus on the different methods of multi-dimensional scaling, tree-fitting
and hierarchical clustering.
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the correlated presence of an initial burst [...]” (Shepard, 1980, p. 397). In con-
trast, it seems that the spatial representation of the vowel-phoneme data often
maintains information that gets lost in a hierarchical model that uses discrete
representations of the data. In the case of vowel phonemes, the lost information
is the possible overlap of groups of phonemes. Shepard and Arabie (1979, p. 91)
argue that “once all the voiced consonants were grouped into one cluster (disjoint
from the cluster of voiceless consonants), it would no longer be possible to group
either all the stops or all the fricatives into one cluster.” Taken together, Shep-
ard’s (1980) and Shepard and Arabie’s (1979) analyses of the vowel-phoneme
data suggests that those aspects of the data that contain possible overlaps in
properties of vowel phonemes are easier to model with a spatial solution while
aspects of distinct classifications of the vowel phonemes are easier to model by
the discrete-hierarchical solution.
This suggests a constructive way of thinking about the Shepard-Tversky debate:
the preferred definition of PS may depend on the modeller’s intentions, that is,
the intentions of Shepard’s and Tversky’s intentions. One way in which such in-
tentions can be seen is in terms of Weisberg’s (2012) idea that the interpretation
of a model depends in part on the modeller’s intended scope. According to Weis-
berg, the intended scope “specifies which aspects of potential target phenomena
are intended to be represented by the model [...]” (Weisberg, 2012, pp.39–41).
When transferring this characterisation to interpretations of the geometric and
the feature-matching models, one option seems to be that Shepard and Tversky
just have different intended scopes when they study PS in the context of gener-
alisation and explicit judgement. For example, in the vowel-phoneme case, the
geometric model and the feature-matching model can bring out different aspects
of the same data by virtue of different representational methods and algorithms
such as clustering or MDS algorithms. These different ways of representing the
data may be more or less appropriate depending on the particular explanatory
target (e.g., to group versus to distinguish objects).
Another idea is to view the geometric-spaces model of mental representation as a
third way alongside symbolic and associationist approaches to modelling mental
processes. This picture has been proposed by Gärdenfors (2000). Accordingly,
the geometric approach complements these previous approaches, while providing
a basis for connecting them. According to Gärdenfors, one reason for why the
geometric approach is especially suited for this role is that it is flexible; the ge-
ometric model can accommodate both continuous and discrete representations.
Gärdenfors (2000, p. 7) illustrates this with the example of a phylogenetic tree, in
which each node represents a different species and the hierarchical arrangement
of paths connecting them represents biological kinship relations. Older species
are higher up in the tree and younger ones are lower down, so that the vertical
axis implicitly represents the (continuous) dimension of time. It is possible to
make gradual distinctions between species because the length of the path be-
tween any two nodes represents the phylogenetic difference between the species
that they represent, relative to the lengths of other paths. Gärdenfors example
for such relations is that “birds and reptiles are more closely related than rep-
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tiles and crocodiles” (Gärdenfors, 2000, p. 8). At the same time, the tree has a
discrete structure; the hierarchical arrangement of the nodes allows one to infer
distinct kinship categories. Thus, the geometric model can encompass aspects
of continuous as well as discrete representations and, although the assumptions
about continuous and discrete representations are different, they can be related
intuitively.
In sum, there is an obvious contrast in the explanatory targets and implicit as-
sumptions about the structure of mental representations in the geometric model
and in the feature-matching model. I have explained two possible interpretations
of this contrast. The first interpretation was inspired by Shepard and Arabie
(1979) and is that the decision about which model is appropriate to model dif-
ferent aspects of the data depends on which aspects of the data the modeller is
interested in (i.e., the intended scope). Shepard and Arabie’s (1979) analysis of
solutions of the vowel phoneme data is an example. Here, if the modeller is inter-
ested in aspects of generalisation and recognition, she should use the geometric
model. In contrast, if she is interested in aspects of classification and distinc-
tion, she should use the feature-matching model. The second interpretation was
inspired by Gärdenfors (2000) and is that representations of different aspects of
the data can be combined in the geometric model. Gärdenfors’ example of a kin-
ship tree illustrates that the assumptions of the geometric and feature-matching
models do not entirely conflict with regards to the structure of their representa-
tions. But at the same time, both approaches to PS compete with respect to the
explanation of how people may possibly judge similarities (section 5.2).
On the whole, this conglomerate picture calls for better organisation. Intuitively,
it seems reasonable to connect aspects of the different representational structures
because minds are presumably capable of using all of these structures when rep-
resenting similarities, i.e., none should be discarded a priori. But it also seems
reasonable to keep aspects of these models apart that concern different possible
mechanisms. Is there a single approach that can connect aspects of these models
of PS, while keeping aspects of them apart? The next section reformulates this
question as a problem of unification.
5.5. A problem of unification
Modellers need a guiding framework that can relate these models to each other
while keeping an account of the empirical data. Given the empirical support that
both models have received, neither of them can be discarded. However, given
their theoretical differences in the underlying axioms, their different explanatory
targets and different assumptions about the structure of mental representations, it
is a challenge to integrate them to a single coherent theory of PS that can possibly
explain aspects of possible mechanisms underlying PC. Nevertheless, the forego-
ing analysis suggests that these distinct approaches to PS may possibly overlap
in various ways. For instance, Tversky’s theory can accommodate non-directional
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(symmetric) similarity-judgement behaviour as well, so long as the focus on each
object in the comparison is balanced (i.e., if α = β). Likewise Shepard’s model is
capable of dealing with stimuli that can be analysed in terms of discrete objects,
for instance, if the dimensions are discrete and the geometric space is carved up
into sets of points, and can possibly be extended to accommodate directionality
as well.
(How) can the divide between these approaches be bridged and the confusing
picture be systematically organised? A sketch of this problem is illustrated in
figure 5.1. The idea is that Shepard’s and Tversky’s models suggest two distinct
explanans, ‘similarity A’ and ‘similarity B’, that are associated with different
aspects of PC behaviour. The challenge is to unify the observations of the ex-
ponential gradient and the effect of directionality, despite the theoretical conflict
between Shepard’s and Tversky’s approaches.
In Part II of this thesis, I approach this problem from a Bayesian perspective on
concept learning and propose a unifying approach to PC. The motivation of this
approach is to better comprehend the diversity of empirical phenomena associated
with PS. My approach builds on Tenenbaum & Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian model
of concept learning and focuses on combining the predictive powers of Shepard’s
and Tversky’s models (indicated by the intersection in figure 5.1) while allowing
them to compete with each other (indicated by the disjunction in figure 5.1). I
will discuss Tenenbaum & Griffiths’ model in the next two chapters.
Figure 5.1.: Depiction of the relationship between Shepard’s (1962, 1987) geometric
model of similarity and Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching model of sim-
ilarity. The two accounts are presented as two partly overlapping sets of
statements that describe two distinct types of psychological similarities on
the basis of their empirical predictions. A represents the geometric model
and predicts effects of exponential generalisation. B stands for the feature-
matching model and predicts directionality effects. The area enclosed by




“The best-developed mathematical tool for dealing with in-
ference under uncertainty is probability theory.” (Zednik &





6. A Bayesian approach to
perceptual categorisation
6.1. Introduction
This chapter argues that PC can be analysed as a Bayesian-inference problem
of generalisation at the computational level of explanation. This argument is in-
spired by Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001, henceforth T&G) Bayesian inference
model of similarity and generalisation, an explication of which is at the heart of
this chapter. I explicate T&G’s claim that Bayesian inference explains psycho-
logical similarity (PS) and generalisation and argue that T&G’s Bayesian model
provides a possible alternative to similarity-based explanations of perceptual cat-
egorisation (PC), which have multiple facets that do not fit together well.
Section 6.2 presents 2 examples of a Bayesian analysis of PC, which are inspired
by T&G’s Bayesian model of concept learning. Section 6.2.1 presents a Bayesian
analysis of PC, which is inspired by T&G’s revision of Shepard’s (1987) ideal gen-
eralisation problem. Perceptual categorisation, on this view, is the same as the
problem of judging similarities or generalising from one object to another. Section
6.3 systematically investigates the key ingredients of a Bayesian analysis of PC
at the computational level of explanation. Section 6.4 focuses on the ingredients
for a generic solution to the problem of modelling PC. The solution is T&G’s size
principle of preferring smaller categories in the inference problem. Section 6.5
draws a strong connection between T&G’s size principle and Shepard’s geomet-
ric model, showing that the size principle implicitly relies on a representational
structure of the relevant concepts (e.g., fly agraric mushroom). Section 6.6
argues that the Bayesian approach to PC employs a reverse-engineering strat-
egy to discovering the mechanisms underlying PC behaviour. I conclude that
the Bayesian model provides an elegant perspective on PC that combines the
approaches to PS and generalisation.
6.2. Bayesian-style thinking about categorisation
What does it mean to think of PC as a Bayesian inference? In their paper,
T&G (2001, p. 629) mention several examples for interpreting generalisation as a
problem of Bayesian inference. I will focus on 2 of these to make the conception
of PC as a Bayesian inference intuitively accessible.
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BABY ROBINS
A baby robin needs to learn to distinguish edible from inedible worms on the
basis of their different levels of skin pigmentation. Assume that the first worm
given to the baby robin has a pigmentation level of 60. Given that the worm with
pigmentation level 60 is edible, what other worms are good to eat? Is a worm
with a pigmentation level of 47 edible? What about a worm with a pigmentation
level of 80?
HORMONE LEVELS
A doctor has to determine whether a hormone, naturally produced by the body,
affects a patient’s health. A first blood analysis reveals that a patient, x, has a
level of 60 of this hormone. x has been in the hospital for a long time and has
recovered from their illness, so the doctor knows that x is healthy. They have
to say for any new patient, y, whether y is healthy or unhealthy on the basis
of blood tests that indicate y’s hormone levels. Given the knowledge that 60 is
healthy, is a patient with a level of 47 healthy? What about a patient with a
level of 80?
In each of these Bayesian analyses of a categorisation task, the agent (e.g. doctor
or baby robin) has to infer, on the basis of a set of available concepts (healthy/
unhealthy or edible/poisonous), what the correct concept is in light of the
observations, x and y (hormone levels or worms with different pigmentation levels)
and the knowledge that x is an instance of one of the candidate concepts. This
offers a preliminary definition. For any object x, which is known to be in a
category, C, it has to be inferred how plausible it is that a new object, y, is also
in C (or, alternatively, is not in C). The task of the corresponding inference is
to identify the relevant category, C.
Let me add two points of clarification on these examples. Firstly, the approach
assumes that in all examples, a candidate category or concept that represents the
to-be-inferred properties is already available. When inferring whether the concept
healthy correctly represents a hormone level of 80, some representation of what
it means to be healthy is at least implicitly needed to carry out the categorisation
task (cf. Fodor, 1975). In other words, candidate categories need not be inferred
from scratch.
Secondly, on the Bayesian approach, both the assignment of a category and the
perception of the property that is represented by the category are distinct ca-
pabilities. Not every case of perception involves a category assignment and not
every case of category assignment involves perception. The difference is that per-
ception can be non-inferential, but category assignments are always inferential.
For example, perceiving a worm with pigmentation level 80 does not require one
to infer that this observation is an instance of the category ‘good-to-eat’ worms.
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An extra inferential step would be needed to assign the instance to a category.1 In
what follows, I explicate my claim that PC can be seen as a problem of Bayesian
inference on the basis of T&G’s Bayesian model of concept learning.
6.2.1. Generalisation as a problem of Bayesian inference
Following Marr (1982, p. 22), the computational level of explanation of how an
information-processing system solves a given task consists of two questions. One
question is about what is being computed. The other is about why a task should
be solved with a function of some type x and not one of some type y. The point
of the analysis of the information-processing task at the computational level is
to identify the rationale underlying the problem that the information-processing
system is presented with.
When PC is regarded as an information-processing problem, the analysis focuses
on two aspects. On the one hand, this method analyses the task of PC as a
Bayesian inference problem and a generic function that solves the problem. This
explains what is being computed. On the other hand, the method analyses the
agent’s environmental conditions with a normative standard of how they have to
be met. This explains why the generic solution takes the form that it does. From
the perspective of a Bayesian analysis of the task of PC, an agent is rational
if and only if she solves the inference problem in the hormone levels and baby
robin examples (to infer the relevant category from the perceptual observations)
by computing the relative probabilities for any candidate category in light of the
available evidence by following Bayes’ Theorem. The ‘correct’ category may be
either a single category that obtains the highest probability value or the average
of a set of candidate categories with the highest probabilities. I will now explain
this based on T&G’s (2001) Bayesian model of concept learning.
In their model, T&G assume a Bayesian task analysis of generalisation. They
assume that generalisation is a problem of Bayesian inference. According to
T&G, the problem is this:
[G]iven an encounter with a single stimulus (a patient, a worm) that
can be represented as a point in some psychological space (a hormone
level or pigmentation level of 60), and that has been found to have
some particular consequence (healthy, good to eat), what other stim-
uli in that space should be expected to have the same consequence?
(Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001, p. 629)
T&G’s Bayesian view on the problem is basically a more abstract version of
Shepard’s ideal generalisation problem. To see this, compare T&G’s framing
with Shepard’s original formulation of the problem (Shepard, 1987, 1994):
1In analogy, when explaining how someone infers from the meaning of the concept democracy
the meaning of a concept like equality, no reference to perceptual capabilities is necessary,
as the inference seems to involve only highly abstract concepts.
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The problem that a positive or negative encounter with an unfamiliar
object poses for an individual is just the problem of inferring the con-
sequential region to which that object belongs. A bird that ingested
a caterpillar bearing particular coloration and markings and found it
detectable or sickening, must decide whether another object of more or
less similar visual appearance is of the same natural kind and should
therefore be seized or avoided, respectively. Generalization is thus a
cognitive act, not merely a failure of sensory discrimination. Indeed,
an animal would be ill served by the assumption that just because it
can detect a difference between the present and a previous situation,
what it learned about that previous situation has no bearing on the
present one. (Shepard, 1987, p. 1319)
By a ‘cognitive act’, Shepard means the mental process of testing the hypothesis
that the second object, of “similar visual appearance” is of the same natural kind
as the first object (the caterpillar).
On both accounts, generalisation implies an assignment of each object to a con-
cept (on T&G’s approach) or a consequential region (on Shepard’s approach) in
an agent’s psychological space. What is different is that it is implicit in the sec-
ond quote that the structure of this space relies on evolutionary norms. Shepard’s
position is that generalisation is an inference process that is optimised consider-
ing the agent’s environment. Under this position, the agent should assume that
there could be an underlying connection between the first and the second object
despite their apparent differences. The agent should assume that there exist nat-
ural kinds that the objects could possibly belong to. Why exactly this assumption
is plausible is not clear from this quote, but in other work, Shepard has argued
that organisms have adapted their internal psychological mechanisms that govern
generalisation behaviour to the structure of natural kinds in the world (Shepard,
1981/2017)2. Shepard’s framing of the problem as an adaptively optimised infer-
ence commits his analysis to answers about the representational structure of the
agent’s psychological space. This is because the agent has to somehow represent
the assumed natural kinds. In contrast, T&G’s version disregards such assump-
tions about evolutionary norms and does not explicitly commit to the assumption
that the inference must be optimised given the agents’ natural environment. This
is one reason for why T&G can express some agnosticism in the first quote about
how consequential regions shall be individuated in psychological space.
Is it useful to stay neutral on the structure of the psychological space? One
reason for why the neutral attitude could be useful is because it allows us to
2The key aspect of this work is Shepard’s assumption that the structure of the agent’s internal
representations reflects the structure of natural kinds. The support for this assumption is
that the organisational structure of the agent’s mental representations must be such that
it serves the agent’s adaptive success. Shepard also assumes that the (physical) structure
of natural kinds is best modelled in a geometric space. His assumption that there exists a
structural mapping between the agent’s internal representations and the structure of natural
kinds supports his assumption that the structure of the agent’s internal representations
should be modelled in a psychological space with geometric dimensions.
92
6.3. Key ingredients of the Bayesian model
not buy into the Shepard-Tversky debate. Consequential-regions talk is plausible
only if one can assume that representations in the inference involve geometric
structure. It is not trivial that the psychological space has a geometric structure.
Tversky (1977) has illustrated this with evidence against the symmetry axiom
(chapter 4). Getting rid of the assumption of geometric structure allows one to
express the problem of generalisation on the basis of concepts with an unspecified
representational structure.
Taken together the generalisation problem can be reconstructed considering the
reverse-inference/engineering approach outlined in chapter 1. Correspondingly,
Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian approach to concept learning has the
following argument structure.
Argument structure of T&G’s approach:
A. When psychological process, CL, is recruited by a Bayesian-inference task,
some pattern of generalisation behaviour, E, is likely to be found.
B. In Bayesian-inference task T, E was found.
C. Hence, psychological process, CL, was recruited by Bayesian-inference task
T.
Where ‘CL’ refers to a process of concept learning (e.g., the process of inferring
a concept such as edible from examples x and y). T&G’s theory explains con-
cept learning on the basis of their Bayesian model of generalisation. The next
section shows how T&G analyse generalisation as an inference problem at the
computational level. One of the main contributions of this analysis is that this
abstract description is compatible with multiple interpretations of the structure
of psychological space, particularly with the idea of overlapping concepts. The
virtue of this approach is that it can unify PC (as will be argued in chapter 9).
6.3. Key ingredients of the Bayesian model
A HYPOTHESIS SPACE
The first ingredient of T&G’s model is an abstract hypothesis space, H. H rep-
resents the agent’s innate background knowledge about which possible concepts
could be assigned to observable objects. T&G assume about H that “[...] one and
only one element of H is assumed to be the true [concept corresponding to some
unknown consequence,] C (although the different candidate regions represented
in H may overlap arbitrarily in the stimuli that they include)” (Tenenbaum &
Griffiths, 2001, pp. 630-631). Let us unpack this assumption.
In T&G’s model, H is a probability distribution over a set of mutually exclusive
hypotheses. Mutual exclusivity means that if there are two hypotheses, h and
h∗, then both cannot be absolutely true at the same time, so it cannot be that
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simultaneously, pr(h) = 1 and pr(h∗) = 1. Either both are absolutely false or one
of them is somewhat true and the other is somewhat false. Hypotheses have the
form h : x ∈ C ∧ x ∈ C∗ or h∗ : x /∈ C ∧ x ∈ C∗, where C is a concept and C∗
is a concept whose members include all members of C and some other members
as well. For example, if C represents the concept edible mushroom and C∗
represents the concept mushroom, then h says that x is an instance of both
concepts while h∗ says that x is an instance of the concept mushroom but not
of the concept edible mushroom. Note that the concepts can overlap, despite
the fact that hypotheses are mutually exclusive. In the example, the concept
mushroom includes the concept edible mushroom. Roughly, in terms of their
extension, the set of edible mushrooms is a subset of the set of mushrooms.
However, the hypotheses still have different truth-conditions; if it is true that x is
an instance of the concept mushroom but not of the concept edible mushroom,
then it must be false that x is both an instance of the concept edible mushroom
and of the concept mushroom.
Following T&G’s assumption, H can be specified more explicitly on the basis of
three abstract components. (1) A set of countable, possibly infinite, and mutually
exclusive hypotheses, hi, ..., hn, ..., (2) a set of object representations (stimuli) that
belong to sets of concepts (each concept corresponds to a consequence), and (3)
a probability distribution. I briefly comment on each component in turn.
Hypotheses are statements about possibilities.3 In T&G’s model, a hypothesis
represents the possibility that a stimulus is an instance of a candidate concept.
For example, a hypothesis might represent the possibility that the object x, a fly
agraric mushroom, is an instance of the concept fly agraric mushroom. At
the abstract level relevant for T&G’s approach, hypotheses are simply functions
that assign objects from the set of pieces of available evidence, e : x, y, ..., to
a candidate concept. In T&G’s model, H is a partition of sets of hypotheses,
hi, ..., hn, .... A plausible assumption of their model seems to be that H only
contains hypotheses that are consistent with e. The intuition is that if it is not a
logical possibility that x is an example of the concept fly agraric mushroom
then the occurrence of x cannot inform the hypothesis that x is an instance of
the concept fly agraric mushroom.
In T&G’s model, concepts are not individuated. Concepts are abstract sets of
possible stimuli that could have the same consequence. T&G’s abstract descrip-
tion of the hypothesis space contrasts with Shepard’s model and framing of the
generalisation problem in the previous section. On Shepard’s account, the con-
sequential region is ‘located’ in the agent’s PS space Shepard (1987, p. 1319).
We know from chapter 3 that Shepard proposes a geometric structure for this
space. The dimensions (e.g., hue, saturation or brightness) of this space repre-
sent aspects of perceptual experience (e.g., how bright something looks). A con-
sequential region is a mental representation in the agent’s PS space. For Shepard,
3This is a typical understanding in Bayesian epistemology and philosophy of science (Hartmann
& Sprenger, 2010; Sprenger & Hartmann, 2019).
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this region corresponds to “a particular class—what philosophers term a ‘natu-
ral kind”’ (Shepard, 1987, p. 1319) (although he does not specify what natural
kinds are supposed to be). In Shepard’s jargon of behavioural consequences, a
concept captures all possible objects that, upon observation, would obtain the
same behavioural consequence. With regards to the geometric interpretation of
PS space, a concept covers the area that represents the average distances between
any points that could fall in that area, while each point represents a way in which
the concept could be instantiated. I interpret the consequential region in Shep-
ard’s model to represent the intension of a concept. That is, the consequential
region is the agent’s representation of what things could possibly be such that
they could be instances of the concept. For example, the intension of the con-
cept red represents all the possible ways in which the agent could perceive a
red-shade.
The equation of consequential region and concept is plausible from an explanatory
perspective. As explanatory entities in psychology, concepts are kinds of men-
tal representations that explain behaviour. In Shepard’s case, the consequential
region fulfils the same explanatory job, it is part of the explanation of why gen-
eralisation has the shape that it does (see also chapter 3). I show in section 6.5
that, on the basis of this contrast, T&G’s explanation of generalisation abstracts
away from such details in Shepard’s explanation.
Sets of stimuli with the same consequences (concepts) have two characteris-
tics. Firstly, they represent the extension of concepts that figure into mutually-
exclusive hypotheses. Secondly, while hypotheses are mutually exclusive, sets of
stimuli can overlap with respect to a concept. The first characteristic contrasts
sets of stimuli with concepts (consequential regions) in Shepard’s PS space. Sets
of stimuli are discrete, while consequential regions can be continuous (like the
dimensions of PS space).
As an example of the second characteristic, consider the set of tigers and the
set of pumas. On the one hand, sets of stimuli can overlap with respect to a
concept. Both sets are in the extension of the same class: wild cat. In other
words, assignment of the experiences of tigers or pumas to the class wild cat
need not be mutually exclusive because membership of the class applies to both
tigers and pumas. On the other hand, each set can be associated with different
and differently plausible possibilities. For example, the hypothesis that the label
‘wild cat’ refers to the set of tigers but not to the set of pumas and the hypothesis
that the label ‘wild cat’ refers to the set of tigers and pumas must be mutually
exclusive; these hypotheses cannot be true simultaneously. The relation between
the sets of stimuli and hypotheses in H is the following. At the level of stimulus
representation,H partitions sets of stimuli into mutually exclusive alternatives. A
hypothesis is a membership-statement of the form ‘x is in class C’, where x could
be a tiger and C could be the concept wild cat. By definition of a partition,
the truth-values of these hypotheses cannot overlap because the assignment of
truth-values to hypotheses in H must be mutually exclusive. Thus, also on a set-
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theoretic interpretation, the simultaneous existence of overlapping sets of stimuli
and mutually exclusive hypotheses in T&G’s model is not inconsistent.
The probability distribution represents the agent’s knowledge as a conditional
probability function, pr(h|e). The function, pr(h|e), assigns each hypothesis,
h ∈ H, a probability value. This assignment is conditional on the observation of
an example, e, which is the evidence for h. In T&G’s model, ‘pr(h|e)’ represents
the learner’s degree of belief in h after observing e, that is, how strongly the
learner believes that h is true, compared to all other hypotheses in H, in light of
e. The strength of this belief is represented by a probability value, a value in the
interval [0, 1].
A GENERALISATION FUNCTION
The second ingredient of T&G’s model is a generalisation function, which for-
malises the Bayesian inference task.
The task is that the agent has to infer from two observations, x and y, whether
these belong to the same concept (or whether they do not). The generalisation
function recovers this task formally. The following is a modification of T&G’s
formulation to emphasize that the hypothesis is a statement about the concept.
For their original formulation, compare with Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001, p.
631). Correspondingly, the generalisation function can be characterised as a sum
over a set of conditional probabilities associated with such hypotheses.




Each probability function is associated with a hypothesis, h, given the evidence, e.
The term h ∈ H indicates a subset of hypotheses inH. Generalisation probability
is normalised, so that values of the function in equation 6.1 lie between 0 and 1.
Correspondingly, the sum of all conditional probabilities, pr(h|e) must sum up to
1.4 With regards to the evidence, e, and in the cases of interest here, these are
the relevant examples, x and y, for candidate concepts.
Let me describe equation 6.1 with an example. Imagine that an agent observes
x, a fly agraric mushroom, followed by y, also a fly agraric mushroom. A hy-
pothesis about x may take the following form: ‘x is an instance of the concept
fly agraric mushroom.’ A hypothesis about y may take the form: ‘y is an
instance of the concept fly agraric mushroom.’ The problem of generalising
from x to y is the problem of inferring how plausible it is that y is in a candidate
concept, C (e.g., fly agraric mushroom), given that x is in C. Alternative
4This implies that any particular conditional probability function must follow the rule that
if, for example, pr(h|e) = .6 then the sum of the probabilities of all other hypotheses, h∗,
must be .4. In other words, the plausibilities of hypotheses in light of the evidence mutually
constrain each other.
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candidate concepts in this case are the concept mushroom or the concept thing
in the universe.
T&G are not clear about how to interpret the content of the hypotheses. Here,
I assume that H contains hypotheses of the form h : x ∨ y ∈ C. That is, h ∈ H
represents the set of subsets of hypotheses that say that either x or y, or both,
are in the extension of the concept C. T&G are also not clear about the status
of the generalisation function: they do not make clear whether the conditional
probability on the left in equation 6.1 should be interpreted as the probability
of a hypothesis given a body of evidence, of the form pr(h|e), or whether it is a
probability of a hypothesis given another hypothesis, of the form pr(h|h), instead.
Here, I choose the second option and interpret the left-hand term in equation 6.1
as a probability of a hypothesis given another hypothesis. Correspondingly, gen-
eralisation is the problem of inferring how probable it is that the hypothesis ‘y is
in the concept fly agraric mushroom’, h, is true given that the hypothesis ‘x
is in the concept fly agraric mushroom’, h∗, is true. Correspondingly, if there
are only two hypotheses, h and h∗, then the generalisation probability is equal to
a weighted sum of the two conditional probabilities, pr(h|e) and pr(h∗|e). Each of
these conditional probabilities is a posterior probability associated with a partic-
ular hypothesis. The posterior probability represents how plausible a hypothesis
is in light of the given pieces of evidence, e.g., in light of the observations of x and
y. In the current example, when there are only two conditional-probability func-
tions, then one conditional probability function is associated with the hypothesis
that x is in fly agraric mushroom given the observation of x and the other
conditional probability function is associated with the hypothesis that y is in fly
agraric mushroom and the observation of y.
How can equation 6.1 contribute to solving the problem of generalisation? In
T&G’s model, equation 6.1 represents the agent’s psychological categorisation
task as a probabilistic problem. In particular, generalisation is now understood
as the problem of computing the correlation of the plausibilities of two hypothe-
ses about what concept any of the two objects, x and y (e.g., two fly agraric
mushrooms), respectively, most plausibly belong to. For example, we can specify
one hypothesis, h, which says that x is an instance of the concept fly agraric
mushroom and the other hypothesis, h∗, which says that y is an instance of
the concept fly agraric mushroom. From the perspective of T&G’s model,
the task of generalising behaviour from x to y is the problem of identifying the
probability of h∗ to be true given that h is true. Following equation 6.1, the
probability to generalise is equal to the sum of the probability that h is true and
the probability that h∗ is true. However, implicit in this formulation is that the
given object is already known to be an instance of the concept. For instance,
when x is the known object, this means that the agent has already figured out
in a previous step that x is in the concept fly agraric mushroom. That is,
in this previous step, the agent has already computed the conditional probability
that x is in the concept fly agraric mushroom in light of the observation of
x. On the basis of this previous step, the agent ‘knows’ that it is the concept
fly agraric mushroom with respect to which the relevant hypotheses, h and
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h∗ correlate. On this basis, the agent identifies how plausible it is that y is an
instance of the concept fly agraric mushroom, given the observation of y.
To determine the actual correlation of these hypotheses, the agent then compares
the plausibilities by summing over their individual probabilities.
The point of T&G’s formulation of the generalisation task (corresponding to
equation 6.1) is that a measure of the likelihood of generalising from x to y (the
term on the left) can be understood as the average probability that is assigned
to each of these hypotheses, h and h∗ (on the right). If the left-hand term
in equation 6.1 is defined over a hypothesis space with a discrete structure, so
that any hypothesis is a statement about the extension of a concept, then the
generalisation function (equation 6.1) should be computed with a method known
as ‘hypotheses averaging’ (Appendix A). This method indicates the average of
the probabilities associated with all available hypotheses (e.g., those that place x
or y in C), weighted by their posterior probability.5
So far the discussion has covered how knowledge is represented and how con-
ditional probabilities are transferred into a generalisation function. The third
ingredient of T&G’s model is a Bayesian approach to concept learning.
AN APPROACH TO CONCEPT LEARNING
By definition, a Bayesian agent should follow Bayes’s Theorem in approaching a
task (otherwise they would not be ‘Bayesian’). T&G (2001, p. 632) characterise






Equation 6.2 says that the conditional probability of a hypothesis, h, in light of
some piece of evidence, e, is equal to the product of the likelihood of observing
the evidence given that the hypothesis is true and the prior probability of the
hypothesis, regardless of the evidence, taken relative to the sum of the products
of likelihoods and priors for all alternative hypotheses, h′, in the hypothesis space.
For example, the posterior of the hypothesis that x is an instance of fly agraric
mushroom, given the observation of x, is the ratio of two terms.
1. pr(x|x ∈ C)pr(x ∈ C): the product of the likelihood of observing x given
that x is an instance of the concept fly agraric mushroom and the prior
of this hypothesis.
5T&G suggest that this example is transferable to the case in which the hypotheses space has
a continuous structure. In this case, equation 6.1 corresponds to an integral that ranges
over all possible candidate concepts in psychological space. In other work (Poth, 2019), I
suggest, on the basis of the account of Decock, Douven, and Sznajder (2016), to specify this
integral with the Lebesgue integral and the corresponding measure of the concept is the size
of a consequential region, as in Shepard’s (1987) initial account.
98
6.3. Key ingredients of the Bayesian model
2. pr(x|x ∈ C)pr(x ∈ C) + pr(x|x ∈ C ′)pr(x ∈ C ′): the sum of the prod-
ucts of likelihoods and priors for hypotheses that say that x is an instance
of fly agraric mushroom and the products of likelihoods and priors
of hypotheses with alternative candidate concepts, C ′. For instance, the
concepts mushroom or thing in the universe.
The same hypothesis can be evaluated in light of another example, y. The pos-
terior probability of the hypothesis that y is an instance of fly agraric mush-
room given the observation of y, is a ratio of the products of likelihoods and
priors associated with this particular hypothesis, relative to the sum of the prod-
ucts of likelihoods and priors associated with all alternative hypotheses (e.g.,
hypotheses that pair y with mushroom or, alternatively, with thing in the
universe). One way of interpreting the posterior probability of a hypothesis is
as a representation of the plausibility of a candidate concept that the evidence,
x, or y, could be an instance of.
T&G’s hormone-levels example illustrates this with some numbers. Assuming
that x = 60 and y = 47, Bayes’ Theorem should be used to infer whether each is
a healthy (H) hormone level.
pr(60 ∈ healthy|60) =
pr(60|60 ∈ H)× pr(60 ∈ H)
pr(60|60 ∈ H)× pr(60 ∈ H)
+pr(60|60 /∈ H)× pr(60 /∈ H).
pr(47 ∈ healthy|47) =
pr(47|47 ∈ H)× pr(47 ∈ H)
pr(47|47 ∈ H)× pr(47 ∈ H)
+pr(47|47 /∈ H)× pr(47 /∈ H).
What is the posterior probability that a given patient is healthy given that they
have a hormone level of 60 (47)? On a Bayesian account, this question should
be answered by assessing how likely it is that the patient displays a hormone
level of 60 (47) if it was true that the patient is healthy (the likelihood) and how
plausible it is that the patient is healthy before their hormone level has been
measured (the prior), relative to the sum of the likelihoods and priors for all
available hypotheses. In this case, there are only 2 hypotheses: one says that the
patient is healthy. The other says that the patient is not healthy.
Bayes’ Theorem is a static rule of inference. It specifies probabilities of a single
hypothesis in relation to probabilities of other hypotheses at a single moment in
time. In the example, this is the time point at which the hormone level 60 is
observed and at which the hypothesis ‘60 is a healthy hormone level’ is tested.
How can T&G’s model contribute to a theory of concept learning?
On a Bayesian approach to learning, a Bayesian agent should follow Bayes’ Rule
when updating their old degree of belief in a hypothesis at one point in time to a
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new degree of belief in the hypothesis at a later point in time.6 In the context of
T&G’s paper, Bayes’ Rule can be used to explain concept learning (understood
as the revision of a degree of belief in a hypothesis in light of new information).
For example, learning from a new observation of a level of 47, the agent should
update her belief about what it means to be healthy (more precisely, about what
objects belong to the extension of the concept healthy).7
According to Bayes’ Rule the updating of a prior into a posterior probability is
moderated by the likelihood function, which measures the plausibility of observing
a piece of evidence given that the hypothesis was true. The likelihood function
plays a particularly important part in learning because it measures the degree
of confirmation that a hypothesis obtains from the evidence. How much the
observation of 60 confirms the hypothesis that 60 is a healthy hormone level
is indicated by how well this hypothesis predicts the observation of 60. The
probability of the hypothesis that 60 is a healthy hormone level in light of novel
evidence, 47, will be greater than the prior probability of the hypothesis that 60
is a healthy hormone level when the hypothesis that 60 is a healthy hormone level
makes it likely that 47 is a hormone level as well. The crucial part in learning
a category is then the choice of the likelihood function. The particular choice of
the likelihood function is typically determined by additional assumptions about
the process that has generated the examples, x, and y (the underlying sampling
process). In T&G’s theory, it is assumed that the likelihood function is the
size principle and it is assumed that the examples are sampled explicitly from
whatever is the true target concept in the inference. Section 6.4 discusses these
assumptions in detail.
6.4. T&G’s expansion of Shepard’s universal law
The first assumption concerns the way in which the examples have been sampled.
The sampling assumptions concern the process that has generated the observa-
tions x and y from the concepts fly agraric mushroom, mushroom, or thing
in the universe. T&G’s model uses an assumption that is called ‘strong sam-
pling’ and Shepard’s model uses a ‘weak sampling’ assumption. The role of these
assumptions in these models is to guide an agent’s inference in a generalisation
task. In this section, I contrast and compare these assumptions. I argue that
T&G’s replacement of Shepard’s weak sampling assumption with their strong
6In Bayesian epistemology, a Bayesian agent learns a proposition h when in light of new
evidence, e, the probability associated with that hypothesis becomes higher or lower than
it would be without the new piece of information. Accordingly, h is learned whenever
pr(h|e) 6= pr(h).
7In the example, the concept healthy develops in this sense, when the plausibility of the
hypothesis that 60 is a healthy hormone level given the new observation, 47, is different
from the plausibility of the hypothesis that 60 is a healthy hormone level alone. In section
7.3, I argue on this basis that T&G’s approach should be interpreted as a theory of concept
development, not of concept learning.
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sampling assumption reveals that T&G’s model is more informative than Shep-
ard’s model. In this sense, T&G expand on Shepard’s original approach to ULG.
Later sections show that the increased informativeness of T&G’s model facilitates
its application to domains outside generalisation in perceptual domains.
As an overview of the contrast between these assumptions, when generalising
from x to y, Shepard’s solution is to find the consequential region that is consis-
tent with the example. This implies that if x and y are both instances of both the
concepts fly agraric mushroom and mushroom, then there will be no dis-
tinction between how plausible it is that x and y are in the concept fly agraric
mushroom and that they are in the concept mushroom. In contrast, T&G’s
solution suggests that even when multiple hypotheses are compatible with the ev-
idence, not all of these hypotheses are equally plausible. For example, even when
both x and y are instances of both the concept mushroom and fly agraric
mushroom, a hypothesis that assigns them to the concept fly agraric mush-
room is likely to be differently plausible from the hypothesis that assigns these
objects to the concept mushroom.
6.4.1. Strong sampling
In the hormone-levels case, the learner assumes that the example, x = 60, has
been explicitly sampled at random from the category of healthy hormone levels8.
T&G call this assumption strong sampling.
An intuitive example for strong sampling is this. Imagine you go to the forest with
a mushroom expert, who shows you a mushroom that has a red head and white
spots. The expert tells you that this is a fly agraric mushroom. If you have never
seen a fly agraric mushroom before and follow the maxim of strong sampling, you
may assume that your teacher has chosen this observation as a positive example
of whatever category a fly agraric mushroom belongs to. In this case, the chosen
object is a good example of the kinds of mushrooms that are not edible. Even if
both the hypothesis that the observed example is a mushroom and the hypothesis
that the observed example is a poisonous mushroom are compatible with the
observation, the latter hypothesis seems to be intuitively preferable, and safer
with regards to avoiding food poisoning.
A second example is a statistical illustration with marbles from Perfors, Tenen-
baum, Griffiths, and Xu (2011, pp. 306-307). In this example, concepts are
represented by bags of marbles with different colours. Bag A is small and con-
tains a red and a green marble. Bag B is bigger and contains a red, a green and
a yellow marble. Given these proportions of differently-coloured marbles in the
bag, it is differently likely to blindly pick out a red marble from bag A than to
pick out a red marble from bag B. In particular, the probability of picking a red
marble given that one reaches from bag A is .5 (since the proportion of red to
8The assumption that healthy hormone level corresponds to a natural kind is yet another
idealised assumption, which will not be further discussed when illustrating T&G’s theory
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any colour in the bag is 1 to 2) and the probability of picking a red marble given
that one reaches from bag B is .33 (because the proportion of red to any colour
in the bag is 1 to 3). Thus, it is more likely to blindly pick a red marble from the
smaller bag than from the larger bag.
To illustrate what ‘strong sampling’ means, Perfors et al. focus on the case of
multiple examples, in which the inference task is this. An experimenter randomly
samples a sequence of a red, green, red and green marble (with replacement
after any pick), from bag A or bag B. The subject has to guess what bag these
observations are random samples of. Perfors et al. argue that, given the sizes of
the bags (which are known to the subject—it is just not known which bag the
sequence has been taken from), bag A should be a better candidate. Intuitively,
this is because it would be very surprising to observe this sequence given that
the observations were in fact independently sampled from the bag in which the
variation of colours is greater—one would expect also a yellow marble to occur
in the sequence.
More generally, in strong sampling, examples are chosen independently of each
other but not independently of the concept that they are chosen from. This is
what is meant by the examples being sampled explicitly from the true concept—
the concept that the example belongs to is fixed. In other words, it is not just
any concept that is compatible with the example, but a plausible concept.
Contrast T&G’s approach to generalisation with Shepard’s approach, which takes
on the assumption of weak sampling instead. According to weak sampling, x hap-
pens to fall inside C by coincidence, so that the occurrence of x is independent of
the consequential region, C, that contains x. An intuitive example is the mush-
room case from above, but consider the slightly different scenario in which you
go to the forest with your expert companion and randomly observe a mushroom
with a red head and white spots. Is the mushroom edible or is it not? If you
have never seen a fly agraric mushroom and follow the maxim of weak sampling,
you should expect that your expert companion is going to point out that this
observation is a positive example of the kind edible to the same degree that you
expect her to point out this observation as a negative example, and tell you that
the mushroom is not edible.
Shepard describes weak sampling along the following lines.
In finding a novel stimulus to be consequential, the individual learns
only that there is some consequential region that overlaps the point
in psychological space corresponding to that stimulus. In accordance
with whatever probabilities the individual imputes to nature, a priori,
the individual can only assume that nature chose the consequential
region at random. (Shepard, 1987, p. 1319)
What Shepard means can be intuitively illustrated with the marble case. In weak
sampling, the inference task is this. Recall the marbles example from above (with
replacement after any pick). In this case, the subject may not know what size
the bags have. All that is known is that both bags contain marbles of both red
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and green colours and possibly other colours. It is a default assumption, in this
case, that the proportions of colours in each bag are equal. Thus, under weak
sampling, the subject should infer that both bags are equally plausible candidates
for what source the sequence is sampled from.
More generally, under weak sampling, examples (stimuli) are chosen indepen-
dently of each other and independently of the concept (consequential region)
that they happen to be an instance of. An example could have been drawn from
any concept that is compatible with the observation, and any such a concept
makes this observation plausible in the same way (i.e., it is not the case that
among compatible concepts, some are better candidates than others—they are
all good candidates).
What is common to the mentioned examples is, intuitively, that both reflect
the assumption that the examples have been sampled from the relevant concept
with replacement. Thus, in both cases, the marbles are drawn from the bags
independently of each other and the occurrence of a mushroom is independent
of the occurrence of another mushroom. The difference is that strong sampling
adds a dependence relation between the examples and the candidate concepts.
Before moving on, let me clarify why we should care about the distinction between
strong and weak sampling from a Bayesian perspective on PC. We should care
because each of these distinct assumptions will offer a better fit to distinct sets
of generalisation data. This suggests that in different kinds of generalisation
tasks, it is reasonable to assume that people use either of these assumptions
but not both when they generalise. In the marble example, strong sampling
(reflecting the assumption that the marbles are chosen at random within each
bag) is more plausible when the contents and relative sizes of the bags are known.
If they are unknown, then weak sampling (reflecting the assumption that the
chance of the same colour drawn from each bag will be equally likely) is a better
assumption. In the mushroom example, the distinction matters in contexts where
the inference should eliminate indeterminacy of multiple candidate concepts that
are simultaneously compatible with the available evidence. Even when x and y
are both in the concept fly agraric mushroom and thing in the universe,
it must be possible to distinguish between these concepts. Quine (1960) has
made this point earlier. There is an infinite number of concepts that can be
inferred from the observation of a native shouting ‘Gavagai!’ while a rabbit runs
past (e.g., rabbit, white, undetached rabbit slices, ...). Which of these
concepts is the right one will depend on additional factors than merely that
the concept includes aspects of the observed rabbit. Strong sampling already
eliminates among compatible concepts all those that are broad in their intension,
while weak sampling suggests that all compatible concepts are plausible.
These examples illustrate that strong and weak sampling seem to depend on
different environmental conditions. In the marble case, these conditions concern
the contents and relative sizes of the bags. In the mushrooms and Gavagai cases,
the conditions depend on assumptions about the context of an utterance such as
‘Gavagai!’ or about the structure of natural kinds (e.g., undetached rabbit
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slices is intuitively unnatural). When assuming that differences in the conditions
under which the data have been sampled matter for the inference, these different
assumptions seem differently plausible and their distinction matters.
A formal contrast between the weak and strong sampling assumption is illus-
trated by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001, p. 633), who consider the respective
mathematical expressions of these assumptions side by side. Accordingly:
Definition 6.4.1 (weak sampling).
pr(e|h) = 1 if e ∈ h and 0 otherwise. (6.3)
Definition 6.4.2 (strong sampling).
pr(e|h) = 1
|h|
if e ∈ h and 0 otherwise. (6.4)
T&G mean by ‘|h|’ to indicate the size of a hypothesis, but I think it is more con-
sistent to interpret this term to mean the size of a concept, C, that is indicated
by a hypothesis. For instance, when a hypothesis says that x is an instance of
healthy hormone level, then ‘|h|’ should actually correspond to a represen-
tation of the size of the concept healthy hormone level.
The contrast between these equations is this. Weak sampling (equation 6.3) says
that if two hypotheses, h1 and h2, are consistent with the data, e, then their
associated likelihoods should be the same because pr(e|h1) = 1 and pr(e|h2) = 1.
For example, assume that h1 is the hypothesis, ‘x is an instance of the concept
healthy hormone level’, where that concept spans the interval [58, 62] along
the hormone-levels scale. Assume that h2 is the hypothesis, ‘x is in the concept
healthy hormone level’, where that concept spans the interval [47, 80] along
the hormone-levels scale instead. Then, under weak sampling, the likelihoods
associated with h1 and h2 are the same. In other words, there is no way of
distinguishing between the plausibilities of these hypotheses as long as they are
consistent with the evidence. In contrast, strong sampling (equation 6.4) permits
distinctions amongst multiple consistent hypotheses. These distinctions are based
on the size (indicated by the absolute value bars of a hypothesis, |h|). If |h2| >
|h1|, then pr(e|h1) > pr(e|h2). For instance, if the concept proposed by h1 spans
the interval [58, 62] along the scale of hormone levels, while the concept proposed
by h2 spans the interval [47, 80], then, under strong sampling, the likelihood
associated with h1 will be greater than the likelihood associated with h2. In
contrast to weak sampling, the intuition with strong sampling is that the agent
takes into account how much e is consistent with h.
With respect to the formal contrast, one difference between the two conceptions
deserves further attention, namely that the evidence is less informative under
weak sampling than under strong sampling. Weak sampling is an all-or-none-like
measure of consistency of the evidence with the hypothesis. Strong sampling
is a gradual measure of the hypothesis’ relative plausibility in light of the data.
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Assuming that x has been chosen explicitly helps agents to narrow down the space
of all possible concepts compatible with x to only those that, roughly, make the
occurrence of x the least surprising. T&G’s (2001, p. 633) overview of the formal
definitions of strong and weak sampling illustrates the difference. The difference
between the informative value of equations 6.3 and 6.4 can be illustrated with an

















In equation 6.5, the ratio of the conditional probabilities of the hypotheses given
the evidence, pr(h1|e)/pr(h2|e), is equal to the ratio of the unconditional posterior
probabilities of these hypotheses, pr′(h1)/pr′(h2) (not prior probabilities). This is
because in determining these posteriors by following Bayes’ Rule (see Glossary),
the associated likelihoods will be either 1 or 0, so that updating the prior for
each hypothesis will not change the posterior in both cases. Thus, observing e
does not change the relative plausibility of the two hypotheses. In contrast, in
equation 6.6, the relative influence of the likelihoods in determining the poste-
rior changes with a change in the relative sizes of the hypotheses. The ratio of
the sizes, |h2|/|h1|, functions as a weighting on the ratio of the unconditional
probabilities of h1 and h2. Hypotheses are weighted by their relative sizes and
observing e makes a difference to the relative plausibilities of h1 and h2 in 6.6 but
not in 6.5. Therefore, strong sampling allows the evidence to be more informative
for evaluating different hypotheses.
The contrast between weak and strong sampling suggests that choosing between
Shepard’s and T&G’s models reduces to choosing one of these types of sampling
assumptions. Which one is more helpful for solving the problem of generalisation
(section 6.2.1)? I think that this depends on the context of the problem. The
relevant question for evaluating T&G’s expansion of Shepard’s approach to ULG
is, thus, in which context strong sampling is a better method to approach the
generalisation task. My claim is motivated by the following thoughts.
In the literature, the two assumptions are sometimes distinguished as a ‘learner’
and a ‘teacher’ condition of a generalisation task (M. Frank, Goodman, Lai, &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007, p. 289). Accordingly, weak sampling
is an appropriate assumption when the task does not involve a teacher, but an
agent has to infer the concept from an observation alone. Strong sampling is
appropriate when a teacher is explicitly teaching the concept, and chooses exam-
ples with respect to the goal of communicating the right concept. Navarro et al.
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(2012) also propose an intermediate version of weak and strong sampling, which
suggests that these two options are not the only possible principles guiding the
inference.
One take on this difference is that the two assumptions make different commit-
ments to what psychological processes are involved in the inference task. Ac-
cordingly, strong sampling relies on causal reasoning, which is the answer to the
generalisation problem when an intention about a concept has caused the obser-
vation. For example, observing a fly agraric mushroom is caused by the expert’s
intention to teach what a poisonous mushroom looks like. In contrast, weak
sampling relies on logical reasoning, and does not assume that there is a causal
or intentional relationship between the true candidate concept and the observed
example. To interpret this in light of the quote from Shepard (section 6.2.1),
weak sampling is the answer to the generalisation problem when nature does not
intentionally guide observations on the basis of the kinds they belong to. For
example, it is a logical possibility that the observed mushroom in the forest is
poisonous, but it is also logically possible that the mushroom is edible. When the
observed mushroom belongs in fact to the kinds of poisonous mushrooms, this
relationship is only a correlation.
A possible alternative to this take is that the different methods are differently
optimal solutions for different contexts of the generalisation task, and also de-
pend on the kind of organism that solves the generalisation task (e.g., humans
as opposed to pigeons). Correspondingly, the role of these assumptions is to
constrain the generalisation function so that it will be optimised relative to the
agents’ needs and their environments. In these regards, strong sampling seems
more plausible in cases where a teacher tries to explicitly teach a concept.
If strong sampling is an expansion of Shepard’s approach to ULG, this does not
mean that in every case of generalisation, either of these assumptions is bet-
ter. Thus, the contribution of T&G’s model to Shepard’s solution is that not
only weak sampling, but strong sampling as well, could drive generalisation as a
Bayesian inference. However, whichever of these assumptions one chooses as a
formal principle in the Bayesian model may commit one to further assumptions
about the underlying cognitive process that is involved in the inference, if the
formal principle represents aspects of the cognitive-inference process. On T&G’s
account, the first step to understanding this process is to understand how the
relation between the evidence and the content of a hypothesis justifies the assign-
ment of conditional probabilities. For instance, how is it that the relation between
the observation of a fly agraric mushroom and the concept fly agraric mush-
room makes the hypothesis that the fly agraric mushroom is an instance of the
concept fly agraric mushroom plausible? T&G’s answer is that this function
is fulfilled by the size principle, which is a consequence of the strong sampling
assumption and which shows that ULG can be derived from this assumption as
well.
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6.4.2. The size principle
The size principle is a specification of a likelihood associated with each hypoth-
esis in the conditional probability of equation 6.1. For example, the likelihood
corresponding to the hypothesis that the object x (e.g., a fly agraric mushroom)
is in a concept, C, looks as follows.






where n corresponds to the number of instances that are given as examples for
the concept (cf. Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001, p. 633). Equation 6.7 says that the
likelihood of observing x given that x was a true random sample of the concept C
is proportional to a ratio of the size of the concept that the hypothesis points to,
raised to the power of n examples. The same can be done for y. The hypothesis
is ‘y ∈ C’ and the corresponding likelihood function is the probability to observe
y given that y is an instance of C.
The size principle is a tool for agents to infer the most informative concept when
multiple candidate concepts make the evidence likely. The size principle helps to
identify, on the basis of the size of a relevant candidate concept, which of these
compatible hypotheses should be preferred over others. Roughly, equation 6.7
says that the agent should assign greater probabilities to hypotheses that pair x
with a smaller concept. Let me illustrate this with an example.
Suppose x is a fly agraric mushroom, and there are two hypotheses. One hy-
pothesis says that x is in the extension of the concept fly agraric mushroom.
The other hypothesis says that x is in the extension of thing in the uni-
verse. Intuitively, fly agraric mushroom has a smaller size than thing in
the universe because there are fewer fly agraric mushrooms than things in the
universe, whereby the size would correpsond to the concept’s extension. T&G
suggest to approximate the concept’s size with a proxy for the extension, which,
on their account, is an unspecified measure of psychological similarity. However,
it is unclear on T&G’s account, what this psychological proxy is supposed to be.
Plausibly, the agent cannot know the extension of a concept—nobody can know
how many mushrooms precisely fall under the concept mushroom. Moreover,
the extension does not capture the idea that concepts contain possible instances,
the ones that have yet not been observed but, upon observation, would fall under
the concept. For example, the extension of mushroom does not contain all those
(unobserved) mushrooms that could be instances of this concept in the future.
I think that the size of a concept should be understood as a function of the con-
cept’s intension. It is widely held that the intension is a quantity of all attributes
that the things that could fall under the concept have in common. To make
this concrete for a specification of the size of a concept, I build on Shepard’s
proposal, that concepts are consequential regions in a psychological space that is
structured by geometric dimensions, and the relationship between instances of a
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concept (i.e., consequential region) is identified with a measure of the geometric
distance between their corresponding points in this space. The dimensions in the
space represent attributes of (possible) objects. The associated quantity of at-
tributes that are shared is the overall magnitude of the attributes with regards to
which the objects that would fall inside a consequential region overlap. In Poth
(2019), I have built on Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) Conceptual Spaces approach, in
which concepts are also geometric regions, to make this idea more precise. Fol-
lowing this approach, the intension of a concept corresponds to the area that is
covered by a geometric region in psychological space. This area can be understood
as covering the average similarity among the possible instances of the concept.
For instance, the intension of the concept fly agraric mushroom is the area
in psychological space that covers all points that could possibly be observed as
instances of the concept fly agraric mushroom, and can be measured by
taking the average of the distances between already existing observations that
are known to be in this region. In Poth (2019), I follow Decock et al. (2016)’s
application of Carnap’s (1980) γ rule, and argue that the size of a concept, that
is, the measure of the area covered by a geometric region in conceptual space,
can be understood as the Lebesgue-measure over the region. The advantage of
this approach to the size of a concept is that similarity (i.e., geometric distance)
can be used as a basis for the probabilistic inference process that is used in PC,
while, otherwise, the abstract notion of the ‘size’ of a concept is a rather vague
characterisation of the likelihoods in the Bayesian model.
In light of these considerations, and contra T&G’s suggestion to use the exten-
sion, the reader should henceforth understand the concept’s size generally as a
function of the concept’s intension, although this specification is not part of the
Bayesianness of T&G’s model of concept learning and rather an interpretation
that rests on the assumption of a geometric spaces model of concepts. In this
thesis, all subsequent illustrations that appeal to the size of a concept should
be understood as expressing aspects that can be associated with the concept’s
intension under the assumption of a geometric similarity space. For example, the
set of mushrooms is on average less similar than the set of fly agraric mushrooms.
Thus, following the geometric-spaces conception of concepts, these concepts are
different in their sizes because the area covered by the concept mushroom will
be larger than the area covered by the concept fly agraric mushroom.
Given the assumption that instances of a concept occur as systematic random
samples in the world (i.e., the assumption of strong sampling) the size principle
demands the following. It is quite likely to observe x, a fly agraric mushroom,
given that x was a random sample of the category fly agraric mushroom.
But, given the assumption of random sampling, it is very unlikely to observe
x if it was randomly sampled from the concept thing in the universe. In
other words, of everything in the universe that you could observe randomly, it
is less likely that you observe x than if x was a random observation of things
that are fly agraric mushrooms. Therefore, following equation 6.7, the likelihood
associated with the hypothesis that x was in fly agraric mushroom should
be higher than the likelihood associated with the observation of x and thing in
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the universe. The size principle can be used to evaluate the plausibility of the
hypothesis that y is an instance of the concept as well. Suppose that y is a fly
agraric mushroom, and follow the same steps as in the previous example.
The size principle is only a partial answer to how the agent should solve the
Bayesian inference task of generalising from x to y. Generalising from x to y
means going from pr(x ∈ C|x) (equation 6.7) to pr(y ∈ C|x ∈ C) (equation 6.1).
The size principle is a specification of the likelihood that is associated with one of
the hypotheses (‘x ∈ C’ or ‘y ∈ C’, respectively) at a time and the corresponding
piece of evidence (x or y, respectively). It is not the generalisation function,
which compares this to the plausibility of the hypothesis that y is in C. The size
principle determines only partially the plausibilities associated with each of the
relevant hypotheses in the inference of generalisation.9
In the following, I explicate T&G’s view on how this comparison works. My ex-
plication is inspired by Shepard’s (1987, p. 1319) initial interpretation of general-
isation in terms of the relationship between instances and consequential regions.
The comparison comes in multiple layers. Firstly, under the supposition of a
geometric space of psychological representations, it holds for any object, x, or y,
that this object can be associated with a region, C, in this space. This region
represents the candidate concept that x is an instance of. x is known to be an
instance of some concept, but it is unknown which concept in particular this is
(e.g., fly agraric mushroom, mushroom, thing in the universe). For
reasons of mathematical elegance and simplicity, Shepard (1987, p. 1319) assumes
that the candidate regions centre on x. The second step is an analysis of the size
of any candidate region, which is centred on x. Roughly, under the assumption
of a geometric space, the size is a measure of the area covered by the region.
Thirdly, assuming that x is a random sample of the unknown C, and following
T&G’s size principle (equation 6.7), it is more plausible that the region centred
on x is small, i.e., under the spatial interpretation, that the region covers a rather
small area in geometric space.
Doing the same for y, under the assumptions of a geometric space in which y
can be located, the availability of regions (i.e., candidate concepts) that centre
on y and the size principle, the region that best accounts for the observation y is
relatively small rather than large10. For example, fly agraric mushroom is a
region around all possible fly agraric mushrooms, centering on y. thing in the
universe is a much larger region and covers, by assumption, about all possible
representations in psychological space. Therefore, following the size principle, the
probability of observing y given that y is a random instance of the concept fly
agraric mushroom should be higher than the probability of observing y given
that y is a random instance of the concept thing in the universe.
9The model is also only implicitly a ‘Bayesian’ model because priors obtain no explicit atten-
tion. It is implicitly assumed that priors are uniform.
10It is implicit in the generalisation problem that the region must be larger than x and y. The
initial size of C does not depend on the evidence, x or y.
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This establishes that a change in the size of the concept leads to a change in the
likelihood function that is associated with the observations of x and y, respec-
tively. For example, by replacing the smaller concept, fly agraric mushroom,
with the larger concept, thing in the universe, the model predicts that the
likelihoods, pr(x|x ∈ C) and pr(y|y ∈ C) should decrease in both cases.
Taking stock, the previous sections have explained that T&G’s model expands on
Shepard’s earlier model of generalisation with the assumption of strong sampling
and the size principle. In the next section, it will be argued that T&G’s model
offers an approach for rethinking the ULG and psychological similarity.
6.5. From the size principle to generalisation
On the basis of Shepard’s geometric account, the key to generalisation is to com-
pare the overlap of the regions centring around x and y, respectively. In this
example, x and y are both fly agraric mushrooms. Based on the foregoing anal-
ysis, each of them is very likely to be in the region fly agraric mushroom
and very unlikely to be only in the region thing in the universe. Thus, each
of these pieces of evidence is more or less equally likely to be an instance of the
concept fly agraric mushroom and each of these pieces of evidence is more or
less equally likely to be an instance of the concept thing in the universe. In
other words, x and y obtain more or less the same likelihoods of being instances
of either of these concepts. On Shepard’s account, the plausibilities of the con-
cepts in relation to the instances are a measure of the size of the region, which
on T&G’s account simply corresponds to the inverse of the likelihood. Thus, in
intuitive terms and under the interpretation that the generalisation function is a
comparison of two hypotheses, equation 6.1 should be interpreted in terms of the
relative overlap of the most plausible concepts associated with x and y. If these
concepts overlap more, then generalisation probability will increase; x and y will
be more probable to be instances of the same concept, rather than of different
concepts. If the regions have a small overlap, then it is very improbable that x
and y are chosen from the same concept. For a visualisation of the comparison
of regions, consider Shepard’s (1987, p. 1319) illustration of the overlap in figure
6.1.
Although it is not necessary for the prediction of an increase or decrease of the
generalisation probability to make explicit reference to the PS between x and y,
it is implicit in this task that the PS between x and y (their distance in geometric
space) plays a role in determining the plausibility of x and y to be in the same
region. This is because, holding fixed the size of concepts, the closer x and y are
in geometric space, the more probable it is that their associated regions overlap.
T&G’s framing of the generalisation task suggests that the interpretation of the
generalisation function does not require an explicit analysis of PS. From the per-
spective of the analysis in terms of the size principle, all that is required is a com-
parison between the likelihoods, which depend on the size of the concept. Their
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Figure 6.1.: An illustration of the overlap of regions. Region C represents a candidate
concept. x and 0 represent the evidence. By assumption, the regions are
centred on these examples. m(s, x) measures the overlap of the regions
associated with x and 0 and of the same size as C. m(s) represents a
measure of the size of the region, C. In this illustration, C functions as
a candidate concept for determining the regions around x and 0. From
“Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science,” by
Shepard, Science, 237(4820), p. 1319. Copyright 1987 by The American
Association for the Advancement of Science. Reprinted with permission.
claim is that given the rationale of the size principle, generalisation should follow
the exponential gradient (the ULG) as well. Equation 6.7 says that hypotheses
that point towards smaller concepts should be assigned a higher probability than
hypotheses that point towards larger concepts. This relationship between the
size of the concept and the likelihood is exponential and strengthens with more
examples (i.e., x1, ..., xn). The exponential gradient is expected purely on the
basis of this formal relation.
Figure 6.2, which I have adapted from Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001, p. 632),
recovers the relationship between the logic of the size principle and generalisation
intuitively. The y-axis indicates the probability that y is in C given that x is
in C. This represents the model’s prediction of how strong the tendency of an
agent to generalise behaviour to y in light of x will be. The x-axis represents
a hypothetical scale of perceptual representations. x is a point on this scale,
representing a perceptual object (e.g., a fly agraric mushroom). The height of a
bar indicates the inverse of the size of a concept that is referred to by a hypothesis.
Example sizes are indicated on the left of the figure. The length of a bar represents
the length of an interval on the x-axis. An interval is a simplified version of
Shepard’s idea of a consequential region (a concept). The figure illustrates that
the probability of generalising from x to y peaks at x and decreases exponentially
on both sides.
Intuitively, thicker bars (hypotheses with a smaller size) take up more of the
area under the curve associated with the generalisation function, while covering
a small interval along the psychological scale. Thinner bars take up less of the
area under the ‘generalisation curve’, while covering a broader interval on the
psychological scale. In other words, bars represent different portions of the area
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Figure 6.2.: A sketch of how T&G’s model accomplishes ULG. The y-axis represents
generalisation probability, which exponentially decreases with an increase
in the size of a concept, which is depicted as the width of a respective inter-
val covering x. The x-axis represents the values associated with different
levels of pigmentations or hormones (see examples in section 6.2). Each
interval centres on x and expands equally into both directions along the
x-axis. The wider the concept, the further to the left or right of x it will
extend, and this is where y-values are small. Adapted from Tenenbaum
and Griffiths (2001, p. 631).
in psychological space that is associated with a stronger or weaker generalisation
response. The response is stronger for thicker bars and weaker for thinner bars.
This expresses the intuition that is associated with the size principle, under the
assumption that the inverse of the size of a concept corresponds to the thickness
of a bar.
In light of the size principle, the likelihood of observing x, which is a particular
point on the scale, given that x was a random sample of one of the candidate
intervals along the scale, corresponds to a portion of the area under the general-
isation curve. In T&G’s model, this area indicates the likelihood. This can be
made more specific in light of Shepard’s geometric-regions approach, so that it
appears that the relevant portion corresponds to the area of the region that is
most likely associated with x in psychological space. As can be seen in figure 6.2,
most of the area is centred on x. Intervals covering this area more closely obtain
higher likelihoods, following the size principle.
A main insight from figure 6.2 is that the more probable it is that x and y be-
long to the same concept, the more probable is generalisation from one to the
other. The probability of an agent to generalise from x to y, on the basis of C,
will depend on whether x and y are similarly likely in light of the same concept,
instead of different concepts.11 If both x and y are equally likely to be in C, then
11It seems to be a problem for the approach that it is unclear how cases can be solved where the
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generalisation will be very probable. If x and y don’t overlap in this sense, it will
be unlikely that the agent treats them as the same. Following the size principle,
the tendency of either x or y to be an instance of the relevant concept is expo-
nential, where the exponent represents the number of examples. Taken together,
for both x and y, the generalisation function is therefore almost shaped like a
Gaussian with negative exponential curves on both sides. Generalisation prob-
ability increases exponentially with an increase in the average (metaphorically:
‘overlap’) of the likelihoods associated with the concepts centred on x and y (cf.
section 6.5). I take it that, on the basis of Shepard’s geometric interpretation
of PS space, the overlap can be measured as the overlap of the areas covered by
the relevant concepts. This suggests to rethink the initial generalisation task:
generalising implies measuring the overlap of two likelihoods, as specified by the
sizes of the relevant concepts.
However, the examples suggest that this view on generalisation does still im-
plicitly rely on a notion of similarity as a geometric distance between x and y.
Intuitively, in figure 6.2, the distance between x and y on the scale determines
how much the candidate concepts centering on x and y will overlap. It is because
x and y are very close on the spectrum that their associated concepts are most
probable to be the same. In other words, given that smaller concepts should
be preferred (according to the size principle), the concepts to be compared will
be more likely to overlap with each other only if x and y are relatively close in
psychological space. Intuitively, longer bars contain more examples than shorter
ones because they cover broader intervals in psychological space (the concepts
corresponding to longer bars have broader extensions). Thus, the overlap of the
likelihoods depends on two aspects. Firstly, following strong sampling, it is less
probable for two random points, x and y, located along the x-axis, to fall inside
the same interval if the interval centering on each of them is smaller rather than
larger. Secondly, the further away (i.e., the less similar) two points are, the less
likely they are to be in the same (small) concept.
This interpretation suggests that the generalisation function in figure 6.2 does
rely implicitly on the distance (dissimilarity) between x and y. Although this
interpretation relies intuitively on the PS between x and y, there is some infor-
mation that is added by T&G’s approach: generalisation becomes a correlation
between two likelihood functions that can be identified with the size principle,
whereas it had been a measure of the overlap of regions on Shepard’s approach.
In the next section, I argue that despite its implicit reliance on PS, the Bayesian
theory of generalisation inspired by T&G’s model contributes to a simpler ex-
planation of ULG. I show how this contribution figures in a reverse-engineering
approach to PC.
objects are similarly likely in light of two different hypotheses. For example, if it was the case
that the probability of observing an apple given that it was an instance of the ‘fruit’ category
was the same as the probability of observing a chair given that this chair was an instance of
the category ‘kitchen furniture’, this would imply, according to T&G’s approach, that the
apple and the chair should be considered to be similar or obtain the same generalisation
response. But they clearly aren’t similar and shouldn’t receive the same response (e.g, the
apple, but not the chair, should be eaten).
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6.6. From generalisation to similarity
The derivation of the generalisation function with the size principle is not a mere
reformulation of Shepard’s results because it adds a new perspective on how
the psychological mechanism underlying the generalisation data can be studied.
What is new is that the perspective is more abstract: from the perspective of
the size principle, no explicit definition of PS is needed to understand why the
generalisation function should have a negatively exponential shape. At the ab-
stract level of description, reference to the size of concepts and sets of stimuli is
sufficient for understanding why generalisation has the shape that it does (figure
6.2). This is because hypotheses pointing to increasingly smaller concepts be-
come exponentially more probable than hypotheses pointing to larger concepts.
From this abstract perspective, generalisation is a process of inferring the rela-
tionship between x and y depending on the probability that x and y are samples of
the same concept. This novel perspective suggests a possible revision of the ULG:
Definition 6.6.1 (The universal law of generalisation revisited). For any hy-
pothesis that pairs one or two stimuli x, or y, with a concept, C, the probability,
pr(y ∈ C|x ∈ C), to generalise a behaviour from x to y is an exponentially
decreasing function of the size of C.
Definition 6.6.1 says that with increasingly bigger concepts, the probability to
generalise becomes exponentially smaller. With respect to generalisation, the
ULG (definition 3.2) and definition 6.6.1 make similar predictions because, roughly,
the meaning of ‘size’ in T&G’s model corresponds to the meaning of ‘relative dis-
tance’ in Shepard’s model. However, as indicated above, T&G’s model adds
emphasis on the relevance of the concept, C, instead of geometric distance. This
produces the novel empirical hypothesis that the concept possibly determines
the relevant context of the similarity judgement, and that generalisation should
change in light of different candidate concepts.12
I will now argue that a Bayesian theory of generalisation that is inspired by the
conjunction of Shepard’s PS model and T&G’s model of concept learning ex-
emplifies a strategy to reverse-engineer the cognitive mechanism underlying PC
behaviour. Typically, behaviour is recorded in generalisation data and similarity-
judgement matrices (cf. chapters 3 and 4) and it is unclear what the physiological
processes are that generate the data. Like in Marr’s (1982) computational anal-
ysis of information-processing systems (chapter 2), the practical implication of a
Bayesian approach to PC is that PC can be studied with computational methods,
while knowledge about the actual physiological details underlying PC mechanisms
is still inaccessible.
12One way of elaborating on this idea further is to illustrate that the Bayesian model, in
choosing the relevant concept (e.g., an interval along the psychological scale in figure 6.2),
determines at least partly what portion of the psychological space is relevant for the inference
in the similarity judgement.
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In chapter 2, I have illustrated what a computational-level analysis from a Bayesian
perspective looks like with the example of vision. Vision is a perceiver’s problem
to infer from an image on the retina what physical stimulus has caused the image.
The perceiver’s strategy to solve the problem is Bayesian inference, and the logic
is to infer backwards, from features of the image, what the features associated
with the stimulus are. The strategy is rational in light of the fact that the true
stimulus that has caused the retinal image is not directly accessible, and infer-
ring what stimulus has caused the image will increase the agent’s ability to act
towards the stimulus in an appropriate way.
The computational-level analysis of PC from a Bayesian perspective proceeds
likewise. PC is a perceptual categoriser’s problem to infer from a set of examples
what concept or category (e.g., fly agraric mushroom) is associated with the
examples. I say ‘is associated with the examples’ rather than ‘has caused the
examples’ because it cannot be assumed in every case of PC that the relationship
between the examples and the concept or category is causal. I have explained
in section 6.4.1 that sometimes, it is more sensible to assume that the examples
and the category only correlate with each other. The difference is implicit in the
additional assumptions about the sampling process—strong sampling assumes a
causal relationship, while weak sampling assumes a logical relationship between
the examples and a candidate concept.
However, in either of these cases, the perceptual categoriser’s strategy to solve
the problem is Bayesian inference. The perceptual categoriser must infer the pos-
terior probability of a hypothesis about the ‘hidden’ category or concept in light
of a piece of evidence (i.e., an example of the concept) from the probability of
observing the evidence given that the hypothesis is true together with some back-
ground knowledge which is encoded in the probability of the hypothesis regardless
of the evidence.
The logic of the strategy is to infer backwards, from the similarity among the
examples, what the intension of the concept is that is associated with, or has
caused, these examples as random samples. Given the distinction between strong
and weak sampling, the logic of this strategy can be refined with an optimality
principle. This is what the size principle does: when inferring what concept has
‘caused’ the examples, learners should have a preference for candidate concepts
with relatively small intensions. For instance, they should choose Dalmatian
instead of dog or animal. On the contrary, in weak sampling, learners should
only look out for concepts that are merely ‘logically consistent’ with the exam-
ples. For instance, they may be indifferent in their choice between fly agraric
mushroom or poisonous mushroom in light of a few examples that fall under
both concepts.
The rationality of this analysis of PC is constrained by additional considerations
of what would be the ‘optimal’ PC behaviour of an ideal perceptual categoriser
in a given environment and given their subjective needs. To make this more
concrete, I take on Shepard’s implicit assumption that concepts fulfil a role for
the survival of the perceptual categoriser and assume that PC has adaptive value
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(see also preliminaries). In light of the distinction between weak and strong sam-
pling, I distinguish between two principles that are relevant for the rationality
of PC. PC behaviour that corresponds to these principles will be optimal and,
hence, considered to be rational. The first principle I call ‘informativeness’. Fol-
lowing this principle optimises PC performance in cultural environments where
the goal of PC is to communicate about perceptual categories. The second prin-
ciple I call ‘survival’. Following this principle optimises PC behaviour in purely
‘natural’ environments. By assumption, concepts that are informative serve com-
munication, while concepts that are learnable serve the ability to remember.
Intuitively, getting the categorisations in ‘natural’ environments right will in-
crease the categoriser’s chances of survival (e.g., by distinguishing edible from
poisonous mushrooms). Likewise, in ‘cultural’ environments, learning to distin-
guish word-meanings such as ‘Dalmatian’ from ‘dog’ increases one’s chances of
communicating effectively, and also this ability seems to carry adaptive value
(Pinker, 2000, 2003). Thus, on the Bayesian approach to PC, PC is rational if
and only if it generates behaviour that is optimal by appeal to these additional
constraints of survival and communicative success.
The connection between the task of PC and its associated adaptive value can be
expressed with the use of a utility function that pairs an expected utility value
with each candidate concept, and concepts that are relatively more informative
and survival-conducive are assigned to higher expected utility values. A concept
learner will choose one candidate concept over another if and only if the expected
utility associated with the former exceeds that of the latter concept. The optimal
outcome of this function is behaviour produced by a concept that maximises the
expected utility with regards to these principles, and the perceptual categoriser
should choose this concept because it optimises their chances of inferring the
‘correct’ (i.e., adaptive) categories.
However, what the ‘optimal’ combination of values associated with these princi-
ples are will depend on the environmental niche. My hypothesis is that Shepard’s
(1987) weak sampling assumption optimises PC performance with regards to the
survival principle, while T&G’s (2001) strong sampling assumption optimises PC
performance with regards to the informativeness principle. Showing this in detail
will require future work, but the general argument is that these two assump-
tions constrain the Bayesian model of concept learning in ways that make the
model produce ‘optimal’ PC behaviour. This behaviour carries adaptive value in
a respective environmental niche.
An example is Xu and Tenenbaum’s (2007) Bayesian analysis of word learning,
which I discuss in more detail in chapter 7. In Xu and Tenenbaum’s exper-
iments, learners have to infer whether, given a sequence of three Dalmatians
of the word ‘fep’, the right concept corresponding to this word is Dalmatian,
dog or animal. On Xu and Tenenbaum’s Bayesian approach to word learning,
learners should follow the size principle and prefer smaller concepts over larger
concepts. On my unified approach to PC as a Bayesian inference task, the reason
for choosing the smaller concept in this inference task, i.e., Dalmatian, over the
alternative candidate concepts is that this choice maximises the expected utility
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associated with the principle of informativeness. In the context of word learning,
it is more informative to categorise or label objects more narrowly; for example,
in an extreme case, assigning one label to only one object but no other objects
will be maximally informative. If the goal of a concept learner is to infer word
meanings in such a way that enables them to communicate informatively, then
they should favour concepts with relatively small intensions. Favouring concepts
with relatively small intensions in the inference of word meaning will help the
agent to be informative when using the word to refer to instances of this concept
(M. Frank et al., 2009). Therefore, the expected utility should be maximized for
concepts that have smaller intensions. In the Bayesian model, the use of the size
principle and the assumption that examples are explicit random samples of the
true category is justified by the assumption that PC is optimised with respect to
communication and word learning, where being informative is most adaptive.
It has been argued elsewhere that in contexts of learning alone, concepts with
broader intensions, such as basic-level concepts (Rosch, 1975) produce optimal
categorisations. This hypothesis has been extensively studied in the context
of language use and the simultaneous elimination of communicative pressures
(Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015).
6.7. Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has argued that PC is a Bayesian-inference task that
can be analysed at the computational level of explanation (Marr, 1982). I have
illustrated this argument with the model of T&G’s (2001) size principle, which
specifies the likelihood function in the inference problem (section 6.4.2). Roughly,
the size principle says that given an instance of an unknown concept, generalisa-
tion should be stronger for objects that are in the same concept, rather than in
different concepts. I have analysed the assumptions of T&G’s Bayesian analysis
of the generalisation task with an emphasis on the contrast between weak and
strong sampling (section 6.4.1). I have argued that there is no unique solution to
the generalisation task; strong and weak sampling are aspects of different kinds
of generic solutions to the generalisation task given different environmental con-
ditions. On this basis, one interpretation of the additional contribution of T&G’s
model is that the size principle helps to solve the indeterminacy problem in word-
learning tasks (selecting some word meanings over others), while in other cases,
weak sampling (equation 6.3) is relatively more plausible (e.g., when robins learn
to eat).
I have compared T&G’s model to Shepard’s model, and argued that the size
principle offers a novel, more general, perspective on the ULG (section 6.6). Al-
though the prediction of the generalisation gradient is already available in Shep-
ard’s model, it is simpler when derived with the size principle in that it does not
explicitly rely on a geometric PS-spaces model. T&G’s model derives ULG on
the basis of the abstract relationship between likelihoods and sizes of concepts
(section 6.5). Generalisation is exponentially decreasing with an increase in the
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overlap of likelihoods associated with small concepts, where the size of a concept
is assessed intuitively. For example, thing in the universe has a broader ex-
tension than fly agraric mushroom, therefore, the latter has a smaller size.
Thus, the approach is simple because it refrains from specifying the content of
the concept precisely.
Finally, I have argued that jointly, Shepard’s model of generalisation and T&G’s
model of concept learning are justifiably part of a reverse-engineering strategy
to PC (section 6.6). Together, the combination of these models illustrates an
optimal procedure to use generalisation data and reverse infer from that data the
underlying cognitive processes that have generated the data. This approach fits
into the reverse-inference scheme from chapter 2.
Argument structure of the Bayesian model of PC:
(A) When psychological process, CL, is recruited by a Bayesian-inference task,
an exponential gradient of generalisation, E, is likely to be found.
(B) In Bayesian-inference task T, E was found.
(C) Hence, psychological process, CL, was recruited by Bayesian-inference task
T.
Where ‘CL’ refers to a process of concept learning that is driven by the size
principle.
To be clear, as part of a reverse-engineering strategy, the Bayesian theory of
generalisation should not be seen as a replacement of Shepard’s earlier approach
to generalisation and PS. At the abstract level of description, the notion of the
size in the size principle (equation 6.7) is still unspecified. To make it precise, as
I have illustrated on the basis of Shepard’s earlier work in section 6.5, a PS space
is needed. What is more, to relate the relevant concepts in the hypotheses (e.g.,
fly agraric mushroom) to the evidence for the likelihood function, one must
still assess some way of identifying whether a concept overlaps, or centres on, the
relevant body of evidence (e.g., x or y). The need for defining what ‘centrality’
and ‘overlap’ mean calls for an additional theory of how these hypotheses and
the relevant concepts are individuated with respect to the sets of stimuli, e.g.,
Shepard’s PS theory. Instead of a replacement, the abstract perspective offered
by the size principle should be seen as a contribution to Shepard’s geometric
PS model. The contribution consists in offering a simpler interpretation of the
generalisation data, which is not bound to a geometric-spaces model of concepts.
In sum, the previous discussion suggests that a Bayesian approach to PC sys-
tematically combines a theory of PS and generalisation. In the next chapter, I
critically evaluate the Bayesian approach to PC.
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7.1. Introduction
This chapter evaluates the Bayesian approach to PC presented in chapter 6 with
regards to the Shepard-Tversky debate. I argue that the Bayesian approach to
PC is positioned at the computational level of explanation. At this level, it can
generalise predictions associated with the previous theories of PS but it cannot
replace these theories at the representational and algorithmic levels.
To support this argument, I outline four possible limitations of T&G’s (2001)
model of concept learning from chapter 6. The first limitation is that T&G’s
strong sampling assumption is too strong in many tasks. This principally limits
the size principle to an explanation of word learning (section 7.2). The second
limitation concerns the status of T&G’s Bayesian model as a theory of concept
learning. I suggest that the theory is at best an incomplete theory of concept
learning that could be understood as a theory of concept development because
it lacks an account of how concepts are acquired in the first place (section 7.3).
The third limitation concerns the status of T&G’s Bayesian model as a theory of
PS and its restriction to the computational level of explanation. It appears that
the Bayesian model is limited to a theory of generalisation and does not provide
a theory of PS in the sense that Shepard had originally proposed (section 7.4).
A fourth limitation is that the prior probabilities are still unspecified in T&G’s
model (section 7.5). In what follows, I explain each limitation in turn.
7.2. Plausibility of the strong sampling assumption
The first limitation is that T&G’s strong sampling assumption, which motivates
the size principle, is not genuinely plausible for inference-tasks outside the domain
of word learning. Correspondingly, a possible worry for the Bayesian theory of
generalisation is that the size principle is restricted to an explanation of general-
isation of words or labels, but not of perceptual categories in organisms without
linguistic capabilities (e.g., pigeons).
To recapitulate, strong sampling reflects the assumption that perceived objects
are explicit random samples of a concept. In section 6.4.1, I have explained that
this assumption implies that an observed example of a concept depends causally
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on the concept. I have contrasted this assumption with weak sampling, under
which the observed instance is independent of the corresponding concept instead.
A case can be made in favour of the strong sampling assumption in the context
of communication (see also M. Frank et al., 2009). In their 2007 paper, Xu
and Tenenbaum use the strong sampling assumption to explain a Bayesian word-
learning task. In their example, H is a hypothesis space with hypotheses that
each pair a candidate concept, C, with a given label, L. A hypothesis can be
represented in the form h〈C,L〉. For reasons of simplicity, and because the label
is always the same in a given word-learning task, L is not explicitly mentioned
further.1 The following are a few examples for such hypotheses.
hDal: a hypothesis that pairs the concept dalmatian with the label ‘fep’.
hD: a hypothesis that pairs the concept dog with the label ‘fep’.
hA: a hypothesis that pairs the concept animal with the label ‘fep’.
In Xu and Tenenbaum’s experiments, word learners are presented with a labelled
example and have to indicate for any novel object whether this object should be
called with the same label. Xu and Tenenbaum assume that a learner decides
this on the basis of the example’s perceptual features, a set of available candidate
concepts (e.g., dalmatian, dog or animal) and Bayes’ Theorem. Given the
evidence (i.e., an object paired with a label), a learner has to compute the prob-
abilities associated with the relevant hypotheses, where each hypothesis pairs the
given label with a candidate concept. In the example, the learner has to compute
pr(hDal|e), pr(hD|e) and pr(hA|e).
When explaining how learners infer concept-label pairs, Xu and Tenenbaum con-
centrate on the likelihoods and for this, they use the size principle. They ask:
Given a Dalmatian called ‘fep’, how should a learner assign the probabilities to
each of these hypotheses? Following the size principle, if the given evidence is a
Dalmatian that is called ‘fep’, learners should assign the highest probability value
to hDal, and should disregard hD and hA. Why? Because the size principle says
that given an example, a hypothesis that pairs the label with a smaller concept
should be preferred over a hypothesis that pairs the label with a larger concept.
In their paper, Xu & Tenenbaum use the size principle to provide a computational
level explanation for their experimental observation that subjects prefer to restrict
their generalisations of labels to the smallest possible category level despite the
fact that the given evidence is compatible with all hypotheses. For example, they
find that, when shown a Dalmatian called ‘fep’ and subsequently given an array
with different kinds of animals to choose from, subjects prefer to generalise the
1The label is, however, important in Xu and Tenenbaum’s (2007) experiments, where it pro-
vides an objective measure of generalisation. (The experimenter uses the label to test
whether the learner assigns the same or a different behavioural or labelling response to the
training and test objects.)
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word ‘fep’ to all Dalmatians but not all dogs or all animals in the array2. Xu &
Tenenbaum argue that this result is to be expected under the assumption of strong
sampling in a Bayesian model of concept learning. The model would predict
that pr(hDal) > pr(hD) > pr(hA) whenever size(dalmatian) < size(dog) <
size(animal). On this basis, Xu and Tenenbaum argue that learners make a
rational choice when they generalise ‘fep’ all and only to Dalmatians in the array,
instead of to other animals or dogs.
Xu and Tenenbaum support this argument with a variation in the example. One
variation is the case in which learners observe 3 Dalmatians in subsequent order
as examples for the meaning of ‘fep’. The variation intensifies the intuition that
strong sampling is plausible when the task is to eliminate options of the word’s
meaning. Under the assumption that the Dalmatians are chosen explicitly from
the true concept, it would be highly surprising to observe 3 Dalmatians if these
were in fact random samples of the category of dogs or the category of animals.
Learners think that this observation would be highly surprising under the al-
ternative hypotheses hD and hA. Following Xu and Tenenbaum, choosing the
hypothesis that pairs ‘fep’ with Dalmatian is rational because it helps learners
to eliminate the alternative, evidence-consistent, hypotheses efficiently. It is ef-
ficient for learners to infer that ‘fep’ is most plausibly paired with dalmatian
because only a few examples are necessary to draw this connection.
In this example, the justification of strong sampling rests on additional back-
ground assumptions about how words are communicated. In a word learning task,
it seems plausible to assume that the teacher knows the true concept and chooses
the example (e.g., the Dalmatian) explicitly as an instance thereof. When teach-
ing a word, the teacher presumably intends to be informative, and the learner
can assume that the teacher would not have chosen to present three Dalmatians
to illustrate the meaning of ‘fep’, if they had intended to teach the concept dog,
or animal instead. Assuming that teachers want to be informative in conveying
word-meanings justifies the explicit connection between the example and the con-
cept. Xu and Tenenbaum’s claim that the size principle enables learners to learn
concepts efficiently, from only a few examples, makes the preference of smaller
concepts a description of behaviour that is optimal for word-learning.
Nevertheless, T&G’s explanation of concept learning seems unjustified for cases
outside the domain of word-learning, when there is no agent who could have
sampled the example from the true concept. The mushroom example, which
contrasts with Xu and Tenenbaum’s ‘fep’ example, illustrates this. If you have
never seen a fly agraric mushroom and see one, then this observation, x, should
be equally likely to be of the kind edible as of the kind edible or poisonous.
To someone who lacks the additional knowledge that fly agraric mushrooms are
poisonous mushrooms, prior to the observation of x, knowing that x looks like a
fly agraric mushroom contributes nothing to eliminating between the competing
hypotheses. Intuitively, if there is no reason to prefer either of these hypotheses,
2This result is difficult to explain in light of the observation that young children often over-
generalise labels (Bloom, 2002, chapter 1). For a treatment of this issue in the context of
the size principle, see Poth and Broessel (2020).
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there is no intuition about which of these hypotheses makes the observation less
surprising. Correspondingly, there is no reason to believe that it should be more
surprising to observe 3 mushrooms that look very similar to x under the hypoth-
esis that these are all edible than under the hypothesis that the 3 mushrooms are
edible or poisonous.
In this example, the task is to infer a category outside the context of word-learning
and it is difficult to motivate that this context involves communicative intentions.
It even seems counter-intuitive to follow the size principle in the example and
prefer the smaller concept over the larger concept. Outside the context of a word-
learning task, it seems to be more rational, in the sense of adaptively successful,
to assume that x, which could be in the concept edible and also in the concept
edible or poisonous, is an instance of the concept edible or poisonous.
There is no reason to assume that x or any of the other mushrooms is an explicit
sample of either of the relevant categories. In this case, when inferring whether x
is edible or possibly poisonous, the reason for preferring the concept edible or
poisonous seems to conflict with the principle of choosing the concept with the
smallest size (as edible or poisonous is intuitively larger than either edible or
poisonous) and seems to be bound to factors such as adaptive success instead.
This suggests that, without further justification, the size principle, which holds
only under strong sampling, seems to be limited to a specification of likelihoods in
Bayesian word-learning tasks and not in (all) tasks in which one might care about
matters of adaptive success on an evolutionary time-scale. Thus, the principle
seems to generate behaviour that is ‘optimal’ only in cases in which the task of
perceptual categorisation coincides with a task of word learning.
7.3. A theory of concept development, not
acquisition
The second limitation is that T&G present their theory as a theory of concept
learning. However, their theory seems to be limited to an account of concept
development.
Theories of concept learning typically ask questions about the initial acquisition
of concepts from novel experience. The ordinary view is that, when learning a
particular concept, one does not have it already. Theories of concept acquisition
divide into empiricists and nativists. Empiricists say that experience is neces-
sary for all concept acquisition (e.g. Locke, 1805; Piaget, 1976). Any concept’s
origin is in experience. Nativists argue that at least some primitive concepts
are necessary for experience and for concept acquisition (Carey, 2009; Chomsky,
1986; Fodor, 1975, 2008; Laurence & Margolis, 2002). Moderate nativists and
empiricists agree that experience and background knowledge are both sufficient
for concept acquisition.
A theory of concept development targets conceptual change in response to new
experiences. Theories of concept development target conceptual change, for which
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background knowledge is necessary. Such a theory assumes a base of already
existing concepts and explains how these concepts change either as a function of
experience or as a function of their relations to other concepts, or both. A theory
of development may or may not consider experience to be necessary for concept
acquisition.
If a theory is a theory of concept learning only if it includes both a theory of
concept acquisition and a theory of concept development, then T&G’s Bayesian
theory does not constitute an ordinary theory of concept learning because it seems
to have difficulty to explain the initial acquisition of concepts from experience.
This appears to be the case in light of the theory’s liability to Fodor’s (Fodor,
1975, 2008) puzzle. The puzzle consists of the following premises and conclusion.
(1) Concept learning is a form of hypothesis-formation and -testing. For example,
from some observations of ravens that are black, a learner infers: ‘all ravens are
black.’ (2) To represent a hypothesis, one needs to represent its constituting
concept (because a hypothesis is a belief and its content is a function of its
individual concepts and the way in which they are combined). Thus, testing
a hypothesis about a property requires having a concept of that property. For
example, if a learner is able to think about the properties black and raven,
then that learner has the concepts black and raven (Fodor, 2008, p. 138).
The corresponding hypothesis to be tested would be ‘the things that are ravens
are black’. (1) and (2) taken together are circular. Before testing the hypothesis
against the empirical evidence, the concept that should be learned from this
experience must already have been available in the first place. The hypothesis
‘the things that are ravens are black’ cannot be used to learn the constituent
concept black. Fodor (ibid.) concludes that concepts are either innate or must
be acquired in some other way that does not involve hypothesis testing.
Fodor’s conclusion suggests that a hypothesis-testing theory cannot be a theory
of concept acquisition. T&G’s theory is a Bayesian theory of hypothesis testing
that assumes (1) and follows (2). Thereby, it falls short of explaining concept
acquisition. In T&G’s theory, probabilities can only be assigned to the relevant
hypotheses when each hypothesis already takes a candidate concept as its con-
stituent. The hormone-levels example illustrates this. To test the hypothesis
that 60 is a healthy hormone level, the doctor needs to know what it means to
be healthy. Following premise (2), she must be able to pair the example with
a candidate concept, for instance, the interval [55,65]. If Fodor is right3 and if
representing a concept implies having it, then Bayesian inference should not be
seen as a theory of concept acquisition, and is possibly incomplete as a theory of
concept learning. Therefore, I henceforth use ‘learning’ in the context of T&G’s
theory to mean ‘development’ in the sense of ‘learning after initial acquisition’.
Although it is not clear how T&G’s (2001) Bayesian model can explain the ini-
tial formation of concepts from experience, it has much to say about conceptual
change. It explains how novel experiences lead to changes in the relevant beliefs in
the inference and in their constituting concepts. In the hormone-levels example,
3For criticism, see Margolis and Laurence (2011).
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the doctor initially believes that 60 is a random sample from [55,65]. She should
change her belief if she takes samples from 3 novel patients who are obviously
healthy but have hormone levels of 40, 60 and 77. With this additional evidence,
she should be more convinced that [40,80] is the right range of hormone levels
that belong to the concept healthy. To explain this change from a Bayesian
perspective, it is unnecessary to explain how the doctor acquired her initial rep-
resentation of the numbers in the interval [55,65]. It is only necessary to explain
why, in light of the additional evidence, [40,80] is more plausible than [55,65].
Bayes’ Rule provides a guide for this (6.3).
7.4. A theory of generalisation, not psychological
similarity
The third possible limitation concerns the explanatory power of T&G’s Bayesian
model. In particular, T&G’s model offers a theory of generalisation but not a
theory of PS. One way in which this limitation can be illustrated is based on the
distinction between three levels of explanation (cf. chapter 2.2). In the literature
on heuristics and biases, the limitation is expressed as a suspicion towards the
ability of Bayesian models to explain cognitive processing beyond the level of
rational analysis. Brighton and Gigerenzer argue that “a principle objective of
the rational analysis of cognition is to narrow down candidate algorithmic level
theories by establishing empirically determined performance criteria. If the grand
prize in cognitive science is uncovering both why minds do what they do and how
they do it, then the productivity and scope of the metaphor would ideally extend
to the process level” (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 189). Here, finding out
how minds do what they do corresponds to investigations at the algorithmic level
or beyond, and, ideally, to a causal explanation of the mental processes that carry
out the given computational task (e.g., generalisation as a Bayesian inference)4.
One might believe that T&G’s theory is already operating at the algorithmic
level, since the size principle looks like a ‘rule’ of ranking hypotheses according
to the sizes of their concepts. However, there are reasons to believe that this
interpretation is too permissive. From the perspective of the Bayesian theory
of generalisation, generalisation depends on the probabilities associated with the
relevant hypotheses. Regarding ULG, generalisation from x to y depends on
how probable it is that x and y are in the same concept, as opposed to different
concepts. Bayesian inference derives these predictions on the basis of a criterion of
selecting some hypotheses over others, which is the size principle (i.e., hypotheses
suggesting smaller concepts should be preferred over hypotheses proposing larger
concepts). The tendency to generalise decreases exponentially with an increasing
size of a candidate concept. However, the Bayesian theory of generalisation fails to
4In a similar vein, Eberhardt and Danks (2011, p. 404) argue that Bayesian models, if not
constrained by a rationality assumption, risk to fall back onto methodological behaviourism.
On this basis, they associate the unificatory power of Bayesian models in cognitive science
with this risk, and call for stronger commitments than unification alone.
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specify how hypotheses are individuated with respect to the sizes of the respective
concepts. Smaller concepts should be preferred, but what is a smaller concept,
as opposed to a larger concept? The size principle theoretically specifies the
formal relationship of how some measure of the size of a concept determines
the likelihood associated with a hypothesis. But the theory does not say how a
hypothesis is individuated; it does not say how the intension or extension of the
concept is represented. Therefore, the theory does not include an account of how
exactly the rule of ranking hypotheses works. At the level of respresentation and
algorithm, a specification of the size of a concept is needed. Thus, the Bayesian
model of generalisation is not a theory at this level.
When generalisation is analysed as an abstract problem of Bayesian inference, this
does not speak to the mechanisms underlying the corresponding PS judgement
behaviour. A comparison with Anderson’s (1991) rational model of categorisation
illustrates this lack of commitment. Anderson’s model has 3 structural compo-
nents: (a) A level of features, such as [has a beak], [can fly], [has fur] [has four
legs]. (b) A level of sets of objects such as [3 robins], [1 penguin], [1 bat], [1 cat,
1 dog, 1 elephant]. (c) A level of category labels: [‘bird’], [‘mammal’]. The model
assumes that the categories ‘bird’ and ‘mammal’ are organised into subcategories
corresponding to the objects (animals) at level (b), which are themselves organ-
ised into subcategories of sets of features at level (a). The model also assumes
that the resulting classification behaviour corresponds to Bayesian inference over
a probability mass function associated with each cluster. For example, since the
number of robins is greater than the number of penguins, robin is more probable
to show up as a member of the category ‘bird’. (Likewise, for ‘mammal’, bat is
unlikely to occur because intuitively, there are fewer bats in the world and so
probability will be higher for the set of dog, cat and elephant.)5 The limited
specification of how these clusters of objects could be represented in the brain
limits the scope of Anderson’s model; Anderson’s model offers no explanation of
components or activities of the mechanism of categorisation.
Likewise, in the Bayesian model of PC, hypotheses are mathematically abstract
variables that do not need to correspond to component parts of a mechanism.
The Bayesian analysis of the hormone-levels example in chapter 6 illustrates this.
Bayes’ Theorem does not state how the doctor actually calculates the relevant
probabilities but it says how they should approach the generalisation task. A re-
capitulation of the likelihood function 6.1, which is key to understanding the task
in T&G’s model, makes this claim more precise. In chapter 6, I have argued that
a notion of PS is already implicit in the likelihood function. My geometric-spaces
interpretation of the size principle illustrates this; it shows that the likelihoods
associated with each of the two hypotheses, hx∈C and hy∈C , depends implicitly
on the relative distance of the points, x and y, in geometric space (section 6.5).
The reason for why the probability of generalising from x to y becomes greater
5This example is simplified and concentrates on an inference over relative frequencies of the
objects and their features. Anderson’s model counts as Bayesian because it also considers
prior probabilities that are associated with the distributions over the sets. For example, in
some environments it might be a priori more probable to observe bats than elephants.
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with an increase in the correlation between the likelihood functions is the follow-
ing rationale. If x and y are in the same concept, which should be small, and if
that concept is a region in geometric space, then how plausible it is that hx∈C and
hy∈C make the observations of x and y, respectively, equally likely depends on the
relative distance between x and y in PS space. In other words, on a geometric-
spaces interpretation of the relevant concepts, the average of likelihoods in the
generalisation function (equation 6.1) depends on the relative geometric distance
between x and y.
My analysis illustrates that T&G’s proposed explanation of PS with Bayesian
inference and the size principle relies on an additional theory of PS processes
when going beyond the level of computational analysis to specify the size of a
concept. The generalisation function predicts behaviour accurately, and the size
principle draws an elegant connection between the likelihoods in the model and
a measure of the size of a concept. Nevertheless, it does not specify how the size
can be measured, or what kind of representational structure a concept has. To
do this, an additional theory of PS (e.g., Shepard’s geometric theory) is required
to specify the details of the representational structure of the model. Therefore,
more justification is needed to explain how Bayesian inference could relate to
an identification of a possible mechanism of PS. Nevertheless, the restriction to a
theory of generalisation is not fatal for T&G’s model. I will show in chapter 9 that
the model is still useful to summarise, predict and systematise the observations
of the exponential gradient and the directionality effect, which seemed to be in
conflict given Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories of PS.
7.5. Prior probabilities
The fourth limitation of T&G’s model of concept learning is that T&G only focus
on specifying the likelihoods in Bayes’ Theorem but they do not say what could
determine the prior probabilities. Prior probabilities could be associated with
aspects associated with the size of the concept as well, regardless of whether the
concept includes the evidence (x or y). For instance, intuitively and when identi-
fying concepts with Shepard’s (1987) consequential regions, the prior probability
that some object x and some object y could be instances of C should be greater
when C is large and covers many possible points (e.g., possibly both x and y) in
PS space. This would mean that hypotheses with larger concepts should a priori
be preferred over hypotheses with smaller concepts. However, such a rule would
exclude many intuitively plausible hypotheses. One example is the set of hypothe-
ses that is constituted by concepts that include x but not y (or the other way
around). Take, for example, the hypothesis h1, which says that x is an instance of
fly agraric mushroom but that y is not. The alternative hypothesis is h2 and
says that both x and y are instances of the concept mushroom. If prior proba-
bilities should be greater for hypotheses with relatively larger concepts, then, a
priori, h2 should be preferred over h1 (e.g., because mushroom has an intuitively
larger extension than fly agraric mushroom). Thus, if the prior probabilities
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always favour relatively larger concepts, then hypotheses such as h1 should never
be a priori plausible. But this seems too strict. Without additional information,
h1 seems a priori plausible and should not be directly excluded.
What is more, just considering the size of hypotheses cannot account for the
intuition that some concepts seem to be a priori more ‘natural’ than others.
For example, in his classical riddle of induction, Goodman (1955) contrasts the
predicates ‘blue’ and ‘green’ with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’. To illustrate the riddle, define
‘grue’ as everything observed before the year 2020 and ‘bleen’ as everything after
the year 2020. Intuitively, all Emeralds that have been observed until now have
been found to be green. But at the same time, these observations also fall under
the predicate grue. Why have they not been found to be grue? More generally,
why is ‘green’ a more natural predicate to infer than ‘grue’? Goodman’s answer
to the riddle is that ‘green’ is more projectible, but he did not clearly say what
‘projectible’ means. The analogy to T&G’s case is that hypotheses proposing such
unnatural concepts such as grue should be intuitively ruled out on an a priori
basis, however, there is no criterion in T&G’s framework to do this. Notably, the
answer cannot have to do with the size of the concepts; ‘green’ seems to have
the same size than ‘grue’. Generally, just considering the sizes of the concepts
associated with hypotheses in the inference seems to be insufficient to eliminate
among them.
There are alternative suggestions for how priors could be specified in the liter-
ature on PS spaces, but Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) seem to disregard this
literature to some extent. One option is mentioned by Shepard (1987, p. 1319),
who suggests to include a constraint on the shape of regions (i.e., concepts), when
assuming a geometric-spaces framework. According to Shepard, regions in geo-
metric PS should be convex. Roughly, a region is convex if for any two points
in the region, any other point falling on a straight line between these two points
is, necessarily, also in that region. This option adds another criterion, on the
basis of which certain types of regions can be excluded. For instance, it would
already exclude star-shaped regions in a PS space. A region that is star-shaped
may be very big but still not include some x and y, if x and y would happen
to fall in those locations in similarity space that are between the outer ends of
the star-shaped region. The criterion of convexity is also preferred by Gärdenfors
(2000, pp. 71-72), who identifies convex regions in psychological similarity space
with ‘natural’ properties. Examples for such properties are the concepts green
or blue as opposed to grue or bleen. This literature suggests that the size
of a concept is plausibly not the only determinant of the prior probabilities, and
these are still unknown in T&G’s Bayesian model.
The idea that ‘natural’ concepts are convex regions in similarity space has ob-
tained empirical support from various sources. Sivik and Taft (1994) presented
people with a colour patch of the Swedish Natural Color System and a Swedish
colour term while asking them to rate along a Likert scale from a to 7 how well
the colour of the patch matches the meaning of the term. When modelling sub-
jects’ responses in a MDS solution, Sivik and Taft find that none of the data
points corresponding to one colour term falls into a region of any other colour
127
7. Possible limitations of the Bayesian approach
term, thereby concluding that the regions drawn around the data points are con-
vex. A second study that provides empirical evidence for the hypothesis that
(some) concepts are convex was conducted by Douven, Wenmackers, Jraissati,
and Decock (2016). They focused on the concepts of vase and bowl. They first
constructed a 3-dimensional city-block space of shape-dimensions, along which
they positioned the test stimuli (shapes of vases and bowls that are gradually
more or less similar to each other). Participants were shown pictures of shapes
and asked which ones they find typical of a vase (or a bowl). Participants were
subsequently shown two screens, one with vase shapes and the other with bowl
shapes. For each picture, the participant had to click if they found a shape looked
typical of a vase or a bowl (for each screen, respectively). Douven et al. subse-
quently constructed convex hulls of the majority choices of typical vase (or bowl)
shapes, and found that nearly all subjects categorised typical vases in the convex
hull corresponding to the vase region in 3-dimensional city-block metric space;
nearly all subjects categorised typical bowls in the convex hull corresponding to
the vase region in the model. These studies provide evidence on categorisation of
objects with respect to colour and shape concepts supports the hypothesis that
these concepts are convex.6
7.6. Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has proposed four possible limitations of the Bayesian
theory of generalisation with regards to the Shepard-Tversky debate. The first
limitation is that the strong sampling assumption is possibly too strong in tasks
outside of the domain of word learning. Secondly, T&G’s Bayesian model is better
seen as a theory of concept development instead of concept learning. Thirdly,
the Bayesian approach inspired by T&G is restricted to a computational level
explanation of generalisation data. It is not a theory of PS mechanisms. A fourth
limitation is that the prior probabilities are still unspecified in T&G’s model.
However, the Bayesian approach to PC also contributes to issues in the Shepard-
Tversky debate. The first contribution is its instrumental and heuristic value with
regards to the Shepard-Tversky debate; it can predict and systematise the findings
of the exponential gradient and directionality effects and it can simplify the space
of possible representations and principles to instantiate perceptual and linguistic
categorisation tasks. The second contribution is that the Bayesian approach is
flexible and rivals with the context-sensitivity that had been offered by Tversky’s
diagnosticity principle.
6Although convexity has been proposed as a necessary condition for natural concepts, there
is doubt as to whether it is a sufficient criterion of natural concepts, as many non-natural
concepts might be convex as well (Douven & Gärdenfors, 2018). For example, Dautriche,
Chemla, and Christophe (2016) identify the concept baseball-bat as a convex concept,
and argue that convexity makes concepts more learnable. Douven and Gärdenfors (2018)
suggest a set of ‘design principles’ as additions to the convexity assumption. Whether




What has been learned is, firstly, that the theory of generalisation as a Bayesian
inference is a computational level theory that presents a generic solution to the
problem of generalisation but stays agnostic about how this solution can be car-
ried out by any particular algorithm of PS. The size principle is only a partial
solution to this problem if decoupled from a PS-spaces model and if regarded with-
out deeper investigations of prior knowledge. These aspects limit the Bayesian
approach to a computational-level explanation of PC.
In the next two chapters, I argue that the Bayesian approach can contribute
to the Shepard-Tversky debate with a unifying theory of the phenomena of the
exponential gradient and the effect of directionality. In this way, the Bayesian
approach to PC can serve as a tool for predicting and systematising the exponen-
tial gradient and the effect of directionality. The next chapter proposes 3 criteria
of unification as a test for this argument.
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8.1. Introduction
In passing, yet without justification, T&G claim that their Bayesian model of con-
cept learning unifies Shepard’s geometric and Tversky’s feature-matching theories
of psychological similarity (PS). They argue that
[...] when we generalize Shepard’s Bayesian analysis from consequen-
tial regions in continuous metric spaces to apply to arbitrary conse-
quential subsets, the model comes to look very much like a version
of Tversky’s set-theoretic models. Making this connection explicit al-
lows us not only to unify the two classically opposing approaches to
similarity and generalization, but also to explain some significant as-
pects of similarity that Tversky’s original treatment did not attempt
to explain. (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001, p. 336)
More can be done to make T&G’s proposal to unify Shepard’s and Tversky’s
models of PS explicit. How is it that their Bayesian model of concept learning
unifies Shepard’s and Tversky’s models? Which criteria of unification does their
Bayesian model meet? In what sense is a Bayesian unification of Shepard’s and
Tversky’s theories of PS useful?
In this chapter, I motivate the need for unifying Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories
and outline a set of appropriate criteria for when unification is the case. As a
preliminary definition, unification obtains if a theory, T , provides a single set
of assumptions to predict two phenomena, p1 and p2, while previously, these
phenomena had been predicted in light of two distinct sets of assumptions. In the
current context, of the distinct sets of assumptions constitutes Shepard’s theory
of PS as a geometric-distance function. The other set of distinct assumptions
constitutes Tversky’s theory of PS as a function of matching distinct sets of
features.
The conception of unification that I work with in this chapter is based on three
different accounts of unification. The first is an account of simplicity or elegance.
This account is inspired by Colombo and Hartmann’s (2017, henceforth ‘C&H’)
analysis of unification in Bayesian cognitive science. According to this account,
Bayesian models of cognition unify because they express complex ideas that are
connected to a variety of cognitive phenomena with only a few mathematical
equations. The second account is inspired by Kitcher’s (1981; 1989) idea that
a theory is unifying only if it is of unbounded scope, which roughly means that
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the theory predicts many phenomena. I argue that this criterion is intuitively
helpful but too imprecise, which motivates the addition of a third criterion of
unification. This criterion builds on Myrvold’s (2003) Bayesian approach to uni-
fication, according to which a theory T unifies two propositions p1 and p2 if and
only if T reduces the degree of informational irrelevance between p1 and p2. This
means that, without regards to T , p1 and p2 appear to be irrelevant to each other.
Unification occurs when, in light of T , p1 and p2 become relevant to each other.
Taken together, these criteria of unification serve as a test for my argument that a
Bayesian theory of generalisation can unify the ULG and the law of directionality.
My incentive to use these three accounts of unification is to gain a better under-
standing of the aspects that connect and the aspects that compete between Shep-
ard’s (1987) and Tversky’s (1977) models of PS. Typically, simplicity is motivated
by aesthetic or pragmatic considerations. In addition to such considerations, the
present account of unification is also motivated by epistemic values associated
with theory confirmation and choice. Unification in this context means unifica-
tion of the phenomena. Therefore, I assess the unifying potential of the Bayesian
theory of generalisation not only by its aesthetic and pragmatic standards but
also in terms of its ability to relate occurrences of the exponential gradient and
directionality effects, while their simultaneous occurrence in similarity-judgement
data previously appeared to be puzzling (chapter 5).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.1 highlights the differences
between the empirical predictions associated with Shepard’s and Tversky’s mod-
els. This section sets the target for the project of a Bayesian unification of the
two approaches to PS: to connect the empirical observations of the exponential
gradient and directionality in light of a single theoretical background. Section
8.3 discusses the three criteria of unification: elegance, unbounded scope and
informational relevance. I conclude that more attention should be paid to the
criterion of informational relevance when evaluating to what extent a Bayesian
unification of Shepard’s and Tversky’s models of PS is possible.
8.2. The exponential gradient and directionality
effects: two separate phenomena
A major dispute about Shepard’s and Tversky’s models is whether their empirical
predictions about the exponential gradient of generalisation and effects of direc-
tionality can be connected. Let us briefly recapitulate how Shepard and Tversky
derive these distinct phenomena given their distinct definitions of PS.
As explained in chapter 3, Shepard’s (1987) derivation of the exponential gradi-
ent transforms ordinal data points (e.g., from Rothkopf’s matrix of Morse Code
data) into a spatial configuration under the assumption of the metric axioms.
The resulting spatial configuration represents pair-wise dissimilarities between
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the objects, x and y, as distances between points in a geometric space. The
model predicts that the empirical probability of subjects to confuse pairs of ob-
jects (i.e., the objective generalisation probability) decreases exponentially with
the objects’ geometric distance in the spatial configuration.
Assuming that concepts are consequential regions in such a PS space, Shepard
(1987) had predicted for any single case, in which an agent has to decide whether
she should generalise her behaviour from x to y, that “the conditional probability
that [y] is contained in the [candidate] consequential region, given that [x] is, is
just the ratio m(s, [y])/m(s) of the (volumetric) measure of the overlap to the
measure of a whole such region” (Shepard, 1987, p. 1319). A priori, all possible
locations in the consequential region are equally probable to be occupied by a
possible instance of the concept, indicating that the agent takes these possible
instances to be equally representative of the concept. On this basis, Shepard
was able to derive the exponential function in figure 3.1 by integrating over all
locations of possible points that the corresponding concept may cover.
Tversky’s findings of directionality effects in people’s similarity judgements stands
in sharp contrast to Shepard’s assumption that PS follows the metric axioms,
especially the axiom of symmetry (chapter 4). Tversky could account for the
observed effects of directionality under the assumptions that PS is a function of a
linear contrast between the sets of shared and distinct features that represent the
objects in the comparison. Sets of features are discrete entities, unlike continuous
dimensions. Tversky had offered two explicit versions of the feature-matching
function, but for the current purposes, only the ratio model shall be of interest.
To recapitulate, the ratio model says that the PS between two objects, a and b,
is the ratio of the set of common features to the sum of their common features,
the weighted set of features distinct to a and the weighted set of features distinct
to b, where the weights have to be greater or equal to zero. Formally:
S(a, b) = f(A ∩B)
f(A ∩B) + αf(A−B) + βf(B − A) , for some α, β ≥ 0. (8.1)
Following equation 8.1, if the cardinalities of the sets of distinct features or their
associated weights change, then S(a, b) 6= S(b, a) (chapter 4). On this basis,
Tversky could accommodate cases such as the observation that people judge the
similarity of Tel Aviv to New York to be greater than vice versa. Taken together,
in light of Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories of PS alone, there is no apparent
connection or unity between these results of the exponential gradient and the
effects of directionality. In the next section, I introduce a scientific conception
of unification based on three criteria that I subsequently use to connect these
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observations in light of T&G’s Bayesian model (chapter 9).
8.3. Three criteria of unification
Current analyses of unification in cognitive science suggest that a Bayesian uni-
fication of cognitive phenomena can be achieved in virtue of two theoretical fea-
tures: elegance (Colombo & Hartmann, 2017) and invariance (Mi lkowski, 2016).
I claim that Bayesian unification in cognitive science is sometimes justified only
if it combines elegance with yet a third criterion: it renders previously separate
phenomena or theories informationally relevant to each other (Myrvold, 2003).
In particular, this third criterion is needed when the goal of the unification is to
combine key insights from previous explanations of these phenomena. Practically,
these criteria may not be mutually exclusive. It seems to be helpful to start with
a simplification of the theoretical landscape (the first criterion), even when the
end goal is to combine previous explanations (the third criterion). For instance,
this combination can help to identify key insights of previous explanations of the
phenomena and combine previous explanations more efficiently than would other-
wise be possible. What is more, if unification is an issue of accounting for a set of
phenomena (the second criterion), then the desired combination of the previous
explanations (the third criterion) should have an intuitively broad scope in the
sense that it should take into account the relevant phenomena to be explained.
The task of this section is to explain clearly what the three criteria mean.
8.3.1. Elegance
A common principle of theory choice is to favour simpler theories. There are two
broad definitions of simplicity, elegance and parsimony. I focus on the former
definition because it is a fairer standard of evaluating the Bayesian theory of
generalisation inspired by T&G’s model. Below, I explain why.
Simplicity, in the sense of elegance, is a structural property of a theory. Roughly,
a theory T ’s elegance is measured by the syntactic complexity associated with
T ’s auxiliary hypotheses. T is simpler than T ′ if T contains a fewer number of
auxiliary hypotheses, that is, T makes fewer initial assumptions, than T ′. An
example is given by Baker (2016), who compares the more elegant Keplerian
world model and its less elegant Copernican and Ptolemaic predecessors in terms
of their theoretical background assumptions.
The moves from the Ptolemaic model to the Copernican model, and
from the Copernican model to the Keplerian model, both involved a
reduction in the number of epicycles and free parameters postulated.
Since these are both reductions in theoretical apparatus [i.e., in the
number and complexity of geometric and astronomical hypotheses],
rather than reductions in the number of objects (or kinds of objects)
postulated in the world, this amounts in each case to an increase in
elegance rather than in parsimony (Baker, 2016, note 15).
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In other words, the Keplerian world model is simpler because it reduces the
number of hypotheses and laws (e.g., about epicycles and free parameters) that
are necessary to account for the observed motion of the planets.
An alternative reading of simplicity is in terms of the number of a theory’s on-
tological commitments. Roughly, a theory is simple if it makes a few ontological
commitments. The orthodox view is that a theory’s ontological commitment is a
demand on the entities that the world has to contain for the theory to be true.
This view is typically ascribed to Quine (cf. 1948, pp. 29–33). Correspondingly,
if a theory refers to a phenomenon F , then the theory is ontologically committed
to F ’s existence. This means that a theory with a few ontological commitments
demands fewer things to exist in the world than a theory with many ontological
commitments. This reading of simplicity is commonly described with the term
‘parsimony’.
However, the ontological reading of simplicity seems to be relatively inappropri-
ate in some cases of evaluating theories. Such cases occur, in particular, when
the evaluation is of mathematical theories. The problem is that the ontological
reading of simplicity seems to imply that a mathematical theory that poses an
infinite number of entities cannot be parsimonious. To apply an ontological eval-
uation criterion to a mathematical theory, one would first have to assume some
form of Platonism and assume that the postulated entities actually exist. Then,
the problem becomes that the mathematical theory would be maximally complex
because it would postulate a maximum number of entities. A prominent solution
to the problem is to introduce another distinction between an evaluation of the
overall number of the entities postulated and an evaluation of the kinds of enti-
ties postulated (e.g., Lewis, 1973, p. 87)1. Reducing either makes the respective
theory simpler. In Nolan’s (1997) words: “Not just total numbers of things, but
how many things of each type there are is relevant” (Nolan, 1997, p. 340, origi-
nal emphasis). This suggests a solution to the case of mathematical theories: a
mathematical theory that postulates an infinite number of entities may still be
relatively more parsimonious than its rivals if it postulates fewer kinds of entities.
Thus, also a mathematical theory can possibly be parsimonious in this sense.
But not all mathematical theorists are Platonists. Can these theorists evaluate
their mathematical theories with respect to a criterion of simplicity? The notion
of ‘kinds of entities postulated’ seems to rely on the premise that the postulated
entities are real because the notion is still an ontological criterion of simplicity.
So how would a nominalist evaluate the simplicity of mathematical theories? One
way to approach this problem is to assess the mathematical theory in terms of
the syntactic structure of the formalisms that the theory postulates. Correspond-
ingly, if a mathematical theory can express an intuitively complex idea with an
intuitively simple formalism (e.g., only a single formula), then, intuitively, the
mathematical theory is simple. No commitment must be made to the assump-
tion that the formalism describes entities that are ontologically real. I refer to
1Originally, Lewis coined the two types of parsimony ‘qualitative parsimony’ (referring to fewer
kinds of postulated entities) and ‘quantitative parsimony’ (referring to a smaller number of
postulated entities) (Lewis, 1973, p. 87).
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this sense of syntactic simplicity as ‘elegance’. I take the distinction between
parsimony and elegance to be important in the current context, in which I eval-
uate a Bayesian (i.e., mathematical) theory. This is because no commitment will
be made that the Bayesian theory describes entities that are ontologically real.
Hence, the Bayesian theory under consideration is better evaluated in terms of
its elegance, or syntactic simplicity, than with respect to its parsimony.
My idea to evaluate the Bayesian theory in terms of its elegance is inspired by
C&H’s (2017) previous work on Bayesian unification in cognitive science. Accord-
ing to C&H, “[t]he kind of unification afforded by Bayesian models to cognitive
phenomena does not reveal per se the causal structure of a mechanism. The
unifying power of the Bayesian approach in cognitive science arises in virtue of
the mathematics that it employs: this approach shows how a wide variety of
phenomena obey regularities that are captured by few mathematical equations”
(Colombo & Hartmann, 2017, p. 462). In this way, Bayesian cognitive scientists
can combine observations of many different cognitive phenomena by assigning
scientific representations of these phenomena the same types of mathematical
properties. In Bayesian decision theory, these properties are typically identified
with three abstract ingredients of a Bayesian model. The first ingredient is (a) a
hypothesis space, H (e.g., a set of propositions that are possible to obtain). The
second ingredient is (b) a set of prior probabilities, pr(h)—prior probability is
associated with each hypothesis in the hypothesis space. The third ingredient is
(c) a (likelihood) function that relates the space of hypothesis and some pieces
of evidence, pr(e|h). Any Bayesian model combines these three ingredients by
following Bayes’ Theorem, pr(h|e) = pr(e|h) × pr(h)/∑h∈H pr(e|h) × pr(h) (see
Glossary and chapter 6 for an explanation). In Bayesian cognitive science, this
method offers a single mathematical description of a variety of cognitive tasks.
Admittedly, C&H do not clearly separate considerations of a criterion of simplicity
from other criteria such as unbounded scope2. Nevertheless, their argument is
useful to explain why a criterion of elegance seems to be better suited than a
criterion of parsimony for the purpose of evaluating the simplicity of a Bayesian
model. The crucial point in their characterisation of how Bayesian models unify
is that the mathematics in Bayesian decision theory is abstract; the mentioned
regularities postulated by a Bayesian model need not represent causal regularities
in the world. For example, the kind of Bayesian cognitive science that unifies
(many phenomena), according to C&H, makes no commitment to the claim that
H, pr(h) or pr(e|h) represent ontologically real entities—the mathematics of the
model is abstract and cannot be identified with ontological postulates. Thus, I
take it that the simplicity of a Bayesian model is better evaluated by analysing
the syntactic structure or elegance of the model’s formalisms.
In sum, what I have proposed in this section is that a criterion of simplicity should
be used to evaluate whether T&G’s (2001) Bayesian theory of generalisation can
2I think that C&H’s description of the abstract mathematics of the model is a description
of the model’s simplicity. This is because the mathematics of the model can already be
characterised without regards to how many types of phenomena (e.g., types of cognitive
behaviours) the model describes.
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unify Shepard’s (1987) and Tversky’s (1977) theories of PS. In particular, I have
argued that a criterion of elegance is better than a criterion of parsimony to
evaluate the simplicity of a Bayesian theory. As a final remark, there is no
obvious link between a theory being elegant and it being true. The criterion
of elegance (and simplicity more generally) is often appreciated because of its
aesthetic value3. One of the most intuitive reasons for why the aesthetic character
of a theory cannot be identified with a theory’s truth is that the former seems
to be to some extent subjective while a theory’s truth should be a (relatively)
objective matter. A unifying theory should not only be aesthetically pleasing but
also help us to better understand the phenomena. I take this as a motivation to
discuss the criterion of unbounded scope in the next section.
8.3.2. Unbounded scope
Intuitively, a theory has a relatively unbounded scope if the theory can explain or
predict many phenomena, or, at least, if it can explain or predict more phenomena
than the set of available alternative theories. The main work of cashing out this
criterion lies in determining how ‘many’ or ‘more’ should be specified.
The argument that a good theory is one of unbounded scope has been discussed
rigorously by Kitcher (1981, 1989, pp. 430-519). Kitcher’s notion of scope is
specific, but for the current purposes it serves to illustrate a traditional concep-
tion of unification in terms of unbounded scope. This conception follows the
idea that scientific understanding is “the comprehending of a maximum of facts
and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical concepts and assumptions”
(originally Feigl, 1970, 12, cited by Kitcher, 1981, p. 508), and, likewise, that
“[u]nderstanding the phenomena is not simply a matter of reducing the ‘fun-
damental incomprehensibilities’ but of seeing connections, common patterns, in
what initially appeared to be different situations” (Kitcher, 1989, p. 432).
In trying to make these ideas more precise, Kitcher’s approach analyses the sys-
tem of a set of premises and conclusions that a theory consists of and uses to offer
an explanation of the phenomena. Roughly, on Kitcher’s account, a theory is of
unbounded scope (and therefore, on his account, offers a good explanation) if the
theory uses only a few argument patterns (on the basis of the available premises)
to derive a large number of conclusions.4 Kitcher’s own illustrations are, as he
himself admits (Kitcher, 1981, pp. 520–522), complicated. A relatively simple
3Sometimes also its pragmatic value—a relatively simpler theory may be preferred over its
rivals not because it is closer to the truth but because it is “easier to work with” (Myrvold,
2003, p. 401)
4Kitcher takes inspiration for this approach from Friedman (1974), who, according to Kitcher,
“argues that a theory of explanation should show how explanation yields understanding,
and he suggests that we achieve understanding of the world by reducing the number of
facts we have to take as brute.” On Kitcher’s interpretation, what Friedman could mean
by this is that we should “characterize [the explanatory store] as the set of arguments that
achieves the best tradeoff between minimizing the number of premises used and maximizing
the number of conclusions obtained” Kitcher (1989, p. 431).
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example for his approach is the statistical law that almost anyone whose brain is
deprived of oxygen for five continuous minutes will sustain brain damage. In ap-
plication, this law seems to permit quite many conclusions. For example, it can be
applied to most animals, so that ‘almost anyone’ in the argument can be replaced
with ‘some woman’, ‘some man’, ‘some dog’, etc.5 Roughly, from the perspective
of Kitcher’s account, we can evaluate the power of this explanation by counting
the number of its argument patterns and the number of its conclusions. Here,
the single argument pattern is the derivation that oxygen deprivation for more
than five minutes in an animal typically explains brain damage in that animal,
and the number of conclusions is approximally the (high) number of observations
of animals to which this conclusion would apply. Thus, the explanation for brain
damage as a result of oxygen-deprivation has a broad scope. The corresponding
theory of oxygen deprivation in the brain is unifying insofar as the theory can
explain more phenomena of oxygen deprivation while using fewer derivations than
alternative theories of oxygen deprivation in the brain.
Following this understanding of unbounded scope, the Bayesian models mentioned
in the previous section seem to provide good theories. Because of their abstract-
mathematical features, Bayesian models can predict a variety of phenomena with
a single analytic framework; C&H (2017, p. 454) provide two examples. Firstly, in
categorisation, the problem is to infer the probability distribution associated with
a set of examples of a category. Secondly, in perception, the problem is to infer the
current state of the world given a sensory stimulus-input (e.g., light-reflection or
sound-frequency). Both problems can be analysed as Bayesian inference tasks and
solved with a generic function that pairs pieces of evidence (e.g., sensory stimuli
or category exemplars) and hypotheses (e.g., candidate states of the world or
candidate categories), and, in line with the axioms of probability, assigns those
pairs a probability distribution. In this way, a Bayesian approach provides a
single type of answer (i.e., that the system solves a Bayesian-inference problem)
to questions about a variety of phenomena (e.g., perception and categorisation).
Thus, intuitively, these theories have a broad scope.
However, it is unclear how their scope can be measured exactly. To recapitulate
the previous paragraphs, Kitcher’s (1981; 1989) account suggests to measure a
theory’s scope in terms of the number of phenomena that the theory explains.
But this approach to measuring scope is suboptimal for the general purpose of
evaluating how good any theory is. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the number
of phenomena that a theory can explain is often not critical for how good a
theory is. A theory that gives an accurate explanation of a single phenomenon
is sometimes as good as a theory that offers explanations of many phenomena.
Craver and Kaplan (2018, p. 21) give an example for this while arguing that
“[a]n explanatory model that applies only to a single, rare strain of fly is not less
explanatory than a model that applies to a ubiquitous strain simply in virtue of
the fly’s rarity. The model explains fewer tokens, but it explains each of them, we
5Some exceptions are freshwater turtles, Arctic ground squirrels, seals and whales and naked
mole-rats. All of them have been reported to survive extreme conditions of oxygen depriva-
tion (Larson, Drew, Folkow, Milton, & Park, 2014).
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suppose, perfectly well.” The model’s limited applicability to the phenomenon of
a single rare strain of fly makes the corresponding explanation no less powerful
than the explanation offered by the more encompassing alternative model. With
regards to the distinct phenomena that they explain, both models are adequate
in their scope; their explanations seem to be equally powerful with respect to the
different contexts in which they apply.
Secondly, it is often the case that the exact number of cases in which a respective
theory applies cannot even be identified in the first place. For example, the Big
Bang Theory can possibly explain the existence of any galaxy, but we do not
know how many possible galaxies there will be whose existence can be explained.
There is an uncountably infinite number of phenomena that could be observed
in the future that the theory could apply to. If the scope of a theory should
tell something about how good the theory is, then the scope of a theory cannot
simply be measured in terms of the number of phenomena that the theory can
predict or explain. Sometimes, other aspects of the theory seem to be more
important to evaluate the theory’s explanatory scope. Thus, there are reasons to
not understand ‘unbounded scope’ in the literal sense of ‘number of phenomena
to predict or explain’.6
A possible alternative to the number-criterion is to specify the scope of a theory in
terms of the theory’s significance. However, also this alternative is unsatisfying
for the current purposes. Let me explain. In trying to illustrate this option,
Mi lkowski (2016, p. 20) compares the Big Bang Theory with a theory that
explains two car accidents in Warsaw. Mi lkowski argues that, nominally (i.e., in
terms of the number of phenomena that the theory can explain), the Big Bang
Theory would have a smaller scope than a theory that explains two car accidents
in Warsaw. Against this (unobvious) conclusion about the theories’ nominal
differences in scope, Mi lkowski continues to argue on an intuitive basis that the
Big Bang Theory is more powerful because “the Big Bang is of much greater
scientific significance” (Mi lkowski, 2016, p. 20).
Mi lkowski interprets this alternative notion of unbounded scope in the context
of current applications of unification strategies, one of which he identifies with
Danks’ (2014, p. 176) proposal that unification is the application of “some com-
6Kitcher seems to be aware of such possible limitations and refines his account by introducing
the notion of a stringent argument pattern. Accordingly, “unifying power is achieved by
generating a large number of accepted sentences as the conclusions of acceptable arguments
which instantiate a few, stringent patterns” (Kitcher, 1981, p. 520). Roughly, a stringent
argument pattern is one which contains arguments with “some nonlogical expressions and
which are fairly similar in terms of logical structure” (Kitcher, 1981, p. 518). On this basis,
Kitcher takes up the suggestion that his earlier “conditions on unifying power should be
modified, so that, instead of merely counting the number of different patterns in a basis, we
pay attention to similarities among these patterns. All the patterns in the basis may contain
a common core pattern, that is, each of them may contain some pattern as a subpattern.
The unifying power of a basis is obviously increased if some (or all) of the patterns it contains
share a common core pattern” (Kitcher, 1981, p. 521). The problem with Kitcher’s own
alternative to number-counting is that it stays unclear, on his account, how the similarity,
or stringency, of an argument pattern, can be assessed.
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mon template that is shared by all the individual cognitive models, rather than
through shared cognitive elements (representations, processes, or both) across
those models”. On the basis of Danks’ proposal, Mi lkowski (2016, p. 22) sug-
gests that a theory’s significance is intimately connected to the invariance that
the theory offers with respect to the phenomena or sub-theories to which the the-
ory applies. Mi lkowski illustrates this connection with an example from Newell’s
(1994) defence of cognitive architectures as tools for unification within cognitive
psychology.
At the heart of Newell’s defence is the idea that a unique physical structure can
instantiate a variety of information-theoretic tasks. Some examples for these tasks
include [1] mental rotation of objects (cf. Cooper & Shepard, 1973), [2] perception
of chess positions (Chase & Simon, 1973), [3] linear search on displays (Sternberg,
1980), [4] free recall (e.g. Murdock, 1962), [5] perceiving illusions, e.g. Mueller-
Lyer illusion (cf. Berry, 1968), [6] identifying ambiguous figures, e.g. Necker
cube and others (cf. Boring, 1943)[7], visual icon (cf. Sperling, 1960). According
to Newell, the simultaneous performance of these information-theoretic tasks by
a single cognitive architecture offers a single theory about why performance is
possible. This theory unifies the psychological sub-theories of these phenomena,
which could previously only provide separate answers to how a cognitive system
could solve either of these tasks at a time. In light of Newell’s example, the theory
is invariant in the sense that the same (physical) structure can be used to answer
questions about many domains of cognitive processes, and explain why and how
the architecture performs all of these tasks simultaneously.
I do not follow Milkowski’s approach to unification and unbounded scope for
two reasons. Firstly, the invariance of a theory that Mi lkowski seems to have in
mind is bound to the scope of a theory only if that theory can be positioned at
the process-level of explanation. Newell’s architecture delivers a theory of the
cognitive processes and algorithms that have to be performed to carry out the
variety of illustrated tasks (1-7). It is not guaranteed that there is an intimate
connection between invariance and the unbounded scope of a computational level
theory, such as the one offered by T&G’s (2001) Bayesian model of concept learn-
ing. However, there is no reason for why a measure of a theory’s scope should
be bound to a process-level characterisation of the theory. Without further jus-
tification for their intimate connection, a separation between Newell’s approach
to invariance and the general notion of unbounded scope should be maintained.
From this perspective, the criterion of unbounded scope can be useful for evalu-
ating a Bayesian theory of generalisation.
The second reason to not follow Milkowski’s characterisation of unbounded scope
is that there are independent problems with specifying a theory’s scope in terms
of the theory’s significance. One problem is that it is generally not precisely
understood what makes a theory significant. This lack of precision is illustrated
by Milkowski’s intuitive argument that the Big Bang Theory would be nominally
of a smaller scope than a theory that explains two car accidents, despite the
greater significance of the Big Bang. From Milkowski’s illustration, it does not
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become clear why the Big Bang Theory is more significant than a theory of two
car accidents in Warsaw.
Taken together, my discussion in the last paragraphs reveals that there are cur-
rently no satisfying options to precisely define ‘unbounded scope’. Nevertheless,
I do not consider these objections as fatal to the criterion of unbounded scope;
this criterion should not be thrown because the idea that theories of unbounded
scope make predictions about a variety of phenomena has some intuitive appeal
and historical relevance. In the next section, I consider a third and more precise
criterion to evaluate the unificatory status of the Bayesian theory of generalisa-
tion inspired by T&G’s Bayesian model of concept learning. This is Myrvold’s
(2003) account of informational relevance.
8.3.3. Informational relevance
On Myrvold’s (2003) approach, informational relevance is an epistemic criterion
of theory evaluation. What is evaluated is how good a theory is at combining
and transferring the information delivered by a set of separate sub-theories or
phenomena. Here, I focus on the case in which there are two available sub-
theories that are associated with two sets of phenomena. Roughly, a theory, T ,
unifies two phenomena, p1 and p2, if T renders the phenomena informationally
relevant to each other.7 I explain Myrvold’s criterion of unification with the
notion of probabilistic dependence; T unifies p1 and p2 if T reveals them positively
probabilistically dependent, whereas p1 and p2 appeared to be probabilistically
independent before. A special aspect of this criterion is that it relates to issues
of theory confirmation and choice. Myrvold also argues that if a theory is better
at combining this information than its competitors, then the theory is relatively
better confirmed than its competitors. On this basis, the unifying theory might
be preferred over the competing sub-theories.
The example of the Copernican theory of planetary motion
This approach to unification can be illustrated with Myrvold’s example of the
Copernican theory of planetary motion (Myrvold, 2003, pp. 401–406). the Coper-
nican theory, which suggests that the planets orbit the Sun, competes with the
Ptolemaic theory, which suggests that the planets orbit the Earth. Both theories
can predict equally well the apparent motions of the planets as observed from
7The terminology adopted here originates from Myrvold (2003). However, in his original
notation, the variable p seems to be used to sometimes refer to either a ‘proposition’ or a
‘phenomenon’, a ‘hypothesis’, a ‘sub-theory’ or a ‘body of evidence’. I use p to represent a
proposition that describes a phenomenon. The reasoning behind this is that in Myrvold’s
Bayesian explication of informational relevance, the degree-of-belief function, pr(·|·), takes
propositions (i.e., not phenomena) as its arguments. The informational relevance of p1 to
p2 in light of T is then always measured with such a function as the amount of information
that one proposition delivers to another proposition. I refer to such a proposition sometimes
as a sub-theory. I refer to a description of a body of evidence with the variable e.
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the Earth. To evaluate which theory is better, Myrvold focuses on the theories’
contrasting epistemic values, and asks: how much information does the apparent
motion of some planet in the system give about the apparent motion of other
planets in the system, given either of these theories? On the Ptolemaic theory,
the apparent motion of the planets from the perspective of Earth does not give
information about the apparent motion of the other planets and the motions of
the planets as observed from Earth appear to be unrelated. In contrast, under
the Copernican theory, the apparent motion of the planets can be traced back to
the motion of the Earth around the Sun. Under the hypothesis that the Earth
itself moves in a circle around the Sun, like the other planets, one can explain the
mean deviations of the planets from what would be perfect circles centring on
the Sun. Following Myrvold (2003, pp. 405–406), the Copernican theory renders
the motion of the Earth around the Sun informationally relevant for the apparent
motions of the planets, whereby the theory unifies these phenomena. Myrvold
also argues that, in relating the motions of the planets to the motion of the Earth
around the Sun, the Copernican theory is mutually supported by the joint set
of observations of planetary motions, whereby it obtains overall more evidential
support. Therefore, the Copernican theory is better than the Ptolemaic with
regards to its unifying power.
Before I explain the details of Myrvold’s approach to unification and mutual sup-
port, let me mention two remarks that distinguish the criterion of informational
relevance from the criteria of simplicity and unbounded scope. Firstly, on Myr-
vold’s approach, unification is not a extra-empirical phenomenon. Typically, the
need for unification arises when two theories compete with each other in their
explanations of a phenomenon (e.g., planetary motion) and when it is impossible
to decide between the two theories on the basis of the evidence alone (e.g., the
apparent motions of the planets as perceived from Earth).8 Often, it is assumed
that a choice for one or the other theory must be made on the basis of extra-
empirical considerations, such as simplicity, which concerns the aesthetic or prag-
matic value of a theory. In contrast, according to the criterion of informational
relevance, aspects of the empirical evidence are also relevant for unification: to
show that a theory unifies a set of phenomena implies showing that the observed
phenomena become in some sense dependent on each other under the unifying
theory, whereas they had previously appeared to be independent. As will be ar-
gued below, the relevant sense of unification in Myrvold’s approach concerns the
phenomena’s positive probabilistic dependence given the unifying theory.9
8This is the case in the planetary-motions example but also in the current case of interest:
Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories compete with each other about what similarity is as a
psychological phenomenon, and, independently, they both obtain fair amounts of evidence
with regards to the data on generalisation and similarity-judgements.
9The contrast to simplicity can be illustrated with the example of the Copernican theory.
In virtue of the single hypothesis that the orbits of the planets are centred on the Sun, it
was possible to predict the deviations of the planets from their mean apparent motions,
while these deviations appear to be independent in light of the Ptolemaic hypothesis. The
corresponding explanation for planetary motion is simpler (here, more parsimonious) in the
case of the Copernican system because the observed daily motion of planets (including that
of the Sun) is only attributed to the motion of the Earth instead of other planetary bodies.
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Secondly, as an empirically-related criterion, unification becomes relevant for the
confirmation of theories. The phenomena play the role of the evidence and the
unifying theory and unified sub-theories play the roles of hypotheses or sets of
assumptions that may compete with each other. On Myrvold’s account, by ren-
dering distinct pieces of evidence or sub-theories informationally relevant to each
other, the unifying theory (e.g., the Copernican theory) obtains a higher degree of
confirmation by the total evidence (e.g., observations of the motions of the plan-
ets in the solar system taken together). This offers a justification to prefer the
Copernican theory over the Ptolemaic hypothesis, not on the basis of its simplic-
ity or unbounded scope but by contrasting their relative degrees of confirmation
by the evidence taken together (i.e., the total evidence).
In light of these considerations, I explain three key aspects of Myrvold’s approach
in the next three sections. Firstly, I explain the notion of informational relevance
with the notion of probabilistic dependence. Secondly, on the basis of this notion,
I explain Myrvold’s definition of unificatory power. Finally, I explain how a
theory’s unificatory power relates to a measure of the theory’s evidential support.
Informational relevance as probabilistic dependence
Following Myrvold (2003), a theory unifies two phenomena when the phenomena
appear to be informationally irrelevant to each other a priori but appear infor-
mationally relevant to each other in light of the unifying theory (Myrvold, 2003,
pp. 408–409). Thus, the first step to understanding unification is to understand
what it means to render phenomena informationally relevant to each other.
In terms of probabilistic dependence (see Glossary), rendering two propositions,
p1 and p2, informationally relevant to each other means revealing that they are
probabilistically dependent, whereas they had previously appeared to be proba-
bilistically independent (see Glossary). For example, if p1 describes the apparent
motion of Venus and p2 describes the apparent motion of the Sun, then the de-
scriptions of these phenomena (henceforth only ‘the phenomena’) are probabilis-
tically independent under the Ptolemaic hypothesis—under this hypothesis, the
joint probability associated with these phenomena is no different to the product
of the probabilities associated with each phenomenon individually. But under
the Copernican hypothesis, these phenomena are modelled as probabilistically
dependent. Copernicus assumed that the Earth evolves around the Sun, and
that therefore, the motions of the Sun and Earth are related. In light of this
assumption, the observed motions of the other planets become dependent on the
observer’s position relative to the Sun as well. Correspondingly, the probability
But the Copernican hypothesis does more than introducing simplicity: whereas the observed
planetary motions appeared to be independent from each other in light of the Ptolemaic
previous hypothesis, they suddenly appeared to be dependent on the motion of the Earth in
light of the Copernican subsequent hypothesis. In relation to unbounded scope, there seem
to be resemblances, as informational relevance implies that the unifying theory will be able
to predict the phenomena that it renders relevant to each other. However, Myrvold defines
the notion of ‘rendering informationally relevant’ more clearly.
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of observing Venus’ motion given the Sun’s motion and the Copernican theory
should be greater than the probability of observing Venus’ motion given the Sun’s
motion when considered without regards to the Copernican theory.
Let me add two refinements of my interpretation of Myrvold’s criterion. Firstly, it
is often the case that the way in which a theory renders phenomena information-
ally relevant to each other is gradual and not absolute, so that my characterisation
in the previous paragraph would be too simplistic. A suitable adjustment is to
say that rendering p1 and p2 to be more informationally relevant to each other
means increasing their probabilistic dependence or, conversely, decreasing their
probabilistic independence in one’s model more than in the competing model.
For example, in light of the hypothesis that the Earth moves around the Sun, the
apparent motions of Venus and of the Sun are relatively more probabilistically
dependent than they had been before, under the competing assumption that the
Sun evolves around the Earth.
Secondly, it is useful to introduce a more sensitive distinction between posi-
tive relevance and negative relevance. According to Falk and Bar-Hillel (1983,
p. 240), two events, or phenomena, p1 and p2 are positively relevant to each
other if and only if the probability of p1 given p2 is greater than the proba-
bility of p1 alone or when the joint probability of these phenomena is greater
than the individual probabilities of each of them taken together. Formally, pos-
itive relevance between p1 and p2 obtains if and only if pr(p1|p2) > pr(p1) or
pr(p1, p2) > pr(p1)pr(p2). Conversely, negative relevance between p1 and p2
obtains if and only if these relationships are reversed, that is, if and only if
pr(p1|p2) < pr(p1) or pr(p1, p2) < pr(p1)pr(p2). For example, the observation
of Venus’ apparent motion is positively relevant to the observation of the Sun’s
motion if and only if it is more probable to observe Venus’ position, given the
Sun’s position, than it is to observe each of their positions independently. This is
true under the Copernican hypothesis, which traces the joint occurrence of both
planets’ motions back to a common cause (i.e., the motion of the Earth). This
is not the case under the Ptolemaic hypothesis, under which the probability of
the Venus’ apparent motion and the Sun’s apparent motion (at any position) is
equal to their individual probabilities taken together. Under the Ptolemaic hy-
pothesis, the phenomena appear to be informationally irrelevant to each other
because they are probabilistically independent. Under this refinement, rendering
two phenomena positively informationally relevant to each other implies making
them positively probabilistically dependent.
Probabilistic dependence and unification
The notion of positive probabilistic relevance explains the link between Myrvold’s
notion of informational relevance and unification. Accordingly, a theory T uni-
fies two propositions, p1 and p2, if T renders p1 and p2 positively probabilistically
relevant to each other, while they had been either negatively probabilistically rele-
vant or probabilistically irrelevant to each other before. In other words, T unifies
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p1 and p2 if p1 and p2 are probabilistically independent a priori but positively
probabilistically dependent in consideration of T .
This explanation of unification pretends that T either unifies or does not unify
p1 and p2 but Myrvold’s notion is gradual. Unifying by rendering informationally
relevant (i.e., probabilistically dependent) means reducing the relative informa-
tional (i.e., probabilistic) independence of the phenomena more than the com-
peting alternative theories do. Myrvold’s (2003, 410) corresponding measure of
the unificatory power of a theory T with respect to two phenomena, p1, and p2,
is captured by the following definition.
Definition 8.3.1 (The unificatory power of a theory considering two types of
phenomena10). The unificatory power, UP , of a theory T , associated with two
phenomena, p1 and p2, is a measure of the informational relevance, I, between
p1 and p2 in light of T in contrast to how informationally relevant p1 and p2 are
to each other alone (i.e., without consideration of T ). Formally: UP (p1, p2;T ) =
I(p1, p2|T )− I(p1, p2).
This definition can be spelled out with the notion of probabilistic dependence
introduced earlier. In terms of probabilistic dependence, measuring the degree of
unification implies contrasting, on the one hand, how probabilistically dependent
p1 and p2 are in light of T with, on the other hand, how probabilistically depen-
dent p1 and p2 are without regards to T . The relevant targets are conditional
probabilities of the form pr(p2|p1, T ) and pr(p1|p2, T ) (Myrvold, 2003, p. 401),
and the relevant condition of unification is the first in the following list:
(1) p1 and p2 are positively probabilistically dependent in light of T if and only
if pr(p1|p2, T ) > pr(p1|p2),
(2) p1 and p2 are negatively probabilistically dependent in light of T if and only
if pr(p1|p2, T ) < pr(p1|p2) and
(3) p1 and p2 are probabilistically irrelevant in light of T if and only if pr(p1|p2, T ) =
pr(p1|p2),
where each of these relations is symmetric, so that (1) implies that pr(p2|p1, T ) >
pr(p2|p1), (2) implies that pr(p2|p1, T ) < pr(p2|p1) and (3) implies that pr(p2|p1, T ) =
pr(p2|p1). Unification is the case only if the contrast in definition 8.3.1 is positive,
that is, only if p1 and p2 are positively probabilistically dependent given T and
neither negatively probabilistically dependent nor probabilistically independent.
Therefore, when measuring the degree of the unificatory power of T associated
with p1 and p2, I focus only on condition (1).
The Copernican theory can be used to illustrate this. Let p1 represent the ap-
parent motion of Venus and p2 the apparent motion of the Sun. T represents the
10Myrvold (2003, p. 412) offers an extension towards multiple phenomena but this is not
relevant for the current purposes since the relevant Bayesian unification concerns only two
phenomena—instances of ULG and instances of the law of directionality.
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Copernican hypothesis that the Earth and the other planets evolve around the
Sun. Without regards to the Copernican hypothesis, and under assumption of the
Ptolemaic hypothesis, the motions of the planets appear to be probabilistically
independent (i.e., condition 3 obtains). The probability of observing, for example,
the motion of Venus given the Sun’s apparent motion and the Ptolemaic hypoth-
esis that the planets evolve around the Sun should be equal to the probability of
observing Venus’ motion and the Sun’s apparent motion without regards to the
Ptolemaic hypothesis. On the contrary, the Copernican theory unifies the mo-
tions of the planets because it renders them positively probabilistically relevant to
each other (i.e., condition 1 obtains). The probability of observing, for example,
the motion of Venus given the Sun’s apparent motion and the Copernican hy-
pothesis that Earth and Venus evolve around the Sun should be greater than the
probability of observing Venus’ motion given the Sun’s apparent motion without
regards to the Copernican hypothesis. In other words, given the combination of
the apparent motion of the Sun and the hypothesis that the Earth moves around
the Sun, the apparent motion of Venus is more probable than only given the
apparent motion of the Sun. Likewise (because the relationship is symmetric),
given the combination of the apparent motion of Venus and the hypothesis that
the Earth moves around the Sun, the Sun’s apparent motion is more probable
than given only the apparent motion of Venus.
A previous interpretation of Myrvold’s approach comes from Brössel (2015, p.
529), who uses the notion of conditional dependence. Accordingly, UP in defi-
nition 8.3.1 is a ratio of how much “[p1] and [p2] are probabilistically dependent
under the condition T [...] and the probabilistic dependence of [p1] and [p2] uncon-
ditionally.” In terms of conditional dependence, positive probabilistic dependence
between p1 and p2 is the case when the truth of p2 makes it more probable that p1
is true given T and negative probabilistic dependence is the case when the truth
of p2 makes it less probable that p1 is true given T . Brössel’s conclusion is, like-
wise, that T unifies p1 and p2, if T renders p1 and p2 positively probabilistically
relevant to each other.
Informational relevance and evidential support
As indicated earlier, what distinguishes Myrvold’s approach to unification from
the previous alternatives is that it makes unification tentatively relevant for issues
on theory confirmation (i.e., questions about how much confidence we should
place in a theory). In particular, Myrvold claims that “the ability of the theory
to provide a unified account of a set of disparate phenomena contribute[s] to the
evidential support these phenomena lend to the theory” (Myrvold, 2003, p. 399).
The key argument for this claim is that the support delivered by the evidence or
phenomena can be conjoined in favour of the confirmation of the unifying theory.
Thereby, the unifying theory picks up relatively more support from the overall
available evidence than either of the unified sub-theories do. Correspondingly, if
the total empirical support is greater with regards to the unifying theory than
with regards to either of the sub-theories, then one may infer that the unified
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theory is better confirmed than either of the sub-theories. On this basis, one
may choose to work with the unifying theory because it is better supported. The
following paragraphs explain this proposal in more detail.
The connection between informational relevance and confirmation theory builds
on an analogy between Myrvold’s (2003, p. 410) original definition of infor-
mational relevance and a classical Bayesian measure of confirmation, which is
pr(h|e)/pr(h) (Strevens, 2012, p. 45). The analogy can be seen in two steps.
Firstly, under the classical Bayesian measure of confirmation, a hypothesis, h, is
confirmed (to some degree) by a piece of evidence, e if and only if the prior prob-
ability of h conditional on e is greater than the prior unconditional probability
of h (i.e., e confirms h if and only if pr(h|e) > pr(h)). On Myrvold’s approach,
the role of the evidence is played by the phenomena, for instance, the apparent
motion of Venus can be represented by e1 and the apparent motion of the Sun
can be represented by e2. Let T represent the hypothesis in question (e.g., the
Copernican hypothesis).
Myrvold then assumes that the degree of evidential support for T by e1 and e2
taken together can be measured with the classical Bayesian measure of confirma-
tion. Correspondingly, T is confirmed by e1 and e2 if and only if T is a priori
unconditionally less probable than conditional on e1 and e2. Likewise, an alter-
native theory, p1, is confirmed by e1 if and only if p1 is a priori unconditionally
less probable than conditional on e1. The same holds for the relation between
another theory, p2, and the corresponding piece of evidence, e211.
Myrvold also assumes that the support offered by the independent pieces of ev-
idence, e1 and e2, is additive. An additivity condition is common in Bayesian
confirmation theory, for example, the Bayesian log likelihood measure of confir-
mation is additive (Strevens, 2012, p. 45). Myrvold follows this example and
assumes that the measure of informational relevance is additive: “when [e1] and
[e2] are independent items of evidence, the information yielded about [p2] by the
conjunction of [e1] and [e2] will be simply the sum of the information yielded by
[e1] and the information yielded by [e2]” (Myrvold, 2003, p. 409).
Secondly, Myrvold identifies the logarithm of the classical Bayesian measure of
confirmation with the measure of informational relevance (Myrvold, 2003, p. 411).
Correspondingly, the logarithm of pr(h|e)/pr(h) measures how informationally
relevant e is to h, and the measure of informational relevance, I(h, e), becomes
11My notation is an adaptation from Myrvold. His original formulation of the classical Bayesian
measure of confirmation is Pr(h|e&b)/Pr(h|b), where b represents some theoretical back-
ground (Myrvold, 2003, p. 411). Myrvold argues that “The background b need not be the
sum total of facts known to an agent at some time, and, in particular, should not include
the evidence e being considered” (Myrvold, 2003, p. 401). It is common to assume that
the background is already accepted as a rational agent’s total knowledge, so that pr(b) = 1.
I adopt this assumption for matters of simplicity. Therefore, I do not mention b explicitly
when explaining Myrvold’s account. As far as I can see, my simplification does not change
the general implications of Myrvold’s proposal to identify a measure of informational rele-
vance or probabilistic dependence with the classical Bayesian measure of confirmation.
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“a candidate measure of the degree to which a piece of evidence supports a hy-
pothesis” (Myrvold, 2003, p. 412). In the current case, the outlined analogy
between informational relevance and the classical Bayesian measure of confirma-
tion concerns the conjunction of e1 and e2 and the theory T , so that the classical
Bayesian measure of confirmation can be compared to the informational relevance
of the total evidence on T . Formally: log pr(T |e1 ∧ e2)/pr(T ) ≈ I(T, e1 ∧ e2). A
third condition seems to be implicit in Myrvold’s approach; that p1 and p2 com-
pete with each other, that is, when p1 is confirmed by e1 but not by e2, and p2 is
confirmed by e2 but not by e1.
If the analogy is suitable (e.g., based on the structural resemblances of the for-
malisms), and under the conditions that the evidence is additive and sub-theories
compete, the measure of informational relevance can be used to assess the rel-
ative degree of confirmation of T by the conjunction of e1 and e2 as compared
with the previous sub-theories, p1 and p2, and their competing explanations of
the available evidence. In other words, if I(T, e1 ∧ e2) is relatively greater than
either I(p1, e2) or I(p2, e1), then we could infer that T is better confirmed by the
joint occurrence of e1 and e2 than either p1, by the occurrence of e2, or p2, by the
occurrence of e1.
Connecting these two steps makes explicit that Myrvold’s measure of UP (def-
inition 8.3.1) reveals something about the relative degree of confirmation of the
theory by the conjunction of the pieces of evidence as contrasted with how much
these pieces of evidence confirm the competitive sub-theories, respectively. When
we assume that the likelihoods associated with p1, p2 and T are equal, so that
pr(e1|T ) = pr(e1|p1), pr(e2|T ) = pr(e2|p2) and pr(e1|p1) = pr(e2|p2), then no
decision about which theory to choose can be made on the basis of the available
evidence. However, following Myrvold’s account, “if [T ] unifies the pair {e1, e2}
by making [these observations] informationally relevant to each other, and [nei-
ther p1 not p2 do], then the likelihood of [T ] on the [conjunction of the] evidence
e1 & e2 is higher than that of [either p1 or p2], and consequently T is better
supported by e1 and e2 than [either p1 or p2 are]” (Myrvold, 2003, p. 412).
The link to confirmation indicates a possibility to choose the unifying theory over
alternative theories on the basis of the relative support that these competitive
theories obtain from the available evidence. The additional evidential support
for the unifying theory suggests that the unifying theory is better confirmed.
If theory confirmation is a criterion of theory choice, then the unifying theory
should be accepted in disfavour of the competing sub-theories based on the total
available evidence.
8.4. Conclusion
In the context of the overall thesis, this chapter has served the goal of making
explicit how the theory of generalisation as a Bayesian inference problem, inspired
by T&G’s Bayesian model of concept learning (chapter 6), can unify Shepard’s
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and Tversky’s theories of PS (chapters 3 and 4), by outlining a set of criteria for
when unification is the case.
In summary, I have explicated 3 criteria of unification: simplicity, unbounded
scope and informational relevance. I have argued that the notion of elegance or
syntactic simplicity is particularly useful for evaluating how simple the Bayesian
theory of generalisation is. In explaining the popular interpretation of unbounded
scope in terms of the number of phenomena that a theory can explain, I have used
Kitcher’s (1981; 1989) approach to explanation as unification. I have rejected
Milkowski’s (2016) suggestion to interpret the criterion of unbounded scope in
terms of a theory’s invariance, which he had based on an illustration of Newell’s
cognitive architecture. My argument against a specification of unbounded scope
in terms of invariance has been that the example from Newell’s architecture is
bound to the assumption that the relevant theory under inspection is a process-
level theory (i.e., a theory that is able to specify the algorithms that produce the
relevant cognitive behaviour). If bound to the process-level, the criterion of in-
variance would be inappropriate for evaluating T&G’s Bayesian model of concept
learning, which has not crossed the boundaries associated with the computational
level of explanation (chapter 7). Thus, for the purpose of evaluating a Bayesian
theory of generalisation that builds on T&G’s model, the criterion of unbounded
scope should be kept separate from a criterion of invariance.
I have argued that the criterion of unbounded scope is yet not well enough un-
derstood but it has intuitive appeal. On this ground, I have added a third and
more precise criterion to the discussion. This is the criterion of informational
relevance, based on Myrvold’s (2003) Bayesian approach to unification. I have
explicated this criterion with the example of planetary motion and the definition
of conditional dependence. I have explained Myrvold’s argument that this ap-
proach indicates a possibility to choose the unifying theory over the competing
sub-theories on the basis of the relative evidential support that these competitive
theories, in contrast to the unifying theory, obtain from the available evidence.
The key to this argument is that, under certain assumptions, the conjunction of
the bodies of evidence that were originally associated with each of the sub-theories
delivers additional evidential support for the unifying theory.
Taken together, the combination of all three criteria is relevant for evaluating
whether a Bayesian theory of generalisation inspired by T&G’s Bayesian model
of concept learning can unify Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories of PS. In the
next chapter, I apply these three criteria to the advocated Bayesian theory of






The task of this chapter is to show that the Bayesian theory of generalisation
satisfies the three criteria of unification that were presented in chapter 8. I
argue that the theory thereby unifies the phenomena of the exponential gradient
of generalisation and the effect of directionality in similarity judgements, while
these phenomena had previously appeared to be unrelated under Shepard’s and
Tversky’s models of psychological similarity (PS).
My argument that the Bayesian theory of generalisation advocated in chapter 6
unifies Shepard’s and Tversky’s competing accounts of PS goes like this. Firstly, I
show that the Bayesian theory of generalisation provides an elegant analysis of the
cognitive task: generalisation is a Bayesian inference task (section 9.2). Secondly,
I show that the theory of generalisation as a Bayesian inference has a broad scope
because it can simultaneously predict both, instances of the ULG and instances
of the law of directionality (9.3). Thirdly, I show that the Bayesian theory of
generalisation makes the occurrence of the exponential gradient appear to be
positively probabilistically dependent on the effect of directionality, while these
observations had previously appeared to be independent of each other (section
9.4). I conclude that the proposed Bayesian approach is a third alternative to
Shepard’s and Tversky’s proposed explanations of these behaviours.
9.2. Satisfying the first criterion
From the perspective of a Bayesian approach, the problem common to Shep-
ard’s and Tversky’s approaches is a problem of generalisation, and its solution is
Bayesian inference. From this perspective, the Bayesian theory of generalisation
inspired by T&G’s model is syntactically simpler or more elegant than the dis-
junction of Shepard’s and Tversky’s models of PS. This is because the Bayesian
theory of generalisation makes fewer initial assumptions about what generalisa-
tion is and how it works than either Shepard’s or Tversky’s models make about
what PS is and how it works.
In particular, the disjunction of Shepard’s and Tversky’s assumptions regarding
the phenomena of the exponential gradient and the effects of directionality seems
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to be relatively more complex than the set of assumptions that constitute the
Bayesian theory of generalisation. This contrast becomes apparent when consid-
ering the following conflicting sets of assumptions about aspects of PS.
The structure of representational space:
(a) geometric in Shepard’s model, and
(a’) set-theoretic in Tversky’s model.
The primary entities:
(b) In Shepard’s model, these are continuous dimensions with a distance metric.
(b’) In Tversky’s model, these are discrete sets of features from a decomposable
data-base of objects.
The form of the PS function:
(c) In Shepard’s model, PS is derived from an exponential function.
(c’) In Tversky’s model, PS is a linear function of matching sets of features.
The explanatory target:
(d) The agent’s task in Shepard’s model is to generalise from a to b.
(d’) In Tversky’s model, the task is to judge how similar a is to b (in one
direction) or how similar b is to a (in the other direction).
Together, the set of these two subsets of mutually exclusive or conflicting al-
ternatives, {a, b, c, d} and {a′, b′, c′, d′}, is a relatively complex representation of
Shepard’s and Tversky’s distinct assumptions about how PS should be defined.
In contrast to the disjunction of Shepard’s and Tversky’s models, the Bayesian
theory of generalisation inspired by T&G’s model builds on a single set of three
assumptions about what is needed to solve a Bayesian generalisation task. These
three assumptions are that learners should be treated as (a*) using a hypothesis
space, H (e.g., a set of propositions about possible candidate concepts), (b*)
using a set of prior probabilities, pr(h), associated with each hypothesis in the
hypothesis space, and (c*) using a relation between hypotheses about candidate
concepts to pieces of evidence with the size principle, pr(e|h) = (1/size(hC))|n|,
for scoring hypotheses according to the size of a concept (chapter 6). Learners
are treated in this way to describe the function that they compute. However,
this description implies no commitment to the claim that this is how a learner
actually computes the task in their minds.
In T&G’s model of concept learning, each hypothesis inH is a proposition about a
candidate concept, C. For example, two hypotheses, hF and hT , express different
statements about the membership of x to either of two candidate concepts, F
and T .
hF : x is in the extension of the concept fly agraric mushroom.
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hT : x is in the extension of the concept thing in the universe.
These hypotheses are different because the extension of fly agraric mush-
room is (intuitively) smaller than the extension of thing in the universe.
Each hypothesis places a relevant object (e.g., x) in a particular candidate con-
cept (e.g., thing in the universe). Candidate concepts can overlap (e.g., the
concept thing in the universe entails the concept fly agraric mushroom).
Correspondingly, hypotheses pick out concepts of varying sizes.
The probability function in (b*) is defined over H. On T&G’s account, the
prior distribution of probabilities associated with these hypotheses is uniform, so
that there is initially no distinction between how plausible the concepts posed
by hF and hT are when x has not yet been observed. (c*) relates each of these
hypotheses to the evidence, x, or y, respectively, to determine the likelihoods of
these hypotheses.
So far it looks as if T&G’s model makes only three basic assumptions but it is
fair to characterise their model with a fourth assumption: that the generalisation
task can be analysed with Bayes’ Theorem to begin with.1 The assumption
is that in the specific case of a Bayesian inference of a generalisation problem,
learners ask themselves: what is the probability that y belongs to the concept
fly agraric mushroom (alternatively, to thing in the universe), given
that x does? Following T&G’s model, the corresponding Bayesian generalisation
function takes the following form.
pr(hy∈C |hx∈C), (9.1)
where ‘hy∈C ’ is the hypothesis that the novel stimulus, y, is in a candidate con-
cept, C, and ‘hx∈C ’ represents the hypothesis that the old stimulus, x, is in C.
Expression 9.1 says that generalisation is a task of inferring the conditional prob-
ability of the hypothesis that the novel stimulus, y, is in candidate concept, C,
given the hypothesis that x is in C. On the basis of the agent’s prior acceptance
that x is in C, and given some way of comparing her observations of x and y with
respect to this concept (e.g., in terms of the relative overlap of the concepts that
make these observations most likely, as I have suggested in chapter 6), the agent
infers whether y is also in C. Thus, under the assumption that generalisation
is a Bayesian inference, the task of generalising from x to y reduces to the task
of inferring the extension of the relevant concept that x belongs to and deciding
whether y also belongs to the extension of this concept2. As argued in chapter 6,
1To recapitulate, Bayes’ Theorem says that pr(h|x) = pr(x|h)pr(h)/
∑
pr(x|h)pr(h). In the
general context of some inference task, Bayes’ Theorem says that the posterior probability of
some hypothesis, h, in light of some body of evidence, x, is equal to the ratio of the product
of the likelihood of observing x, given that h is true, to the product of the likelihood and prior
associated with all hypotheses in H. (See chapter 6 and Glossary for a detailed exposition.)
2The Bayesian model stays largely agnostic about how the extension or intension can be
specified. The agent will at most only have access to a proxy for the extension (e.g., it
cannot be known how many fly agraric mushrooms there are actually in this world). I have
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a partial solution to this task is to generically compute the conditional probabil-
ities associated with the likelihoods of the relevant hypotheses (e.g., hF and hT ,
for x and y respectively), as determined with the size principle.
Taken together, the Bayesian model uses a single set of coherent assumptions,
whereas the disjunction of Shepard’s and Tversky’s models contains two mutu-
ally exclusive/conflicting sets of assumptions (i.e., two distinct structures of the
representational space, two distinct types of primary entities, two distinct forms
of the PS function and two distinct explanatory targets). Together, these are 8
distinct assumptions about aspects of possible processes associated with PS. In
contrast, the Bayesian model provides a single set of four assumptions: generalisa-
tion is a task of Bayesian inference, which can be analysed with three ingredients
(a*, b* and c*). Overall, these are only 4 coherent assumptions about aspects
associated with generalisation. This shows that the characterisation of generali-
sation as a Bayesian inference task is relatively less complex when compared to
the disjunction of Shepard’s and Tversky’s characterisations of PS. Because the
Bayesian theory may principally pose an infinite number of hypotheses, we should
describe the Bayesian analysis as relatively more elegant than the disjunction of
Shepard’s and Tversky’s descriptions of PS (see discussion in chapter 8).
9.3. Satisfying the second criterion
The second criterion of unification is unbounded scope: the idea that a theory uni-
fies only if it predicts more phenomena than its available alternatives. This idea
can be applied to the Bayesian theory: if the theory is of relatively unbounded
scope, it should predict more phenomena than either Shepard’s or Tversky’s the-
ories do. This section shows that the Bayesian model scores well with regards
to the criterion of unbounded scope because it predicts that generalisation from
x to y has an exponential shape and that generalisation from x to y is likely
to be different to generalisation from y to x (i.e., generalisation is likely to be
directional). In contrast, these phenomena could only be derived one at a time
with either Shepard’s or Tversky’s earlier theories.
T&G’s model makes these predictions with two versions of this Bayesian anal-
ysis of the generalisation task (expression 9.1). One version of T&G’s analysis
of generalisation as a task of Bayesian inference (expression 9.1) accommodates
instances of the ULG. I have illustrated this with a mushroom example in chap-
ter 6 (cf. figure 6.2). When comparing the probabilities associated with the
hypothesis that a fly agraric mushroom, x, belongs to the concept fly agraric
mushroom, and the hypothesis that a fly agraric mushroom, y, is also an in-
stance of the concept fly agraric mushroom, it is the relative overlap of the
likelihoods associated with these hypotheses that predicts the exponential gradi-
ent associated with ULG. In the example from chapter 6, a concept corresponds
suggested in chapter 6 that we should understand concepts in the model in terms of their
intensions and I have argued that the intension can be represented in the model as a region
in Shepard’s geometric PS space.
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to an interval along the psychological-similarity scale, and x and y are points on
this scale. On the basis of the size principle (equation 6.7), the tendency to favour
generalisation towards objects that are similarly likely to belong to the same con-
cept drops exponentially with the size of the concept that includes both x and y in
a psychological similarity space (e.g., Shepard’s geometric space of regions). On
this basis, I have suggested a reformulation of ULG that gives candidate concepts
a stronger role in shaping the generalisation gradient.
T&G (2001, p. 637) also give an alternative formulation of the generalisation
function. This function takes the following form.










hy∈C represents the hypothesis that the object y is in the extension of the
concept C.
hx∈C,y /∈C represents the hypothesis that x is in the extension of C but y is
not.
hx,y∈C represents the hypothesis that both x and y are in the extension of
C.
pr(h, x) represents the joint probability of the relevant hypothesis (e.g.,
either the hypothesis that x is in the extension of C but y is not, or the
hypothesis that both x and y are in the extension of C) and the evidence,
x.
In equation 9.2, the weighted sums represent the totality of the probabilities
associated with specific subsets of hypotheses. The connection to Tversky is that
each subset of hypotheses in equation 9.2 corresponds to a subset of features in
Tversky’s ratio model (equation 8.1). For example, hx∈C,y /∈C corresponds to the
features that are distinct to x but not y and hx,y∈C corresponds to the features
that are common to x and y.3 In this version of the Bayesian model, each subset
of hypotheses is weighted according to its joint probability with the evidence,
pr(h, x), where x represents the evidence and h represents a subset of hypotheses.
The joint probability is the product of the hypothesis’ likelihood and prior. For
instance, the weighted sum of all those hypotheses of the type hx∈C,y /∈C is a sum
of each hypothesis that is compatible with x and is incompatible with y, weighted
by the product of the associated likelihood and prior. The formal description of
the weighting process works like hypothesis averaging (Appendix A).
3Note that hx∈C,y /∈C need not be a single element. If x is a fly agraric mushroom and y is a
tree, then hx∈C,y /∈C may represent a set of hypotheses that pick out distinct concepts. One
of these hypotheses might assign x to the concept fly agraric mushroom while another
might assign x to the concept edible, and neither of these concepts has y as a member.
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Equation 9.2 resembles the formal structure of Tversky’s ratio model. If subsets
of hypotheses can be taken to represent sets of features and their corresponding
probabilities represent weights, then generalisation becomes a function of the ratio
of the sum of the weighted distinct features to the weighted common features,
which looks like the inverse of similarity in Tversky’s ratio model. On the basis
of this formal resemblance, T&G (2001, p. 637) argue that their Bayesian model
can accommodate the directionality in Tversky’s model. I show below that this
argument is underdeveloped. I refine it towards the argument that the Bayesian
theory of generalisation can predict observations of the effect of directionality in
generalisation, but that ‘directionality’ in the Bayesian model carries a different
meaning from ‘directionality’ in Tversky’s model.
A first step for this argument is to show how a change in the direction of the
inference produces a change in the joint probabilities with the evidence. This
would correspond to a change in the weights associated with the distinct subsets
of hypotheses. To see this dependency, consider what happens when equation 9.2
is reversed, such as in the following equation.









where hy∈C,x/∈C is the hypothesis that y is in C but x is not. In this direction,
the result of the probability function depends only on the probabilities associated
with hypotheses distinct to y, whereas in the earlier direction, the result had only
depended on the probabilities associated with hypotheses distinct to x.
The second step in the argument is to make explicit that directionality in the
Bayesian model is a property associated with the definition of conditional prob-
ability (see Glossary). Correspondingly, the model derives directionality with
regards to the two generalisation functions (equations 9.2 and 9.3) from differ-
ences between the formal properties (i.e., probabilities) associated with subsets of
distinct hypotheses. On this basis, the Bayesian theory of generalisation can pre-
dict that generalisation from x to y will sometimes be differently probable than
generalisation from y to x. This sense of directionality will be the case whenever
the unconditional probabilities, pr(hx∈C,y /∈C) and pr(hy∈C,x/∈C), are different with
regards to the opposite directions of the comparison. For simplification, let us
abbreviate these hypotheses: hx∈C,y /∈C states that x is in C (in one direction) and
hy∈C,x/∈C states that y is in C (in the other direction). Thus, directionality in gen-
eralisation derives from differences between the formal properties associated with
subsets of distinct hypotheses, i.e., differences between the joint probabilities of
the distinct hypotheses with the evidence. Symmetries should occur whenever the
probabilities attached to these hypotheses are exactly the same, independent of
the direction. This way of using the definition of conditional probability provides
in some sense a ‘law of directionality’: given that x and y are typically different
objects, it is likely that they are differently plausible with respect to a concept.
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The Tel Aviv–New York example illustrates the difference between directionality
in T&G’s Bayesian model and Tversky’s model. On a Bayesian approach, the
problem faced by the subject is different from a simple similarity-judgement task.
On this approach, the problem is to generalise some behaviour (e.g., travelling)
from Tel Aviv to New York (in one direction) or from New York to Tel Aviv (in
the other direction). To decide whether to generalise, the agent has to judge the
conditional probabilities associated with these cities and some candidate concept,
for example, travel destination. In one direction, the agent has to judge how
plausible it is that Tel Aviv is an instance of the concept travel destination,
given that New York is an instance of the concept travel destination. In the
other direction, the agent has to judge how plausible it is that New York is an
instance of the concept travel destination given that Tel Aviv is an instance
of the concept travel destination. These conditional probabilities can be
defined as follows.
pr(Tel Aviv ∈ destination | NYC ∈ destination) =
pr(Tel Aviv ∈ destination ∩ NYC ∈ destination)
pr( NYC ∈ destination) (9.4)
pr(NYC ∈ destination | Tel Aviv ∈ destination) =
pr(NYC ∈ destination ∩ Tel Aviv ∈ destination)
pr(Tel Aviv ∈ destination ) (9.5)
A possible difference between the generalisation probabilities in equations 9.4 and
9.5 depends only on a possible difference between the probability that New York
is a travel destination (in the first direction) and the probability that Tel Aviv is a
travel destination (in the second direction) (see definition of conditional probabil-
ity in Glossary). Intuitively, these probabilities are likely to be different because
New York seems to be (on average) a much more probable travel destination than
Tel Aviv.
This explanation of directionality is different from Tversky’s (chapter 4) because
it makes no reference to the particular differences between the contexts in each
direction. We can manually add aspects of the context to the model, but these do
not explain the change in generalisation probabilities. For example, it seems to be
more probable that New York is a travel destination than Tel Aviv when the
context is a trip to the US. On the other hand, it is more probable that Tel Aviv is
a travel destination than New York when the context is a summer vacation.
The appeal to the definition of conditional probability makes such directionality
effects intuitively more likely. However, it does not explain how these probabilities
(e.g., that New York is a more probable travel destination than Tel Aviv or vice
versa) actually change with respect to a change in the context (e.g., a trip to the
US versus a summer vacation). In light of the definition of conditional probability,
it simply becomes more likely that generalisation is asymmetric if the probability
of the hypothesis that Tel Aviv is in the concept travel destination is different
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from the probability of the hypothesis that New York is in the concept travel
destination. But the model does not say what aspects (e.g., of the context)
determine the intuitive differences between these probabilities4.
Taken together, I have shown in this section that T&G’s Bayesian model is of
relatively broad scope; it simultaneously predicts both instances of the ULG and
instances of what may be called a ‘law of directionality’. This law diverges from
Tversky’s explanation of directionality and it does not explain how probabilities
change with the context. However, it seems to predict the same behavioural
phenomena that Tversky initially took as an argument against the geometric
model of PS. Thus, the Bayesian model predicts more phenomena than either
Shepard’s or Tversky’s models were previously able to do on their own, whereby
it satisfies the second criterion of unification that I have proposed. In the next
section, I test whether the Bayesian theory of generalisation can also meet the
third criterion of informational relevance.
9.4. Satisfying the third criterion
To recapitulate, Myrvold’s (2003) criterion of unification is a reduction of the
informational or probabilistic independence of two phenomena, p1, and p2, by
accepting the unifying hypothesis, T , so that knowing T changes how positively
probabilistically dependent p1 & p2 are on each other. In the current case, p1
corresponds to Shepard’s geometric theory of PS, including the ULG, and p2
corresponds to Tversky’s feature-matching theory of PS. p1 obtains evidence from
observations of the exponential gradient, which are denoted by e1. p2 obtains
evidence from observations of directionality effects, which are denoted by e2. T
represents the Bayesian theory of generalisation, including T&G’s size principle
(chapter 6.4) and the law of directionality (section 9.3). This section argues that
the Bayesian theory of generalisation satisfies Myrvold’s criterion. The theory
unifies the empirical instances of the ULG and of the law of directionality by
making these observations look positively probabilistically dependent while these
observations had previously appeared to be probabilistically independent under
either Shepard’s or Tversky’s previous theories of PS.
To unify in this third sense, the Bayesian theory has to meet the condition that
pr(p1|p2, T ) > pr(p1|p2) or that pr(p2|p1, T ) > pr(p2|p1) (cf. section 8.3.3). That
is, the probability to observe the exponential gradient given directionality ef-
fects and the assumption that generalisation can be described with a function of
4Note that directionality cannot be a result of the likelihood if the size of the concept, des-
tination, is fixed. Following the size principle (equation 6.7), the likelihood is a ra-
tio of the size of the concept. If the size of the concept is fixed, then the likelihoods,
pr(x|x ∈ destination) and pr(y|y ∈ destination), should be unaffected by the direction
because the likelihoods are symmetric—the probabilities associated with these hypotheses
must be the same if the concepts have the same size. This would suggest that directional-
ity must depend on the prior probabilities associated with the sets of distinct hypotheses.
However, T&G do not specify the prior probabilities in their model (chapter 7).
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Bayesian inference must be greater than the probability to observe the exponen-
tial gradient given the observation of an effect of directionality. Alternatively, the
Bayesian model unifies when the probability to observe directionality effects given
the exponential gradient and the Bayesian model is greater than the probability
to observe directionality effects given the exponential gradient. In the following
paragraph, I focus on the contrast between T&G’s and Tversky’s theory, that is,
on the condition that pr(p1|p2, T ) > pr(p1|p2).
Indeed, it seems to be relatively more probable to observe an exponential gra-
dient given the observation of a directionality effect under the supposition that
generalisation is a Bayesian inference (including the size principle and law of
directionality) than when this supposition is replaced with the set of assump-
tions of Tversky’s theory. (To understand this case, it can be imagined that the
Bayesian theory plays the role of the Copernican hypothesis and Tversky’s the-
ory takes the role of the Ptolemaic hypothesis in chapter 8.3.3.) The Bayesian
theory predicts (and is not only consistent with) both the exponential gradient
and directionality effects in generalisation behaviour under the assumption that
both types of behaviour are effects of whatever mechanism can be described with
the laws of probability and the size principle (equation 6.7). In contrast, Tver-
sky’s theory fails to predict the exponential gradient—directionality effects and
the exponential gradient cannot both be accommodated by the feature-matching
model because the model predicts that PS is linear (chapter 4).
In this sense, the Bayesian theory renders observations of the exponential gradient
positively probabilistically dependent on observations of the effect of directional-
ity. That is, according to the Bayesian theory, the occurrence of an exponential
gradient becomes more probable conditional on the occurrence of the effect of
directionality than without regards to the Bayesian theory. Previously, obser-
vations of the exponential gradient and directionality effects had appeared to
be probabilistically independent or even negatively probabilistically dependent
under Tversky’s earlier theory of PS. Therefore, the Bayesian theory of generali-
sation satisfies the third criterion of unification.
Taken together, I have argued in this section that the theory of generalisation
inspired by T&G’s model of concept learning can render the exponential gradi-
ent and the effect of directionality positively probabilistically dependent on each
other.
9.5. Conclusion: unification of the phenomena
Taken together, I have argued in this chapter that the Bayesian theory unifies
Shepard’s (1987) observations of the exponential gradient of generalisation and
Tversky’s (1977) observations of directionality effects in similarity judgements by
meeting the three criteria of unification that I have outlined in chapter 8. Firstly,
the Bayesian theory describes these behaviours as possible solutions to a single
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task of Bayesian inference (expression 9.1) under a single set of assumptions,
whereas previously, these behaviours were associated with two conflicting sets
of assumptions and PS functions. I have argued that this description of the
behaviour is syntactically simple or elegant (section 9.2).
Secondly, I have argued that the Bayesian theory can predict both that generali-
sation behaviour will be exponential and that generalisation will be sometimes di-
rectional on the basis of T&G’s size principle (section 9.3). Thereby, the Bayesian
theory of generalisation combines the predictive powers associated with Shepard’s
previous ULG and the law of directionality, and predicts overall more phenomena
than could be predicted in light of either the ULG or the feature-matching model
alone. In this sense, the theory has a relatively broader scope than Shepard’s and
Tversky’s theories.
Thirdly, I have argued that the Bayesian theory does more than introducing
simplicity and broad scope: whereas the observed facets of generalisation (i.e.,
exponential and directional) behaviours appear to be independent of each other
in light of either Shepard’s or Tversky’s previous definitions of PS, they become
dependent in light of the analysis of generalisation as a Bayesian-inference prob-
lem (section 9.4). Thereby, the Bayesian theory of generalisation satisfies the
third criterion of unification: it renders these types of behaviours informationally
relevant to each other. Thus, overall, the Bayesian theory of generalisation in-
spired by T&G’s (2001) model of concept learning earns the label of a unifying
theory.
My argument in favour of unification plays out positively for a strengthening of
T&G’s (2001) Bayesian approach to generalisation and concept learning in light
of the reverse-inference scheme introduced in chapter 1.
Argument structure of T&G’s (2001) reverse inference:
(A) When psychological process, CL, is recruited by a Bayesian-inference task,
an exponential gradient of generalisation, E, and directional generalisation,
E’, are likely to be found.
(B) In Bayesian-inference task T, E and E’ were found.
(C) Hence, psychological process, CL, was recruited by Bayesian-inference task
T.
Here, the additional evidence, E’, in (A) and (B) seems to lend further support
for the conclusion, (C). Instead of making one observation (E) more probable,
the Bayesian approach makes two observations (E and E’) more probable at the
same time. Thus, in combining the predictions from Shepard’s and Tversky’s
approaches, the Bayesian theory picks up more support by the total evidence (E
plus E’), and seems to be empirically better confirmed.
The proposed unification is a unification of the empirical phenomena of exponen-
tial generalisation and directionality effects from a computational level perspec-
tive. From this perspective, both of these types of behaviours can be analysed
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and predicted in terms of a problem of Bayesian inference. It is not a unifica-
tion of the conflicting theoretical assumptions that are associated with Shepard’s
(1987) and Tversky’s (1977) earlier theories of PS.
This clarification motivates two points of reflection. Firstly, the choice of the
Bayesian theory of generalisation over either the geometric or the feature-matching
theories is a choice at the computational level of explanation. At this level, the
particular psychological processes that have generated the behavioural patterns
are still unknown. For example, the behaviour might be generated by a process
of concept learning (as proposed by T&G, 2001), a process of PS (as proposed
by Shepard, 1987, and Tversky, 1977) or a combination of these. When asking
about the possible psychological mechanisms that have generated the associated
observations of the exponential gradient and the effect of directionality, a deci-
sion has to be made about which of Shepard’s and Tversky’s conflicting sets of
assumptions (chapter 5) should be taken on for further investigations at these
levels. In other words, the competition between the sub-theories about questions
at this level of explanation still remains.
Secondly, at the computational level of explanation, the advocated Bayesian ap-
proach is a third alternative approach to explaining PC. The proposed unification
of the phenomena by the Bayesian theory of generalisation concerns a single set
of theoretical assumptions (e.g., a hypothesis space, a prior probability distribu-
tion over hypotheses and a likelihood function that relates the evidence to the
probability distribution) that is distinct from the sets of assumptions associated
with Shepard’s and Tversky’s previous theories. This can be seen most clearly
in the contrast between the law of directionality that is implicit in T&G’s model
and Tversky’s set-theoretic and psychological assumptions about the asymme-
try in similarity judgements. It can also be seen with regards to the differences
between T&G’s and Shepard’s distinct assumptions about the sampling process
that learners use when they infer the most probable concept (i.e., either weak or
strong sampling), which I have explained in chapter 6.
In light of these reflections, the Bayesian unification of the phenomenon of PC
does not replace the possible representational- and algorithmic level explanations
of PS offered by Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories. The next chapter concludes
with the implications of the proposed unification for the problem of modelling




10.1. Recapitulation of the problem and the claim
This thesis has addressed the problem of modelling perceptual categorisation
(PC). To recall, the problem was to explain our ability to generalise behaviour
from old perceptual experiences to new perceptual experiences. For example,
upon having eaten an umami portobello mushroom and in light of the new expe-
rience of a bitter fly agraric mushroom, we will be likely to seek further instances
of portobello mushrooms and avoid instances of fly agraric mushrooms. I have
addressed this problem from a computational perspective.
Building on this perspective, my claim in this thesis was that PC can be modelled
as a unified phenomenon with a Bayesian approach that is inspired by Tenenbaum
and Griffiths’ (2001) model of concept learning. From the perspective of this ap-
proach, the ability to generalise behaviour from old perceptual experiences to new
perceptual experiences can be analysed as a problem of Bayesian inference at the
computational level: given the observation of an umami portobello mushroom,
an ideal agent can evaluate the plausibility of a hypothesis about what candidate
concept or category (e.g., edible) this mushroom belongs to with Bayes’ Theo-
rem. If this inference strategy reveals that the most plausible category is different
with regards to the observation of the bitter fly agraric mushroom (e.g., if it turns
out that the portobello mushroom belongs to the category of edible mushrooms
but the fly agraric does not), then the agent should be likely to avoid eating the
fly agraric mushroom. From the Bayesian perspective that I have proposed here,
the unified explanation of why the agent is likely to display such behaviour is that
the behaviour can be accurately described and predicted with the principles of
Bayesian inference and additional assumptions about the origin of the perceptual
observations (e.g., assumptions about how the objects have been sampled).
10.2. Summary of the overall argument in support
of the claim
I have supported my claim that the Bayesian approach can unify the phenomenon
of PC in chapters 8 and 9. There I have argued that my approach to PC meets
three philosophical criteria of unification: (i) it can elegantly describe and (ii)
predict two aspects of PC behaviour (the exponential gradient and the effect of
directionality), and (iii) make these aspects appear relevant to each other.
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My approach builds on the background of Marr’s (1982) three-levels of analy-
sis, Anderson’s (1991a) rational analysis and their combination within a reverse-
engineering strategy in cognitive science. I have used these frameworks to position
my unifying approach to PC at the computational level of explanation (chapter
2). At this level, the target is to explain what the agent’s problem is (e.g., to
infer the category that the perceptual experience belongs to), why this problem is
appropriate for the agent to have (e.g., it helps the agent to thrive and survive),
and what the principles are that guide a possible solution to this problem (e.g.,
the agent should prefer relatively smaller categories over larger ones/the size prin-
ciple). I have argued that the approach is idealised at the computational level
but it can be combined with Shepard’s (1962; 1987) theory of psychological sim-
ilarity, in which concepts are represented as geometric regions. Shepard’s theory
offers one way in which the concepts that constitute the contents of hypotheses in
the Bayesian model could be individuated at the level of representation and algo-
rithm (chapter 6). Thus, the proposed unification contrasts with Tenenbaum and
Griffiths’ earlier approach in that it provides a philosophical argument for unifi-
cation and it makes the connection between Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ Bayesian
and Shepard’s similarity-based approaches explicit. Previously, no argument for
unification had been provided and the connection between these approaches was
implicit.
To sum up, here is what I have done to reach this conclusion. In Part I of this
thesis, I have discussed the key contributions of Shepard’s (1987) and Tversky’s
(1977) explanations of two types of behaviours associated with PC. These be-
haviours are (i) the exponential gradient of generalisation, which Shepard had
described and predicted with the Universal Law of Generalisation (chapter 3),
and (ii) the effect of directionality in similarity judgements, which Tversky could
accommodate with the feature-matching model (chapter 4). In chapter 5, I have
contrasted these two competing approaches with respect to their conflicting as-
sumptions about the kinds of psychological similarity representations and pro-
cesses that explain these observed behaviours (i.e., assumptions about psycholog-
ical similarity spaces, explanatory targets, structures of mental representations
and interpretations of the empirical data). This contrast, but also their common
problem of explaining behaviour that appears to be a kind of PC, has motivated
my project of unifying the central observations (the exponential gradient and the
effect of directionality) in Part II of this thesis.
In Part II of this thesis, I have supported my claim that PC can be studied as a
unified phenomenon. I have advocated a Bayesian theory of generalisation that
is inspired by Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001) Bayesian model (chapter 6). In
chapter 7, I have argued that this theory explains observations associated with
PC behaviour at the computational level of analysis. I have subsequently argued
for criteria (i)-(iii) of unification (chapter 8) and shown that the Bayesian theory
of generalisation inspired by Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ model can meet these
criteria (chapter 9). Therefore, PC can be studied as a unified phenomenon at
the computational level of analysis.
Three lessons have been learned from this thesis. Firstly, although Shepard’s and
164
10.2. Summary of the overall argument in support of the claim
Tversky’s approaches to psychological similarity compete with regards to their
assumptions about the underlying psychological spaces and representations in
subjects’ minds, these approaches address a common question: why does the ap-
parent ‘form’ of psychological similarity have the ‘shape’ that it does (e.g., nega-
tively exponential and directional)? Shepard’s and Tversky’s answers to this ques-
tion point to different candidate psychological processes that may be associated
with the actual computation of a psychological similarity function (e.g., a multi-
dimensional scaling algorithm, the contrast model or the ratio model). Secondly,
my proposed unification shows that we can stay neutral on the Shepard-Tversky
debate while offering a comprehensive ‘picture’ that includes either of these candi-
date psychological processes as possible explanatory alternatives. This approach
is useful because it combines the predictive powers of Shepard’s and Tversky’s
models, it is simple, and it lets the different forms of PC behaviour appear to be
compatible with each other, while they had appeared to be incompatible before.
Thirdly, my approach to the problem of modelling PC is a unification of the
phenomena of the exponential gradient and the effect of directionality. Because
the Bayesian theory of generalisation does not unify the conflicting sets of theo-
retical assumptions of Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories, it is a third theoretical
alternative for explaining PC.
These lessons indicate the boundaries of my proposal. In particular, my reply
to the Shepard-Tversky debate does not fuse their distinct answers regarding the
structure of mental representations and possible algorithms into a single answer
about what the psychological space of representations and algorithms looks like.
Therefore, I have not ‘resolved’ the Shepard-Tversky debate when asking about
the representations and algorithms that instantiate the task of PC. When asking
questions at the level of representation and algorithm, the competition between
Shepard’s and Tversky’s theoretical assumptions remains.
What are the implications of my approach? I position my approach at the compu-
tational level of explanation. Therefore, it is possible that my approach competes
with only one of the two other competing approaches at the representational and
algorithmic level. In fact, when I see my proposal as a third way of approaching
PC, then this third way can still be connected to one of the alternative ways of
approaching the problem—the Bayesian approach need not exclude both of these
theories. A possible connection between these approaches depends on which of
the two competing theories at the representational and algorithmic levels are most
coherent with the proposed unifying theory of the phenomena.
In this thesis, I have already addressed aspects of coherence and incoherence
between Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ unifying theory of generalisation and either
Shepard’s or Tversky’s competing theories of psychological similarity. In parts of
chapters 6 and 9, I claim that the Bayesian theory of generalisation inspired by
Tenenbaum and Griffiths is intuitively more coherent with Shepard’s approach to
psychological similarity. I have offered two reasons for this claim. Firstly, both
theories can be identified with a reverse-engineering approach to PC (chapters 3
and 6). Secondly, the mushrooms example of generalisation, which I have used
throughout this thesis, shows that Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ analysis implies
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aspects of Shepard’s analysis of the generalisation problem (chapter 6). Both
approach the problem as one of inferring the most probable concept. The differ-
ence is that they make different assumptions about the principles that guide this
inference, and Shepard makes additional assumptions about how concepts are
represented in psychological space. In contrast, the Bayesian theory has a weaker
theoretical connection to Tversky’s theory of directionality because these theo-
ries refer to a different sense of ‘directionality’ when they are used to explain why
generalisation and similarity judgement tasks are sometimes directional (chapter
9). The Bayesian theory considers directionality to be governed by a law of prob-
ability but Tversky’s theory considers directionality to underlie the constraints of
set-theory.
10.3. Questions for future work
Taken together, these lessons and implications provoke two questions for future
research.
1. Is the proposed Bayesian unification better than either Shepard’s or Tver-
sky’s theories at explaining PC?
2. Which of Shepard’s and Tversky’s competing theories should be chosen
to investigate possible PC mechanisms at the level of representation and
algorithm?
An answer to the first question seems to depend on the level at which PC should
be explained. At the computational level, there are reasons to believe that the
unifying Bayesian theory is better when contrasted with both Shepard’s and
Tversky’s theories. This is because the Bayesian unification seems to be better
confirmed by the total evidence than these competitive theories at the represen-
tational and algorithmic level. I have illustrated this with the reverse-inference
scheme in chapter 9, where it seems that the Bayesian theory picks up relatively
more evidential support by the conjunction of the observations of the exponen-
tial gradient and the effect of directionality. The Bayesian theory does this in
combining the relevant predictions from Shepard’s and Tversky’s models, and
by rendering their observations positively probabilistically dependent. However,
when questions about the internal structure of mental representations in the
Shepard-Tversky debate become important, the Bayesian unification (at least in
isolation) does not seem to address these questions better than either of Tversky’s
or Shepard’s theories. The approach is agnostic about how PC can be explained
at the level of representation and algorithm. The Bayesian approach does not
specify how hypotheses can be individuated with regards to the intensions or
extension of concepts (chapters 6 and 7).
A choice in favour of one over the other approaches across these levels seems to be
difficult under the supposition of Marr’s framework. This framework is useful to
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communicate my approach but it is also somewhat idealised (Danks, 2008).1 For
example, aspects of Shepard’s theory can be positioned at the representational
and algorithmic level and also at the computational level. At the computational
level, Shepard’s and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ theories compete with regards to
their conflicting assumptions about the sampling process. These assumptions
provide answers to the question of why the generalisation problem is appropriate
given the relevant adaptive or communicative constraints on the agent (chapters
6 and 7). However, Shepard’s and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ theories are simul-
taneously compatible with regards to their assumptions about the structure of
psychological space (chapter 6). Likewise, Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ theory com-
petes with Tversky’s assumptions about the principles of directionality (chapter
9), however, these models are principally compatible with respect to the structure
of concepts: there is nothing in the Bayesian approach that prevents hypotheses
in H from being individuated in terms of discrete sets of features. In light of
these preliminary considerations, the very clear contrast between these theories
in terms of the levels-distinction is idealised. It is one future project of mine to
identify the relations of coherence between Shepard’s and Tenenbaum and Grif-
fiths’ and between Tversky’s and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ theories beyond the
levels-distinction.
An answer to the second question will depend on the connections between Shep-
ard’s and Tversky’s competing approaches and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ unifying
theory and the relations between each of these three theories and the empirical
evidence. In the context of this thesis, there seems to be a greater coherence be-
tween Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ Bayesian theory of generalisation and Shepard’s
geometric theory of psychological similarity. This is apparent in light of the mush-
rooms example from chapter 6 and Machery’s (2013) reverse-inference scheme
that I have used to explain the argument patters in these approaches. Intuitively,
if the Bayesian theory is overall better confirmed than either of Shepard’s or
Tversky’s theories (because it unifies their predictions), then the greater coher-
ence with Shepard’s theory could provide a reason for thinking that a Bayesian
approach to PC will indirectly add further theoretical confirmation for Shepard’s
model over Tversky’s model.
A future project of mine is to test this intuition, and to show that the Bayesian
theory of generalisation in fact constrains the relative degrees of confirmation of
Shepard’s and Tversky’s theories. The motivation for this future project is to
investigate whether the intuitively greater coherence between Shepard’s theory
and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ unifying theory and the relatively small coherence
between Tversky’s competing theory and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ unifying the-
ory is enough reason to choose Shepard’s over Tversky’s model of psychological
similarity for further investigations on the possible mechanisms underlying PC.
1Danks (2008) has already started to develop an alternative idea of the levels that is orthogonal
to its normal use. Danks argues that in principle, each of the levels can be applied at each
level in this cascade, so that the hierarchical interpretation of the levels distinction is not
the only plausible interpretation.
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One way in which this could be done is on the basis of the Bayesian network anal-
ysis by Colombo and Hartmann (2017, pp. 471–480). Their analysis illustrates
that, under certain conditions, the additional evidential support for a unifying
theory lends indirectly additional support for either of two unified theories. Two
of these conditions are that (1) the sub-theories must compete with each other
and (2) the unifying theory must have a positive connection to one of the unified
theories but, simultaneously, a negative connection to the other2. Colombo and
Hartmann (2017) argue that, if these conditions are met, then the unifying theory
may offer a constraint on the relative degree of confirmation of the sub-theories.
Thereby, it becomes possible to make a choice between the unified theories when
one but not the other is relatively better supported by the unifying theory.
I end this chapter with a chart that summarises my conclusion and maps the
territory for future directions.
2Colombo and Hartmann (2017) specify these connections formally as correlations between
nodes that represent these theories in a Bayesian network. A positive correlation indicates a
strong coherence between the unifying theory and a sub-theory, while a negative correlation
indicates a weak coherence between these theories.
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Figure 10.1.: Illustration of the position of the proposed unification with regards to
Shepard’s (1987), Tversky’s (1977) and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ (2001)
approaches. The chart illustrates the closer intuitive connection between
Shepard’s geometric theory and Tenenbaum and Griffiths’ Bayesian ap-
proach on the upper left, where Shepard’s geometric regions provide the
concepts for the Bayesian model. On the right hand side, there is no
connection to Tversky’s theory (although a connection could be added
in the future). On the bottom left, it is indicated that Shepard’s the-
ory predicts the exponential gradient on the basis of the Universal Law
of Generalisation, which is generalised towards the generalisation of the
Law of Generalisation with the size principle (indicated by the dotted
lines). In the bottom middle, it is indicated that Tenenbaum and Grif-
fiths’ model predicts the effect of directionality, but does so with a ‘Law
of Directionality’, which does not resemble the assumptions in Tversky’s
set-theoretic explanation of these effects. Thus, together, we see that the
Bayesian approach is powerful in unifying the phenomena associated with
PC behaviour and is more closely connected to Shepard’s theory of psy-
chological similarity. Many thanks to Nicholas Rebol, who implemented







Hypothesis averaging is a part of the third ingredient of Tenenbaum and Griffiths’
(2001) Bayesian model of concept learning in chapter 6.3. Hypothesis averaging
is a (despite not the only) method for selecting hypotheses in Bayesian inference.
How does it work? Roughly, a subset of the most probable hypotheses is selected
and each hypothesis is weighted by its posterior probability. The resulting pos-
terior distribution combines the predictions of several plausible hypotheses. In
T&G’s model (equation 6.1), the degree to which an agent generalises behaviour
from x to y is calculated as the average of “the predictions that each individ-
ual hypothesis makes about y’s membership in C, weighted by the posterior
probability[, pr(h|e),] of that hypothesis.” (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001, 631)
In other words, equation 6.1 computes the average of the posterior predictions,
pr(y ∈ C|x ∈ C), considering each of the available hypotheses, h1, ..., hn ∈ H,
weighted by their posterior probability, pr(h|e).
Implicit in this formulation is that the hypotheses represent ways in which a
psychological space of object representations such as x or y can be carved up into
sets that include either only x or only y, or both x and y—each hypothesis pairs
x or y, with a candidate concept. The selection of the relevant hypotheses is an
issue that depends on the task. In the current case, the task is to predict whether
y belongs to the same concept, C, as x. The relevant hypotheses in H are those
that are compatible with y. These are hypotheses of the form h : y ∈ C (i.e., the
hypothesis states that the instance y is in the intension/extension of the concept
C).1 (If we were interested in the posterior predictive distribution associated with
the converse claim, we would instead specify the posterior distribution associated
with the subset of those hypotheses that pick out regions that do not contain y.)
There are many hypotheses of the form h : y ∈ C because there are many possible
regions that contain y. Take the hormone-levels case. On a one-dimensional scale,
C1 could be the interval covering all levels between 40 and 80, and C2 could be the
interval covering only levels from 50 to 80, and so forth. In general, there are many
hypotheses whose predictions seem plausible, h1 : y ∈ C1, h2 : y ∈ C2, h3 : y ∈ C3,
..., etc. Hypothesis averaging is a nice method because no strict selection has to
be made. The posterior predictive distribution takes the predictions of all of
these hypotheses into account, weighted by their relative importance (posterior
probability).
On T&G’s (2001) Bayesian account, the posterior predictive distribution reflects
subjects’ generalisation behaviour. T&G’s model makes the following empirical
predictions. If the sum of the probabilities associated with the subset h : y ∈ C
1‘Compatible’ here means that the hypothesis indicates a concept that contains both x and y.
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is greater than the sum of the probabilities associated with the subset h : y /∈ C,
then subjects should generalise their behaviour from x to y. This tendency to
generalise should become proportionally stronger with a relative increase in the
difference between the sums of these probabilities. That is, if the sum of the
probabilities associated with h : y ∈ C is much greater than those associated
with h : y /∈ C, subjects should strongly generalise from x to y. If there is hardly
any difference between these distributions, subjects should display indifferent
generalisation behaviour. For instance, they should be equally likely to generalise
from x to y as to not generalise from x to y.
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Glossary
The following are working definitions of the central concepts that I use throughout
the monograph.
Axioms of probability (also called ‘Kolmogorov’s laws of probability’). These
laws or axioms state that for a closed set of subsets in a space of propositions
or events, A,B ∈ Ω, (1) the probability of an event or proposition is a value
in the interval between 0 and 1, that is 0 ≤ Pr(A) ≤ 1, (2) the probability
of any event to happen or proposition to be true is 1, Pr(Ω) = 1, and the
probability of either event or proposition, if they mutually exclude each other, is
the sum of the individual probabilities associated with each of them, Pr(A∪B) =
Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A ∩B = ∅.
Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem is a principle of reasoning about a hypothe-
sis, H, in light of some evidence, E. The Theorem has been proposed by famous
Reverend Thomas Bayes (ca. 1701-1761) and is formalised as follows.
Theorem 1 (Bayes’ Theorem). The probability of a hypothesis given a piece of
evidence is equal to the ratio of the product of the hypothesis’ likelihood and the
prior probabilities to the probability of the evidence.
Pr(H|E) = Pr(E|H)× Pr(H)
Pr(E)
Where ‘Pr(H|E)’ is the posterior probability of the hypothesis given the evidence,
‘Pr(E|H)’ is the likelihood and ‘Pr(H)’ is the prior probability of the hypothesis
regardless of the evidence.
Bayes’ Theorem can be derived with the product rule, which is the same in both
directions, so that Pr(H|E)× Pr(E) = Pr(E|H)× Pr(H). Dividing by Pr(E)
on both sides obtains Bayes’ Theorem: Pr(H|E) = Pr(E|H)× Pr(H)/Pr(E).
Bayes’ Theorem has found many applications in reasoning and inference prob-
lems. For example, a doctor might use Bayes’ Rule to estimate the probability
that a patient has one of three possible disease given that she is coughing. The
three possible disease are three hypotheses, H1, H2 and H3 and the coughing is
the evidence, E. H1 says that the patient has a cold. H2 says that the patient
has heartburn and H3 says that the patient has lung cancer. Following Bayes’
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Theorem, each hypothesis is evaluated based on its likelihood and prior probabil-
ities. H1 and H2 obtain the highest likelihoods because it happens very often that
someone who actually has a cold coughs and also that someone who actually has
lung cancer coughs. In contrast, H1 obtains only a small likelihood: it is unlikely
to observe someone coughing given that she only has a heart burn. The prior
probability for H2 is much smaller than for H1. It is much less probable for the
patient to have cancer than to have a cold, regardless of whether she is coughing
or not. Taken together and following Bayes’ Theorem, H1 will win above the
other candidate hypotheses and the doctor can infer that given the evidence and
background knowledge about all possible disease, it is most plausible to believe
that the patient has a cold.
Bayes’ Rule. This is a learning rule that is commonly used to combine the infor-
mation about the data that is encoded in the likelihood and the prior probability
to update a new posterior probability. In cognitive science and epistemology,
Bayes’ Rule is typically used to dictate how a rational agent should revise her
existing beliefs in light of novel evidence.
Definition A.0.1 (Bayes’ Rule). If Prold(H) is an agent’s old degree of belief
in a proposition H and E is a new piece of information with Pr(E) > 0, then
the agent’s degree of belief in H should change to Prnew, which is the agent’s old
degree of belief in H conditional on E. Formally: Prnew(H) = Prold(H|E).
Definition A.0.1 is also referred to as strict conditionalisation (e.g. Brössel, 2015;
Huber, 2016). The underlying assumption is that probabilities measure a rational
agent’s degrees of belief in the truth of a hypothesis (typically interpreted to be a
proposition). A learner is rational if and only if the structure of its belief system
satisfies a condition of probabilistic coherence over time.
Category. This is a group of things that share one or more properties. For
example, the category dog is the group of things that typically share properties
such as being four-legged, being furry, being smelly, etc. This thesis focuses on
perceptual categories, which are based on perceptual properties, as opposed to
unperceptual categories, like democracy or good. In the contemporary literature,
it is much disputed whether categories are ontologically real or whether they are
mind-constructed groupings.
Under the cognitive/mental conception of categories, the explanatory target of a
theory of PC is to explain the cognitive processes that are at work in carving up
perceptual representations of the world.
Cognitive-computational model. Generally, a model is a representation that
provides a structure for identifying a target phenomenon. The relevant struc-
ture is a set of states and a set of transitions between them. In the case of a
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cognitive-computational model, the represented structure is a cognitive process.
A computational model of some aspect of cognition provides a description of the
transformation of a set of input states into a set of output states. For instance, a
computational model of perception provides a description of a set of perceptual
states as inputs, a description of a set of actions as outputs and a description
of the transformations of perceptual inputs into action outputs. Such a model
might include the description of the rules that govern the transformations in the
computational process. For instance, a model of action might use the rule: given
the option of tea or coffee and knowing that the work meeting lasts three hours,
drink the coffee because it increases the chances of working better. More gener-
ally, the rule says that given a set of perceptual input information pieces and in
light of background information about the situation, choose the action with the
highest utility.2
Cognitive-computational models are useful instruments for understanding cog-
nitive functions, which cannot be directly observed by scientific study (e.g., by
neuroscientific or behavioural methodology). Sun (2008) lists a variety of positive
aspects that come with computational cognitive modelling more generally.
1. Computational cognitive modelling is a tool for understanding the mind,
where this level of understanding is impossible to achieve given an analysis
of behavioural data alone because the latter is just counting correlations.
2. It is a tool for discovering inconsistencies in the theoretical assumptions
that experiments are usually performed on – usually common-sense.
3. It is a tool for bringing out fine details in a process and thereby helps to
gain more conceptual clarity and explanatory precision.
4. It is a tool for thought experiments and hypothesis generation.
5. Though this has according to Sun not yet been successfully implemented,
computational cognitive models might in the future help to unify superficial
explanations across multiple domains (in analogy to Einstein’s theory that
unified electromagnetic and gravitational forces). It may also contribute
against the increasing overspecialisation that may otherwise prevent com-
munication across disciplines
2A computational model is different from a mathematical model in that it is capable of repre-
senting a process at a more detailed level than a mathematical description of the function
that could generate such a process would do (Weisberg 2012, ch. 3; Sun 2008, p. 4).
The purpose of a computational model is to specify the process by which the inputs are
transformed into output states. A mathematical model is broader in that it specifies those
ways of formally representing cognitive phenomena which do not focus on a process or a
procedure but represent static relations between entities. An example is the mathematical
Lotka-Volterra model (Volterra, 1926), which represents the proportion of predator and prey
in a given state. Thus, computational-cognitive modelling is a way of representing cognitive




Although different from a computational theory, a computational model is often
a helpful place to start out with an explanation. In this sense, a theory of a
cognitive process stands to a cognitive-computational model like an explanans to
its explanandum.
For example, perception is a cognitive process that is difficult to directly ob-
serve. By creating a computational model of perception, it is possible to give
an example of how perception could work, given a set of parameters and theo-
retical background assumptions. For instance, if one assumes that perception is
a Bayesian inference (cf. Knill & Richards, 1996), one can construct a model of
perception that uses a Bayesian inference algorithm to infer hidden causes from
inputs in the world (Clark, 2013). This information can be encoded in weighted
nodes of a neural network that should update these parameters upon novel in-
coming information in line with Bayes’ Rule. Predictions of the model can then
be compared to interpret experimental results. Thus, computational-cognitive
modelling can offer possible explanations of a phenomenon.
Computational models should accompany behavioural experiments. It is diffi-
cult to find out which cognitive process was relevant in producing the observed
behaviour from observations of generalisation behaviour alone. Computational
cognitive modelling can help to limit the space of scientific hypotheses about what
cognitive process could be relevant in generating the generalisation behaviour.
This thesis investigates a couple of computational-cognitive models of PC that
may offer adequate constraints on a theory of PC that explains how the psycho-
logical mechanism of PC works. Chapter 1 refers to one popular view on the
levels of explanation along which computational cognitive modelling can be char-
acterised – Marr’s (1982) three levels of explanation of an information-processing
system.3
Cognitive-computational theory. This is an explanation of a cognitive phe-
nomenon in terms of computation. A cognitive-computational theory is different
from a cognitive-computational model in that the former is an explanation while
the latter is a representation of a cognitive phenomenon in terms of computation.
Cognitive-computational modelling is useful for cognitive-computational theoris-
ing, e.g., when direct experimenting on the brain is not practicable or when the
explanatory target is highly complex (cf. Stinson, 2018, p. 121). One instance
of a cognitive-computational theory is the computational theory of mind (CTM).
Roughly, CTM puts forward two central claims: (1) psychological phenomena
may be explained mechanistically (A. Isaac, 2018) and (2) thought is a kind
of computation (Casey & Moran, 1989). The goal of CTM is to explain how
the mind works based on the assumption that the mind works like a computing
system.
3Danks (2008) and Newell (1994) offer alternative analyses of levels of explanation in cognitive
science.
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CTM is inspired by Turing’s (1936) idealised model of the mind. The classi-
cal version of the theory assumes that thinking can be realised in a machine in
which symbolic computations are governed by routine mechanical instructions.
As discrete symbol-manipulation may not be representative of human thinking,
novel interpretations of CTM consider other computational operations, such as
analogue computations. These seem more plausible with respect to sensory pro-
cessing (Shu, Hasenstaub, Duque, Yu, & McCormick, 2006)4. Because analogue
computations are different from the idealised Turing model, it is not yet clear
how these computational approaches figure within a mechanical framework.
Concept. There are roughly three major camps in the philosophy of mind as to
what a concept is. On the Fregean view, concepts are abstract entities, senses,
which determine the semantic content of statements and do not differ in their
truth-values or objects. For example, the difference between “the morning star is
the morning star” and “the morning star is the evening star” is not in their truth-
value; both refer to the same object (i.e., Venus) but they each have a different
sense.
The Fregean view contrasts with a common view in philosophy of cognitive
science, where a concept is a mental representation that figures into proposi-
tional attitudes (mental representations about states of affairs that have a causal-
functional role for producing behaviour directed towards these states of affairs)
like atomic symbols do in sentences (Fodor, 1975, 1987; Margolis & Laurence,
1999, ch. 1). On this view, which has been dubbed ‘Representational Theory of
Mind’ (henceforth ‘RTM’), concepts fulfil a meaning-constitutive role for proposi-
tional attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, ...). For example, the belief that ‘Paris is the
capital of France’ is composed of the concepts Paris, capital and France. The
way in which these concepts are arranged ‘composes’ the meaning of the belief
that Paris is the capital of France, or, in other words, the content that this believe
represents at the personal-level of cognition. According to RTM, concepts are in-
dividuated (i.e., physically realised) in the brains of those who think/represent
such a belief. Many different versions of RTM have been proposed and many of
them are not committed to the idea that concepts are symbolic representations.
It is commonly advocated that concepts can be represented in a variety of differ-
ent formats, e.g., in terms of imagistic (cf. Kosslyn, 1980) or map-like structures
(cf. Blumson, 2012; Camp, 2007) and in subpersonal-level theories of cognition
(cf. Von Eckardt, 2012). The Fregean and the mental-representations views are
principally not incompatible. This has been outlined by Margolis and Laurence
(1999, p. 8), who suggest that the individuation conditions of concepts as mental
representations are also partly determined by a Fregean sense.
A third approach is to define a concept as an ability or a normal function (Mil-
likan, 1989). For example, the concept apple is whatever capacity enables an
organism to discriminate apples from non-apples and to infer the relevant con-
sequences from experiences with apples, e.g., to infer from eating an apple that
4For a critical perspective on the analogue-discrete distinction, see Maley (2011)
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apples are edible. Following the ability-view, mental states carry meaning in
terms of the purpose that they fulfil for the representing system (e.g., attainment
of nutrition and survival). Millikan (1989) gives the example of a frog’s ability
to identify (viz., have a concept of) a fly: the capacity of the frog’s visual system
to produce a representation of the fly is grounded in the need of the frog’s co-
evolved stomach to digest nutrients. The rationale in this explanation is consumer
oriented: aspects of the consumer system explain aspects of the visual system.
Mental content (e.g., ‘fly’) is determined by natural selection of a producer system
(e.g., the frog’s visual system) for a consumer system (e.g., the frog’s stomach).
The producer system (i.e., the visual system) is the representational vehicle and
the consumer system (i.e., the stomach) is the target as it is the device that uses
the representation. From Millikan’s perspective, what it is to have a concept is
to have an adaptive function (e.g., perceiving x) for a device (e.g., a stomach) to
carry out its capacity (e.g., digesting x).
Throughout this thesis, I follow the typical understanding in cognitive science
with a twist towards the ability-view. I use the word ‘concept’ to refer to an
agent’s mental representation of possible perceptual inputs, where this represen-
tation enables the agent to categorise those inputs as belonging to the same or
a different category. For example, the concept dog is a mental representation of
whatever could be a dog-like perceptual experience. Such a mental representation
represents not only information about experiences that are associated with actual
perceptions of dogs, but also ways in which something that would be categorised
as a dog, were the agent to perceive it, could be experienced. For example, even
though I may have never seen a Boxer-Pitbull Mix, my dog concept must in-
clude an instance of this breed as a possibility so that upon seeing a Boxer-Pitbull
Mix, I will be able to use that concept to categorise it as a perceptual experience
of a dog. Thus, a concept represents information about past but also possible
future perceptual experiences (e.g. Boxer experiences and Boxer-Pitbull Mix ex-
periences), which require appropriate actions (e.g., not stroking the dog) in novel
situations.
Given this working definition, a concept is a mental representation that enables
one to categorise perceptual experiences of objects or situations in a way that
leads to efficient generalisation of behaviour across the individual experiences
associated with the particular objects or situation. In this sense, concepts are
equivalent to cognitive categories (in Rosch’s sense), however, not to categorisa-
tion.
This thesis focuses on perceptual concepts such as dog, green or milk, and
largely disregards abstract concepts like democracy, electron or internet.
I endorse the possibility that the cognitive mechanism of perceptual-concept
individuation may be independent of the cognitive mechanism responsible for
abstract-concept individuation. Concepts may be perceptual or linguistic enti-
ties with a variety of different representational formats. Their semantic content
may be encoded in continuous perceptual representations or in discrete linguistic
symbols (cf. Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014).
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Concept learning. This is a cognitive process by which an agent acquires a men-
tal representation from her experience in light of some background knowledge and
with an inductive-inference strategy. For example, upon a few perceptual expe-
riences of mushrooms that the agent categorises as ‘yummy’, she forms a mental
representation that pairs the word ‘yummy’ with (a) information about her past
perceptual experiences associated with the word ‘yummy’ and (b) information
about those things that the agent believes should be labelled ‘yummy’ in the
future. The process is indeterminate as many interpretations of the meaning of
‘yum’ are compatible with the paired association of the mushroom experiences
(cf. Quine, 1960). The possibility of concept learning has been challenged by
Fodor (Fodor, 1975, 1998; Stöckle-Schobel, 2012).
Conditional probability. The probability of an event to occur or a proposition
to be true can be conditionalised upon the assumption of another event or propo-
sition. For example, my degree of belief that it is going to rain tomorrow is very
high. But suppose the weather forecast has announced a sunny day tomorrow.
Given this information, my degree of belief that it is going to rain tomorrow
would go down. This is a conditional degree of belief.
Definition A.0.2 (Conditional probability). The probability that one proposi-
tion is true given another proposition is true. The probability of one proposition,
A, conditional on another proposition, B, is a ratio of their joint probabilities
and the unconditional probability of B. Formally:
pr(A|B) = pr(A ∩B)
pr(B) .
The relationship is directional, so that, conversely,
pr(B|A) = pr(A ∩B)
pr(A) .
Confusion probability. In psychophysical experiments, this is the probability of
a subject to wrongly identify two stimuli as the same. Typically, this is measured
as the percentage of errors associated with “same” or “different” judgements for a
pair of stimuli. For example, if out of 100 trials, a pair of stimuli, {a, b} is judged
to be the same in 40 trials, then the confusion probability associated with that
pair and at position is 40%, or ‘04’.
Generic function. A function that is characteristic of a mapping is a generic
function. This function does not provide precise information about how the
mapping is achieved. Descriptions of functions at the computational level of ex-
planation in cognitive theories (see ‘Cognitive-computational model’) are often
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interpreted in terms of generic functions. At the computational level, the func-
tion specifies the abstract form of the mapping between a set of inputs and a
set of outputs, but does not characterise the rules following which the mapping
between inputs and outputs can be achieved. The rules are specified at the level
of representation and algorithm (Colombo & Seriès, 2012, 698).
Hypothesis space. In Bayesian inference models of cognition, the agent repre-
sents uncertainties associated with events in the world by probability distributions
(Wiese, 2017, pp. 66-67). These representations are commonly interpreted as an
agent’s hypotheses, for instance, about hidden causes or the source of a sensory
signal. In Bayesian epistemology, the hypotheses are modelled as propositions
where their assigned probabilities are interpreted as degrees of beliefs (cf. Tal-
bott, 2015). The probabilities associated with these representations in a Bayesian
model are called the ‘prior probability’ and the ‘likelihood’. The prior probability
is the agent’s representation of how uncertain an event is to occur prior to ob-
serving it. The likelihood represents uncertainty about the relationships between
those possible events and sensory evidence that could be received.
Morse code. A Morse code is a sequence
of signals that can be translated into an al-
phabet. It can be used to transmit words
and sentences across large distances. Fig-
ure A illustrates the international Morse
Code alphabet and numerals. Signals
are encoded as combinations of dots and
dashes. A Morse code contains informa-
tion about syntactic relations within such a
sign system and serves the purpose of con-
veying telegraphic messages. To produce
and interpret messages with the code, one
can follow steps 1-5 in the figure’s legend.
Object perception. This is the ability to
find a stable representation on the basis
of unstable sensory patterns (e.g., unsta-
ble light reflections on the retinal surface) for the purpose of guiding behaviour
adaptively (cf. Shepard, 1981/2017). For example, being able to perceive the
shape of a cup and to separate its figure from the background enables the per-
ceiver to grasp the cup and drink from it.
Perception as a part of cognition relates to the process of interpreting the ob-
jects of sensation in an information-processing procedure with computations on
internal representations. This perspective follows the ‘sandwich model’ (Hurley,
2002), in which perception and action embrace cognition, which links the two like
the filling of a sandwich. The key assumption of this view is that perception is the
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input for cognition, which sends a motor-output signal to the body to facilitate
the appropriate action. The perceived environment and the active body are only
peripheral to understanding the nature of cognition. Recently, there has been
a lot of debate about the sandwich model, yet, it is still a common ground in
current cognitive computational modelling practice.
Perceptual categorisation. Perceptual categorisation (abbrev. ‘PC’) is a cog-
nitive process by which a set of known perceptual observations is grouped into
a mental representation—a perceptual category—that enables an agent to gen-
eralise her behaviour appropriately to novel observations. Following Bundesen
(1990, p. 523), examples for perceptual categories are “the class of red elements
(a color category), the class of letters of type A (a shape category), and the class
of elements located at fixation (a location category).” In PC, the ‘perceptual’
part refers to the notion of a capability for representation (e.g., representing a
red colour shade), whereas the ‘categorisation’ part refers to a decision (e.g., the
decision that the red colour shade should be paid attention to).
PC is different from generalisation behaviour because the multiple different ways
to categorise may lead to the same generalisation behaviour.
Rational/Task analysis. Bayesian models are often located at the level of com-
putational explanation in Marr’s 1982 hierarchy (cf. Colombo & Seriès, 2012;
Danks, 2008; Icard, 2018; Zednik & Jäkel, 2016). At this level, the task that a
cognitive (i.e., an information-processing) system has to solve is specified, and a
rationale for why it has to solve that task is given. Roughly, Bayesian inference
models specify cognition as a task of Bayesian inference. The task is to infer the
posterior probability of a hypothesis (e.g. about a hidden cause in the world)
in light of some piece of evidence (e.g. a sensory signal) from the probability
of observing the evidence given that the hypothesis is true together with some
background knowledge which is encoded in the probability of the hypothesis re-
gardless of the evidence (where a probability value in the model indicates the
agent’s degree of belief in the hypothesis). In Bayesian rational analysis, this
task is framed under the additional consideration of what would be the optimal
behaviour of a rational agent in a given environment, where optimal behaviour is
normally considered to be behaviour that is most adaptive to a given environmen-
tal niche (cf. Anderson, 1991a). This is then considered useful for systematising
and predicting behaviour because it is then possible to ask how the behaviour
would change under changes in the given environment (see also van Rooij et al.
(2018) on ‘what-if’ explanations). The (optimal) solution to the task is usually
framed as a generic function, typically following Bayes’ Theorem.
Probabilistic dependence. The probability of landing ‘heads’ on a coin toss
given that the coin is biased towards heads is different from the probability of
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landing ‘heads’ if the coin was not biased. Knowing that the coin is biased to-
wards ‘heads’ should affect how probable one is to land a ‘head’ on the next toss.
Definition A.0.3 (Probabilistic dependence). Two events or propositions are
probabilistically dependent if knowing that one event occurred—or that one propo-
sition is true—does affect the probability of the other event to occur—or of the
other proposition to be true. A and B stand for events or propositions (e.g.,
landing ‘heads’ and the coin is biased towards heads),
Pr(A,B) 6= Pr(A)× Pr(B) if Pr(A|B) 6= Pr(A).
A and B are probabilistically dependent with respect to a probability function Pr
if and only if the joint probability of A and B is unequal to the product of their
individual probabilities or if the conditional probability of A given B is unequal
to the unconditional probability of A.
Probabilistic independence. The probability of throwing a ‘4’ on a die given
that it is Wednesday is the same as the probability of throwing a ‘4’ if it was
not Wednesday. Knowing that it is Wednesday should not affect whether one is
going to throw a ‘4’ on the die.
Definition A.0.4 (Probabilistic independence). Two events or propositions are
probabilistically independent if knowing that one event occurred or that one propo-
sition is true does not affect the probability of the other event to occur or of the
other proposition to be true. A and B stand for events or propositions,
Pr(A,B) = Pr(A)× Pr(B) if Pr(A|B) = Pr(A).
In words: A and B are probabilistically independent with respect to a probability
function Pr if and only if the joint probability of A and B equals the product of
their individual probabilities or if the conditional probability of A given B equals
the unconditional probability of A.
Product rule (also called ‘chain rule’). Says that the joint probability of two
events or propositions, E and H, is the product of the probability that one
event/proposition has occurred/is true given that the other event/proposition
has occurred/is true and the unconditional probability that the given event has
occurred. For example, the probability to roll a ‘4’ on a die twice in a row is
the product of the probability to roll a ‘4’ on the second throw, given that there
was a ‘4’ on the first throw and the probability of having a ‘4’ on the first throw.
Formally: Pr(H,E) = Pr(E|H)× Pr(H).
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